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- ABSTRACT - 
 
Dada is often dismissed as an anti-art movement that engaged with a limited and 
merely destructive theoretical impetus. French Existentialism is often condemned for 
its perceived quietist implications. However, closer analysis reveals a preoccupation 
with philosophy in the former and with art in the latter. Neither was nonsensical or 
meaningless, but both reveal a rich individualist ethics aimed at the amelioration of 
the individual and society. It is through their combined analysis that we can view 
and productively utilise their alignment. 
Offering new critical aesthetic and philosophical approaches to Dada as a 
quintessential part of the European Avant-Garde, this thesis performs a reassessment 
of the movement as a form of (proto-)Existentialist philosophy. The thesis represents 
the first major comparative study of Dada and Existentialism, contributing a new 
perspective on Dada as a movement, a historical legacy, and a philosophical field of 
study. The five chapters analyse a range of Dada work through a lens of Existentialist 
literary and theoretical works across the themes of choice, alienation, responsibility, 
freedom and truth. These themes contribute to the overarching claim of the thesis 
that Dada and Existentialism both advocate the creation of a self that aims for 
authenticity through ambiguity. 
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- INTRODUCTION - 
‘JE ME REVOLTE, DONC NOUS SOMMES’ 
Dada, in other words, is but one symptom in the great spiritual revolt of our time. It may be called the 
existential revolt, for all its elements can be understood through human existence, by means of 
psychology. 
(DE: 146) 
More and more people are going to psychoanalysts, because they doubt the meaning and value of life, 
because they live in an ‘existential vacuum’. 
(AA: 204) 
‘Dada and Existentialism’ 
When Richard Huelsenbeck posited Dada as an Existentialist phenomenon in 1957, 
he expressed a feeling that had been relatively unexplored critically but that had 
existed as an undercurrent in the movement since its beginnings: Dada not only had 
philosophical content, but also could be used constructively as both a commentary 
on, and a positive, productive analysis of, the human condition. A movement that 
appeared to proclaim loudly the death of all values, Dada advocated revolt beyond 
simple nihilism. The Dada rebel, like Albert Camus’s rebel, is ‘[u]n homme qui dit 
non’, but ‘s’il refuse, il ne renonce pas: c’est aussi un homme qui dit oui, dès son 
premier mouvement’ (HR: 27). Like Camus’s delineation of the rebel, Huelsenbeck 
underlines that ‘[t]he fact that the Dadaists said no was less important than the 
manner in which they said it’ (DE: 144). Huelsenbeck’s essay presents Dada, post 
facto, as a self-aware movement that increasingly drew near (in retrospect) to French 
Existentialism, stating that ‘[i]t was that absolute audacity which brought Dadaism 
so close to existentialism in those days’ (DE: 145). Furthermore, he claims that Dada 
‘was that two-sided, perhaps even double-tongued form of existence taken from life 
itself, which despises ideals’ (ibid.). Fundamentally, Huelsenbeck foregrounds 
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aspects of Dada that are concerned with life as actively experienced and as a desire to 
take on the problematic of existence as a starting point. 
Huelsenbeck had already boldly (and falsely) asserted in his Dada Manifesto 
1949 that Jean-Paul Sartre had declared himself the ‘Nouveau Dada’ as part of a 
wider claim that Dada pre-empted the Existentialist sentiment: 
Unconsciously or semi-consciously, Dadaism anticipated many formulations that are now 
current […]. It is no accident that Sartre calls himself “the Nouveau Dada.” But we believe that 
there is an essential difference between Dadaism and Existentialism. Existentialism is essentially 
negative,1 whereas Dada lived its extreme despair, expressed it in art, and in this “participation 
créatrice” found a therapy for itself. (Huelsenbeck in Motherwell ed. 1989: 400) 
The description of Sartre as the ‘Nouveau Dada’ is reiterated in Dada and 
Existentialism almost a decade later: 
When Sartre, in one of his essays on existentialist philosophy, loudly proclaimed: “I am the new 
dada,” people pricked up their ears. Why did he not hesitate to profess to be the descendant of 
a small group of painters and writers who were smiled at by all intellectuals? (DE: 142-43) 
This need to make associations with famous figures is frequently found in Dada 
writing, as exemplified by claims that Charlie Chaplin belonged to the movement 
(see for example Sanouillet 2009: 109-10), and in the false, and prominent, quoting of 
René Descartes on the cover of the third issue of the eponymous journal Dada (1918). 
The falsification of these alignments with historical figures and their lasting effects 
questions whether ‘arbitrary’ association is all that is necessary in a world where 
truth is subjective. Indeed the fact that these names continue to be linked to Dada 
demonstrates a level of success of the original attempt.  
                                                 
1 It is instructive and ironic that Dada and Existentialist thinkers each accused the other movement of 
negativity, when both fought to be seen in their positive, productive light against their external critics. 
Werner Haftmann writes in his postscript to Dada: Art and Anti-Art that ‘the basic impulse of Dada is 
not despair and protest but a rebellious feeling of joy inspired by new discoveries’ (AA: 216). 
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In addition to Dada’s general love of association with famous names, a 
relationship with Existentialism confers a certain credibility: the Existentialists’ 
incorporation of opinions on Dada in their works prompts a reader to suspect that it 
is not impossible that the Existentialists related to Dada ideas, and indeed that Sartre 
should claim to be ‘the new dada’. Camus refers to Dada in L’Homme révolté (1951), 
citing the oft-quoted Dada sentiment that ‘[l]es vrais dadas sont contre Dada. Tout le 
monde est directeur de Dada’ (HR: 122). Simone de Beauvoir incorporates Dada into 
her consideration of the nihilist and negation: 
La constante négation du mot par le mot, de l’acte par l’acte, de l’art par l’art, s’est trouvée 
réalisée par l’incohérence dadaïste; en appliquant une consigne de désordre et d’anarchie, on 
obtenait une abolition de toutes les conduites, donc de toutes les fins et de soi-même. (MA: 69-
70) 
Through this it is evident that just as several of the Dadas went on to indicate 
affiliation with Existentialist thought, so our central Existentialists included Dada as 
part of their accounts of rebellion. 
Although Huelsenbeck was the only Dada to enunciate separately and 
coherently the relationship between Dada and Existentialism, traces of the desire to 
link the two movements can be found scattered across core Dada texts. Hans Richter 
highlights shared tenets in his seminal text Dada Art and Anti-Art (1965). In a chapter 
ominously named ‘nihil’, he designates Marcel Duchamp’s readymades as evidence 
that ‘[a]rt has been ‘thought through to a conclusion’; in other words eliminated’ 
(AA: 91), and in doing so Richter draws these works close to the nothingness that is 
left. However, he claims that this notion of nothingness is ‘free from cynicism and 
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from regret’ (ibid.). Richter most explicitly incorporates his thoughts on 
Existentialism in a section on anti-art: 
Existentialism has made a clean break with all emotionally-charged attitudes to the self and to 
the world. What remains is a mirror in which nothing is reflected but the individual self. This 
work of clearance has been undertaken with the conceptual and exploratory tools of a scientific 
age, an age which regards scientific method as the only secure anchor in a sea of nothingness. 
When all moral and ethical values fail, this anchor represents hope. (AA: 93) 
While we may not wish to conclude from this statement that Existentialism 
constitutes a direct descendant of Dada, Richter certainly implies that it represents a 
desirable outcome. Furthermore, it expresses a sentiment similar to that found in 
Huelsenbeck’s particularly Existentialist statement: ‘[t]he dada attitude is basically 
the paradox of forgetting the human in order to reveal it all the more penetratingly’ 
(DE: 139). 
Hugo Ball also alludes to Existentialism in several places in his diary, Flight out 
of Time (1974), despite never explicitly mentioning the philosophy. Selected 
quotations demonstrate that he had a comparable preoccupation with Existentialist 
concerns to Richter and Huelsenbeck. Ball writes that: 
What we call dada is a farce of nothingness in which all higher questions are involved […] the 
dadaist loves the extraordinary and the absurd […] He no longer believes in the comprehension 
of things from one point of view, and yet he is still so convinced of the unity of all beings […] he 
cultivates the curiosity of one who feels joy at even the most questionable forms of rebellion. 
(FT: 65-66; original emphasis) 
Ball foregrounds an interest in subjectivity of perspective, while maintaining an 
underlying interest in humanity as a whole. Both concerns are shared by Sartre: the 
former in the emphatically individual creation of values, and the latter in that ‘s’il est 
impossible de trouver en chaque homme une essence universelle qui serait la nature 
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humaine, il existe pourtant une universalité humaine de condition’ (EH: 59; original 
emphasis), and that ‘en créant l’homme que nous voulons être, [on] crée en même 
temps une image de l’homme tel que nous estimons qu’il doit être’ (EH: 31-32). We 
can link this to Camus’s statement: ‘Je me révolte, donc nous sommes’ (HR: 38). This 
relationship between the individual and humanity, and specifically through 
rebellion, draws Ball’s remarks close not only to Huelsenbeck, but also to Sartre and 
Camus. 
Dada through Existentialism: Structuring the Thesis 
I seek through this thesis to take up Huelsenbeck’s invitation and re-evaluate 
the development of Dada through and as a form of Existentialist philosophy. In so 
doing I will consider Huelsenbeck’s suggestions for aligning the two movements, 
bearing in mind smaller references from other Dadas, and branching out his analysis 
to examine a range of Dada works as well as Existentialist texts. In presenting Dada 
as a form of proto-Existential(ist) philosophy the thesis will necessarily follow a 
broadly chronological arrangement. Additionally, this sequential organisation allows 
for a temporal overlap of Dada with French Existentialism, to create a solid common 
ground for a convergence of the philosophies of both movements and their 
respective legacies.  
Thematically, the five chapters of the thesis will comparatively analyse aspects 
of both movements through a set of key terms2 - choice, alienation, responsibility, 
freedom and truth – but also moving from in-depth analysis of individual artists and 
                                                 
2 While these terms will be briefly outlined here, the greater part of their definition will be reserved for 
analysis in the chapters themselves. 
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works, through crucial events, to the death and dispersion of the movement into 
Neo-Dada, postmodernism, and beyond. Martin Gaughan writes that ‘[t]here is a 
tendency in Dada criticism to equate the radical gesture with cultural critique 
without attempting to account for the levels at which the gesture might possibly be 
operating’ (in Foster ed. 1996: 57). This thesis will address these levels of gesture in 
order to synthesise the usefulness of both the radical gestures and their commonly 
held cultural critique, as well as suggest alternative interpretations of Dada’s 
‘critique’ of society. In this respect, Existentialism will be used as a methodological 
tool and as such, will be used only textually and theoretically.  
While I intend to initiate a dialogue between these two movements, my aim is 
the reassessment of Dada through an Existentialist lens. Therefore while the events 
and lives of Dada and its adherents will be considered, this will not extend to the 
Existentialist equivalent. Additionally this focus will necessitate a varying inclusion 
of Existentialist content in general, including lesser integration when concentrated 
analysis of Dada works is required, bringing in Existentialist concepts as and when 
pertinent. This is done with the intention of sharpening a focus on Dada, rather than 
comparing the two movements in a more reductive manner. For the same reason the 
thesis will focus on a body of core Existentialist texts, a condensed but realistic scope 
for comparison of tenets of the movement with a greater variety of Dada work. This 
Existentialist core will be based in the works of Sartre, Beauvoir, Camus and, to a 
lesser extent, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In addition to a central Existentialist 
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methodology, the thesis will draw upon a range of European critical theorists as and 
when useful. 
Chapter One will begin my exploration of the relationship between Dada and 
Existentialism by investigating choice and individuality through the use of masks in 
Dada, to posit the idea of hybrid, fluid identity within the constructed individual 
self, and to position this self in relation to others and as a reaction to society. As the 
opening chapter of the thesis, Chapter One will take a stronger focus on Dada work, 
with a view to gradually bringing out Existentialist threads, which will be drawn 
upon more strongly as the thesis progresses. The chapter will centre on the work of 
Sophie Taeuber, an artist involved with Dada who has nevertheless been widely 
neglected, both by her Dada peers and in secondary literature for many years after 
the movement’s primary lifespan. The chapter will consider whether the deceptive 
simplicity of the works of Taeuber and other Dadas hides a greater comment on 
avant-garde notions of the self, and additionally elucidate the Existentialist value of 
work that extensively and deliberately transcends the boundaries of artistic media.  
Chapter One explores the theme of individuality through choice, concepts that arise 
less through explicit definition by Existentialist authors than from the study of 
subjectivity, especially through their privileging of personal morality. Sartre uses the 
highlighting of individuality in his L’Existentialisme est un humanisme ([1945] 1996) – 
notably a text that was written to clarify (his) Existentialist theory to a wider public – 
to warn against the numbing homogenisation of systems. Chapter One will perform 
its analysis of Dada works against this background of individuality as subjectivity. 
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The chapter will scrutinise manifestations of physical and mental selfhood 
across Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe [Dada Heads] (1918), König Hirsch [King Stag] puppets 
(1918), dance and costumes, as well as her ‘self-portraits’ taken with the Dada-Köpfe, 
exposing identity in all its wrappings, surfaces and fragments, and alongside its form 
as assemblage. The chapter will analyse these different art forms individually but 
also the way in which they interact: the likeness between the Dada-Köpfe and the 
puppets, the way in which the König Hirsch puppets’ movements relate to Taeuber’s 
own movement, and the relationship between costume and body, circling back on 
the wrapping nature of the colours on the Dada-Köpfe. This analysis will take place 
alongside selected other Dada self-based works: Raoul Hausmann’s Mechanischer 
Kopf (Der Geist unserer Zeit) [Mechanical Head (Spirit of our Time)] (1919), Hannah 
Höch’s Dada Puppen [Dada Dolls] (1916) and Man Ray’s Noire et blanche (1926). The 
chapter will begin to assess Dada art alongside such Existentialist concepts as Sartre’s 
‘look’, Camus’s thoughts on silence and music, and Beauvoirian ambiguity. I will 
posit that the self is a complex and multifaceted construction based in various ways 
of masking, unmasking and remasking, a manipulation of ‘truth’ to allow for a being 
founded on individual, subjective choice. 
Chapter Two will consider Dada film in relation to notions of alienation and 
reality, alongside Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of perception, as well as 
briefly taking into account Deleuze’s writings on cinema as an interrogation of 
movement over time. The chapter will investigate the way in which our perception of 
space and time changes with Dada’s extensive manipulation of the film reel, as well 
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as the effect on the filmic experience in its own right. I will posit the medium of film 
as a means of perpetually (re)constructing meaning through simultaneous, 
multifaceted memories or remanence. How can we construct our framework of 
reality, if truth is subjective and situational, and when we are no longer sure of the 
fundamental reliability of our memories? Is our perception of reality based upon a 
fluctuating position of the self inside and outside of itself? Chapter Two’s use of 
alienation will fit more overtly with the Existentialist sense of the term than Chapter 
One’s use of concepts, that is, alienation is the state in which an individual inevitably 
feels, at various points, detached (alienated) from the world in which they exist by 
virtue of being a thinking self. This continues our notions of individuality from 
Chapter One, in terms of individuality as marking difference. Chapter Two will use 
this alienation in a positive sense, a way of viewing and constructing the self from an 
external position, a productive distance from the self within itself. The chapter will 
evaluate this relationship through the theories of perception in Sartre’s L’Être et le 
néant (1943) and Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), taking a 
primarily theoretical route that is suited for combination in a raw analysis with film 
as a single art form. 
The chapter will analyse Man Ray’s Le Retour à la raison (1923) and Emak Bakia 
(1926), Fernand Léger and Dudley Murphy’s Le Ballet mécanique (1924) and René 
Clair and Francis Picabia’s Entr’acte (1924). It will address the fundamental question 
of the primacy of seeing, particularly in relation to the perception of sound, and 
especially when this auditory quality is presented in the form of an out-of-field 
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soundtrack, as is the case in three of these four films. The chapter is organised 
around a set of pairs of concepts relating to perception, including presence and 
absence, sound and silence, and light and shadow. These dichotomies will be 
interrogated to posit a mid-point, or petering-out, a point of potential in which 
opposites cohabit to produce a new or hybrid form, an ambiguity which presents a 
filtering, merging and coexistence of realities and allows for creative, individual 
interpretations of perception. 
Chapter Three will discuss Dada and Existentialist views on responsibility and 
justice through examples of trials represented in their respective literatures. The 
chapter will take a slightly different structure than the four others, focusing on just 
two texts with little external influence, so as to do justice to the greater depth of 
textual analysis afforded by the material itself. The notion of responsibility as defined 
in Existentialist thought will be examined with a view to its more general 
connections with the concept of the individual’s compulsion to choose, to assert and 
therefore own their own morality, as introduced in Chapters One and Two. The 
chapter will use literary Existentialist manifestations of justice to assess the notion of 
responsibility for one’s actions, based in an individual ethics. This will be done 
through a comparative analysis of Dada’s mock trial of Maurice Barrès (1921) and 
Camus’s trial of his protagonist Meursault in L’Étranger (1942). These texts maintain 
an instructive relationship with reality, through their existence as fiction, event, and 
event-as-text. This is particularly important in the Barrès trial, which took the form of 
an event but was also published as a report in Littérature (1921), and was furthermore 
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later published by Marguerite Bonnet as an autonomous text under the title L’Affaire 
Barrès (1987). In this respect, its role evolves over time, moving from event to 
transcript, and later gaining the quality of an avant-garde play through its structure 
and layout. This chapter will begin to confront more directly the notion of 
authenticity, particularly through considering the possibility of degrees or scales of 
authenticity. 
The analysis of these two trials will highlight Dada and Existentialism’s 
engagement with justice both as a physical reality and a philosophical notion, 
especially the limits of such a concept. Furthermore, by looking at their relationships 
with, and particularly the parody of, the justice system, the chapter will seek to 
address the fundamental (in)authenticity of society itself. The chapter will form a 
hinge point between the first part of the thesis, which focuses on individuals and art 
forms within the Dada and Existentialist movements, and the second part, which 
takes a wider notion of art works and events while focusing more strongly on 
philosophical and theoretical content. Furthermore, Chapter Three will mark a move 
into an increased literary focus in terms of Existentialist content, incorporating and 
paralleling Dada and Existentialism’s creative endeavours as applications of their 
philosophies. 
Chapter Four will scrutinise the concepts of censorship and freedom through 
manifestations of Dada provocation, as well as examples from their Neo-Dada and 
postmodern counterparts, alongside Camus’s La Peste (1947). This chapter will assess 
the notion of the acceptance, normalisation and non-repeatability of the censored and 
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the deviant, through the complex relationship between shock and the new. The 
chapter will build upon notions of blankness established through overloading of the 
senses (as explored in Chapter Two) to posit a ‘zero point shock value’ in relation to 
works such as the Dada readymades, examples of Dada altercations with authority, 
as well as the extensive literary techniques employed to avoid censorship at the peak 
of European nationalism. The chapter will investigate the multitude of media 
through which Dada rebellion takes place: Duchamp’s relationship with the rules of 
aesthetics; Kurt Schwitters’s active rejection of the notion of the unwanted; the use of 
authority as a distraction technique; creating rebellion through its own 
normalisation. This will build upon the inevitable incorporation of the deviant into 
societal narrative. Chapter Four will continue to appraise literary uses of 
Existentialist theory while simultaneously drawing upon non-fictional philosophy. 
The chapter will productively analyse the literary expressions of censorship in 
Camus’s La Peste alongside various of Sartre’s texts, as well as Beauvoir’s Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté (1947). As such, this chapter will begin to more strongly pull 
together Existentialist thought in relation to Dada, in contrast with Chapter One’s 
exploratory purpose. 
This chapter will evaluate the extent to which creativity flourishes under 
censorship, or as Sartre states, ‘[ê]tre libre, c’est être perpétuellement en instance de 
liberté’ (EN: 547; original emphasis). To this end, freedom and censorship will initially 
be posited as opposites, in order to later reveal their interdependence. In this way, 
the chapter’s eventual aim is to assess freedom through censorship. George Jagger 
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claims that La Peste ‘deals essentially with man’s fate as Pascal saw it, and as Voltaire 
faced it’ (1948: 125). We can draw links from this both to Existentialism, through 
Pascal’s proto-Existentialist writings, and to Dada, through the naming of Dada’s 
birthplace as ‘Cabaret Voltaire’. This name was by no means chosen at random: Ball 
refers to ‘ideals of culture and of art as a program for a variety show – that is our 
kind of Candide against the times’ (FT: 67). It is instructive that Ball ties the Cabaret to 
this famous comment on the human condition: this chapter will posit the centrality of 
deviance, censorship, normalisation and freedom in the development of the self. 
Chapter Five will examine the concept of truth through the ever-expanding 
repertoire of the stories and histories of Dada, alongside Sartre’s La Nausée (1938), as 
well as examples from a postmodern counterpart, Tom Stoppard’s Travesties (1975). 
We have seen that Dada enjoyed aligning and misaligning itself with historical 
figures, perhaps in an attempt to shake off labels and engage in a never-ending game 
with historicity. Stoppard’s play continues this game from the outside, contributing 
to Dada lineage while highlighting its own ‘falsehood’ through its design as a 
credible contribution with deliberately inserted ‘flaws’. The chapter will work back 
from this postmodern example through a selection of central Dada diaries as ‘first-
hand’ accounts – Richter’s Dada: Art and Anti-Art (1965), Ball’s Flight out of Time: a 
Dada Diary (1974) and Huelsenbeck’s Memoirs of a Dada Drummer (1974)3 – ending on 
an analysis of the Dada manifesto as an archive of core Dada(ist) thought. Chapter 
                                                 
3 I will be using the English translations of these texts. The original German titles for these are Dada: 
Kunst und Anti-Kunst (Richter), Die Flucht aus der Zeit (Ball) and Mit Witz, Licht und Grütze: auf den 
Spuren des Dadaismus (Huelsenbeck). 
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Five will work within a similar vein to Chapter Four, foregrounding a literary text 
while drawing strongly upon its theoretical implications, here through those of 
Sartre and Beauvoir. The discussion of truth will move away from a standard 
definition of containing a predominant element of objectivity, in order to redirect 
towards truth as primarily subjective. Through this Chapter Five will bring the thesis 
thematically back round to Chapter One’s focus on individuality and subjectivity, in 
order to lead into our concluding remarks on the fruitful conversation between Dada 
and Existentialism as an expression of the authenticity of ambiguity. 
This chapter by no means attempts to prove the truthfulness of Dada histories 
(where we take ‘histories’ to mean accounts that seek to document the movement, 
either chronologically or philosophically), nor to produce truth itself; rather, it seeks 
to assess the impact of the multiplicity and/or subjectivity of truth, especially in 
relation to the notion of reality as we experience it, and the resulting combination of 
truths as a hybrid identity of the movement and its artists. The chapter will analyse 
the effect of this confusion and manipulation on the memory of Dada as a 
phenomenon, and its continued use and relevance across art and academia. The 
chapter will evaluate both Dada’s and Existentialism’s resistance to simplistic or 
concrete definition. As Eduardo Mendieta states, ‘[t]he self consists of diverse layers 
of stories. We are the stories we tell, not just about the world but also about 
ourselves’ (in Judaken and Bernasconi eds 2012: 184). It is through this that we might 
posit a productively ambiguous relationship between identity as chosen from within 
and as assigned from without. Chapter Five will draw together all four Existentialist 
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thinkers to explore our final theme of truth, as well as bringing out aspects of all four 
preceding chapters, to provide a last assessment of Dada and Existentialism from a 
contemporary standpoint. 
Common Ground 
Even from these initial explorations it has been clear that Dada and 
Existentialism share concerns that form an intrinsic part of their core tenets, and it is 
this crossover between the two movements that necessitates their study alongside 
one another. From this cohabitation we can draw fundamental common ground on a 
basis of which a critical analysis may take place, while recognising the limits of this 
convergence, as well as the heterogeneity of both movements. Despite common 
perceptions, not only did Dada explicitly articulate an attachment to philosophy, but 
additionally the drawing together of our two movements is supported by a common 
theoretical and philosophical background to Dada and Existentialist thinking.  
Ball maintained an interest in the anarchist works of Mikhail Bakunin (see 
Hubert Van den Berg in Pichon and Riha eds 1996: 76). Sartre and Tristan Tzara were 
both influenced by the theories of Henri Bergson. Huelsenbeck references Paul Tillich 
in Dada and Existentialism (DE: 145), showing admiration for the seminal Existentialist 
text The Courage to Be (1952). Huelsenbeck, who claims that ‘[m]y intellectual legacy 
does not derive just from Picasso, the cubists, or modern architecture, it also comes 
from Goethe, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and the American pragmatists’ (1974: 65; 
my emphasis), has a number of evident theoretical influences in common with Sartre. 
Richter shares this link with Martin Heidegger, citing him on the subjectivity of (and, 
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in the case of Dada, the disintegration of) reality: ‘How can I know that this world is 
not simply a dream, a shimmering hallucination, a horizon no longer suffused with 
its own light but with mine?’ (in AA: 91). This is something that will be highlighted 
throughout the thesis, through our emphasis on ambiguity and subjectivity, as well 
as the individual’s role in the creative interpretation of reality. 
A final theoretical crossover is that of Ball and Heidegger, for their focus on the 
individual’s being in time. In his introduction to Ball’s Flight out of Time John 
Elderfield explains that 
For Heidegger, man was “thrown” into time, into a one-directional momentum that ended only 
in death, and sought, inevitably, some definition of himself “beyond” this predetermined 
material existence. For Ball distancing himself from the times was the path to this “beyond.” 
“We did not flee from life,” he wrote in 1921, “we sought it out.” But his search for authenticity 
meant first a rejection of things as they were. Man’s “ascribed statuses” stifled the initiative and 
individuality of those who assumed them, like masks hiding the true self, and it was these that 
needed exposing. (in FT: xlii) 
What is important to draw from Elderfield’s statement is Ball’s simultaneous need 
for otherness and authenticity, something that I will be seeking to foreground 
throughout the thesis. The element of being ‘thrown into’ and desiring a ‘flight out 
of’ time are varyingly echoed across Dada and Existentialist literature, with an 
increased attention on self-alterity. For example, on attempting to settle into life in 
Zurich Tzara stated that ‘je devins peu à peu un étranger pour moi-même’ (in Buot 
2002: 35); Camus explained that the absurd individual describes themselves as 
‘toujours […] étranger à moi-même’ (MS: 36); and Sartre claimed that ‘l’homme est 
constamment hors de lui-même’ (EH: 76). As an expansion of this latter, Sartre stated 
in his earlier work that ‘la fuite hors de soi est fuite vers soi, et le monde apparaît 
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comme pure distance de soi à soi’ (EN: 288). These statements imply a fundamental 
Existential question: is it necessary to be an outsider, even to oneself, in order to be 
able to redefine the human condition? 
Limitations and Boundaries 
While capitalising on the plethora of similarities between Dada and 
Existentialism, the thesis acknowledges the danger of combining two discrete 
philosophies. I do not wish to suggest in this thesis that Dada and Existentialism are 
one and the same philosophically, nor do I wish to engage in an assumption, through 
the movements’ temporal proximity to World War I and II respectively, that war can 
be said to lead to or cause Dada and/or Existentialism. This would trivialise both 
movements, as well as falling into the fundamental error of genericising war. This is 
not, of course, to infer that the movements and their wars are mutually exclusive, but 
that beyond this initial connection, both movements have wider scope than 
belligerent nationalism.  
The Dadas consciously marked out the boundary between reactions to war and 
productive revolt against something more profound. While Huelsenbeck accepts the 
relevance of war, he seeks to move beyond it as a cause of Dada’s rebellion: ‘Dada 
was a moral protest not only against the war but also against the malaise of the time; 
it was an awareness that something was very wrong’ (DE: xiv). Ball states that ‘[t]he 
dadaist fights against the agony and the death throes of this age’ (FT: 66), his 
temporal ambiguity indicating a longer term breakdown in society. Marcel Janco 
reflects upon the broader sense of malaise within the movement, noting that ‘[w]e 
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were beside ourselves with rage and grief at the suffering and humiliation of 
mankind’ (in AA: 25). As Huelsenbeck further states, ‘there exists a kind of Dadaist 
man, a Dadaist fundamental way of life, which is not only characteristic of our time, 
but is congruent with many assertions of modern thought’ (DE: 143). Instructively 
linking Dada, Existentialism and the notion of rebellion through a crisis of the age, 
Jonathan Judaken claims that ‘Existentialism is a Modernism’ (in Judaken and 
Bernasconi eds 2012: 9). 
The thesis recognises its self-imposed predominant focus on French atheistic 
Existentialism. The logical extremity of atheistic Existentialism is my primary reason 
for foregrounding it over its religious counterpart. As John Killinger states, ‘[o]nce 
man has begun a campaign for human freedom and integrity, it is rationally 
plausible to go all the way and assert his freedom even from a divine being’ (1961: 
310). Furthermore, Sartre advocates atheism, not in a celebration of the death of God, 
and despite the fact that ‘il est très gênant que Dieu n’existe pas’, because any 
reliance on readymade moral values is removed (and this is a good thing): ‘avec lui 
disparaît toute possibilité de trouver des valeurs dans un ciel intelligible; il ne peut 
plus y avoir de valeur de bien a priori puisqu’il n’y a pas de conscience infinie et 
parfaite pour le penser’ (EH: 38). Judaken highlights that Sartre and Beauvoir both 
‘insisted that only an atheistic existentialism had the courage to assume 
responsibility for the creation of values at the heart of the human condition’ (in 
Judaken and Bernasconi eds 2012: 25). Furthermore, Ron Aronson elucidates that 
‘existentialism is neither immoral nor amoral; rather its ethics and morality are not 
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the conventional kinds imposed from on high that give people recipes for living’ (in 
ibid.: 262).  
My choice to analyse Dada alongside French Existentialism also resides in its 
strong links with literature, something which is predominantly absent in, for 
example, its German counterpart. This literary output allows additional access to, 
and alternative angles on, Existentialist thought, as well as inspiring a close 
correlation for a textual reading of the two movements. Further to this, Jeff Malpas 
notes that ‘philosophy in France has always tended to spill over what might be 
thought to be its disciplinary boundaries, never remaining within the confines of the 
academy alone’ (in Crowell ed. 2012: 294). This blurring is perfectly suited both to 
Dada’s tumultuous relationship with the academy and its desire to break down 
boundaries between the arts themselves. A final reason for the pairing of Dada with 
French Existentialism is the strong affinity with Sartre shown by Huelsenbeck in 
‘Dada and Existentialism’, the text from whose combination this thesis takes its 
inspiration. 
Beyond the springboard of Huelsenbeck’s text, there are a number of reasons 
for my privileging a comparison of Existentialism with Dada rather than with 
Surrealism, despite the closer temporal proximity of Surrealism to Existentialism, as 
well as Surrealism’s more concentrated French (and specifically Paris-based) 
contingent. While work exists linking Sartre with Surrealism (for example, Beaujour 
1963; Plank 1981), I would argue that the combination is less compatible than that of 
Existentialism (beyond just Sartre) and Dada for several reasons. Frances Morris 
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writes that Sartre ‘had rejected Surrealism’s preoccupation with the unconscious and 
with dreams because it ignored the totality of man, allowing only for the liberation of 
“pure imagination”’ (1993: 22). Furthermore, Surrealism ‘tries to evade the limits of 
human life and its responsibilities’ (Beaujour 1963: 86), something that is 
fundamentally incompatible with Existentialist tenets of individual choice and 
responsibility for these choices as well as the actions based upon them. We have 
already seen through Huelsenbeck that Dada was grounded in a desire to take life as 
a starting point: the constant provocation to experience life at face value can be 
posited as an acceptance of self-responsibility of the movement and its values.  
Sartre’s opposition to Surrealism is shared by Camus in both his actions and his 
texts. Olivier Todd underlines Camus’s creation of the GLI (Groupes de liaison 
internationale) as running counter to André Breton’s Surrealist tenets (2000: 250). In 
L’Homme révolté’s chapter on Surrealism (HR: 118-30), Camus is initially appreciative 
of Surrealism, in that he considers Surrealists specialists in revolt, but his comments 
become less favourable because ‘[ils] ont cru exalter le meurtre4 et le suicide’, and he 
particularly rejects the way that the Surrealists ‘ont parlé du suicide comme d’une 
solution’ (HR: 123). Camus concludes that their attitude toward revolution is not 
fitting with Existentialism, in that ‘[l]a révolution pour les surréalistes n’était pas une 
fin qu’on réalise au jour le jour, dans l’action, mais un mythe absolu et consolateur’ 
(ibid.: 126). Camus’s statement draws parallel with Dada’s views on religion: faith in 
                                                 
4 One example of this is Breton’s ‘simplest surrealist act’, in which he suggests shooting at random into 
a crowd with revolvers (1979: 74). While we may consider this a ludic and/or ironic Bretonism, its 
flagrantly flippant attitude toward the destruction of human life is objectionable on the part of 
Existentialism. 
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homogenising narratives was frequently cited as having led to armed conflict and the 
debasement of humanity. Ironically, Surrealism’s self-designed structure as a 
systematised evolution of Dada places it closer to religious narratives and Camus’s 
‘mythe absolu et consolateur’. It is important to note that neither Camus nor Dada 
are necessarily anti-religious, and might better be described as a-religious. Camus 
himself said ‘I do not believe in God and I am not an atheist’ (2008: 112).  
Todd highlights Camus’s objection to Breton’s foregrounding of suicide as a 
solution, in that ‘[t]o celebrate self-destruction to the point of rushing to do it in the 
company of others does honor to no one’ (Todd 2000: 304). Although Todd also 
points out the ‘excessively negative’ nature of Camus’s attack on Surrealism (ibid.), it 
is useful in this case because the aspects of Surrealism with which Camus so strongly 
disagreed are comparable with those which mark out Surrealism from Dada. Sartre 
and Camus rejected Surrealism on the grounds of its tendency towards evasion of 
responsibility and the construction of performed myth: in short, Surrealism can be 
said to have lived in a perpetual state of inauthenticity. Through this thesis I will 
prove that Dada, on the other hand, sought out authenticity above all else. 
Whether or not Camus can be called an Existentialist has long been the subject 
of intellectual debate.5 Camus himself refused the label, yet went on to recognise 
several links between his thought and that of Existentialism, as indicated in Olivier 
Salazar-Ferrer’s entry on Existentialism in Jeanyves Guérin’s Dictionnaire Albert 
                                                 
5 The status of Merleau-Ponty as Existentialist is less debated, primarily because of his status as 
Existential Phenomenologist. Moreover, his close literal and theoretical relationship with the French 
Existentialists, the lesser extent to which I will be using his work, as well as its use not alone but in 
tandem with Sartre and Beauvoir, justify his inclusion in this thesis. 
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Camus: ‘Camus déclare en 1959 dans son dernier interview que “Si les premises de 
l’existentialisme se trouvent, comme je crois, chez Pascal, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard et 
Chestov, alors je suis d’accord avec elles”’ (ed. 2009: 310). We must of course bear in 
mind that rejection of a term by a thinker does not necessarily negate its significance 
(as we will see particularly in Chapter Five’s notions of internal and external truth in 
relation to labels), and we must also remember that 
Sartre had refused to allow Gabriel Marcel to apply this adjective [‘Existentialist’] to him. ‘My 
philosophy is a philosophy of existence; I don’t even know what Existentialism is.’ I shared his 
irritation. […] But our protests were in vain. In the end, we took the epithet that everyone used 
for us and used it for our own purposes. (Beauvoir 1968: 45-46) 
If we consider that Camus, Sartre and Beauvoir all rejected the term, and yet all 
clearly exhibit theories that correspond with the contemporary concept(s) of 
Existentialism (as well as all eventually coming to accept the label), we can accept it 
as a valid assignment, as well as one that is perhaps more suited to application from 
without. As David E. Cooper writes, ‘[i]t would be too hasty, however, to treat this 
refusal as good reason to doubt the reality of a distinctive existentialist tendency’ and 
that a ‘number of twentieth-century thinkers are reasonably regarded as belonging to 
just such a family in virtue of their subscribing to a number of philosophical ideas’ 
(in Crowell ed. 2012: 28; 29). For these reasons I will not shy away from labelling 
Camus an Existentialist, or aligning his thought with the more ‘established’ 
Existentialists. Neither will I resort to the more vague term of ‘existential’, primarily 
for the reason for which Malpas states these terms can (and should, in my opinion) 
be differentiated: 
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“Existential” refers to that which pertains to existence […], whereas “existentialist” (and 
“existentialism”) refers to a particular philosophical attitude or mode of philosophical inquiry – 
an attitude or mood that, in general terms, thematizes the problematic character of human 
existence in a world in which there is no pre-given source of meaning or significance. (in 
Crowell ed. 2012: 293) 
I posit that it is precisely this distinction that will anchor the linking of Dada and 
Existentialism, in that both perform the  problematic of how to meaningfully proceed 
in a meaningless world. 
For consistency and ease of reading, throughout this thesis I will maintain a 
capitalisation of the words ‘Existentialist’ and ‘Existentialism’ in all of its uses, and 
particularly in conjunction with the capitalisation of ‘Dada’ and its derivatives. 
Equally, given wide dispute over the use of ‘Dada/ism’ (for the movement itself) and 
‘Dada/ist’ (for its adherents and adjectival use), I will use ‘Dada’ (for the adjective, 
movement and its adherents), since there is no risk of confusion with general use: all 
references to Dada refer to Dada proper. Thus it is not necessary to make an ‘ism’ of 
the word. Despite this, I will forward, toward the end of this thesis, the possibile use 
of ‘Dadaism’ as a philosophy of Dada, as a result of the systematic exploration of the 
tenets of the movement as a theoretical phenomenon. Additionally, discussions of 
notions of identity and self(hood) refer to abstract notions of Dada and Existentialist 
theories of the self as advocated by their philosophies (the ‘Dada/Existentialist self’). 
This self does not refer to Dada/Existentialist adherents nor to Dada/Existentialism 
as movements. 
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Situating the Thesis 
Although Huelsenbeck introduced the concept of the convergence of Dada and 
Existentialist ideas, his short essay remains primarily limited to a perspective of 
Berlin Dada as viewed from New York, and as such does not perform a 
comprehensive analysis of the connection between the two movements, lacking both 
content and detail and dropping the subject after only six pages. Existing academic 
research has not sought to pick up this dropped thread, and it is this gap that my 
thesis aims to address: to reattach, and fully investigate, the links between these two 
movements. As such the thesis represents the first extended analysis of Dada and 
Existentialism alongside one another, and aims to contribute to the opening up of the 
Dada canon towards work on the theoretical and philosophical content of Dada 
activity, and the study of Dada as formative of identity. Such works thus far include 
studies of Dada in relation to gender (Hemus, Sawelson-Gorse), cyber theory (Biro), 
anarchism (Papanikolas) and post/modernism (Pegrum, Sheppard). 
Where there is a tendency in work within the fields of both Dada and 
Existentialism to either perform a historical, biographical or, in the case of 
Existentialism, a philosophical account, my research seeks to adopt a more holistic 
assessment of their cultural impact. The Dadas themselves were open to theory, and 
yet traditionally critics of the movement have largely avoided its theoretical 
implications. The Existentialists’ extensive interest in art will form the basis of a 
productive comparison with the theoretical implications discovered in Dada. I will 
produce new critical Dada research, using an Existentialist methodology to evaluate 
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and understand the role of rebellion, absurdity and otherness within the Dada 
movement. The thesis aims to assess the cultural, artistic and philosophical impact of 
Dada and Existentialism, bringing forward aspects that highlight the inherent 
optimism in their responses to the atrocities of human reality.  
Beyond its contribution as an original study in this area, the thesis also adds to 
and emerges from recent research developments. Work on Dada has recently begun 
to capitalise on the theoretical relevance of the movement, in an effort to enrich 
historical accounts with philosophical and cultural theory. This trend is also present 
in recent developments in literature on Existentialism(s) and Existentialist thinkers. 
Research on both Dada and Existentialism has taken parallel steps in the opening up 
of the canon, in two significant ways. Firstly, through the use of thematic approaches 
to the movements as a whole. Secondly, through a focus on individual members, but 
while offering in-depth analyses of their works or core themes of their opus. Through 
an analysis of these directions it will be demonstrated how the present thesis fits 
with, but also moves away from, work in the field. 
Elza Adamowicz and Eric Robertson’s two edited volumes Dada and Beyond 
(2011-2012) represent an important reassessment of the history of Dada and its 
heritage, which will be particularly relevant to Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. 
The first volume, Dada Discourses, seeks to revisit the movement’s diverse primary 
output, incorporating in-depth textual analysis of Dada works, but also seeking to 
link them to their historical successors, ‘consider[ing] the role of Dada in shaping a 
wide range of artistic, literary and cultural phenomena, from Surrealism to 
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Situationism, post-war Czech cinema, the films of Chris Marker, performance and 
body art’ (2011: 11). The second volume, Dada and its Legacies, takes up where the first 
leaves off, tracing Dada’s influence further into twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
art, while maintaining links with original Dada works. Adamowicz and Robertson’s 
two volumes provide a critical expansion and reappraisal of the ongoing relevance of 
Dada work both in its own right and through its varyingly obvious influences. In the 
case of the present thesis, this type of work is valuable both for the combination of 
Dada with the theoretical implications of Existentialism, and for the assessment of 
post-Dada murmurs, particularly toward the end of the thesis. Additionally, these 
volumes show the necessity and usefulness of writing on multiple art forms as part 
of a wider theoretical whole. 
Recent philosophical research in general has picked up a renewed interest in 
Existentialism, and shows a similar desire to that of the field of Dada to reassert the 
movement’s cultural implications. Judaken and Robert Bernasconi’s edited collection 
Situating Existentialism (2012) foregrounds a strong focus on the trans- and inter-
national nature of Existentialism, as well as its continued relevance in the twenty-first 
century. Likewise, while the arrival of the Cambridge Companion to Existentialism 
(Crowell ed. 2012) is late compared with its volumes on individual Existentialists, 
with almost a decade’s delay on the Companions to Merleau-Ponty (Carman and 
Hansen eds 2004) and Beauvoir (Card ed. 2003), and twenty years after that on Sartre 
(Howells ed. 1992), it devotes a section to ‘The Reach of Existential Philosophy’, 
including a chapter on Existentialism and contemporary psychiatry. Furthermore, 
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Steven Crowell’s introductory chapter highlights the advantage of its publication 
date, stating that ‘[r]eflecting on the classics of existentialism from the vantage point 
of contemporary thought reveals new dimensions in them, which in turn may 
suggest further perspectives on contemporary problems’ (2012: 5). It is from a 
similarly removed vantage point that I aim to comment on and reveal new 
dimensions of crossover between Dada and Existentialism to build upon those 
initially proposed by Huelsenbeck (DE).  
Christina Daigle’s (ed. 2006) Existentialist Thinkers and Ethics also works to insert 
Existentialist philosophy into the contemporary concerns of ethics, despite the often 
expressed assumption that an Existentialist ethics is in itself impossible (an 
assumption that Beauvoir sought to refute in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté (1947)). 
Crowell claims that ‘[e]ach of the major existentialists […] (with the notable 
exception of Simone de Beauvoir) has been accused either of lacking an ethics or else 
paying insufficient attention to the distinction between ethics and politics’ (ed. 2012: 
6). Additional works that seek to highlight Existentialism’s ongoing relevance 
include the two edited collections Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema, which 
devotes its first volume to A Sartrean Perspective (Boulé and McCaffrey eds 2011) and 
its second to A Beauvoirian Perspective (Boulé and Tidd eds 2012). These works 
usefully draw out thematic correspondence between Existentialism and a selection of 
late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century films, from a standpoint of these two 
central Existentialist thinkers. While neither text considers Dada film, both are 
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valuable for their analysis of the applicability of Existentialism to film, which will be 
particularly useful for Chapter Two of the thesis. 
The focus on individual thinkers and artists has also seen developments in the 
last decade. While earlier biographical accounts are beneficial to the continuation of 
research on the movement, recent Dada scholarship has sought to (re-)engage in 
detailed textual analysis within the lives of the individual Dada adherents. Hemus 
provides a particularly notable account of five Dadas in her 2009 monograph Dada’s 
Women, critically analysing works which are often neglected due to the marginalised 
nature of their authors. The book’s section on Taeuber will be valuable to Chapter 
One’s focus on this significant figure, while moving away from Hemus’s emphasis 
on Taeuber’s role as a woman artist toward an analysis of the Existentialist potential 
of her work across the arts. Robertson (2006) offers an assessment of key thematic 
developments in the work of a single artist, Jean/Hans Arp, and Stephen Forcer 
(2006) meticulously dissects the formerly underestimated linguistic value of Tzara’s 
poetry across the artist’s career. Both Robertson and Forcer take a chronological 
approach to the artists’ work, imperative for a proper appraisal of the progression of 
artistic ideas, while moving away from a purely biographical perspective: while 
biographical aspects are important and inevitable, textual analysis is foregrounded. 
We can trace a similar trend in research on Existentialism. Attention has been 
given to individual Existentialists, but often in combination with textual and 
thematic analysis, and/or in combination with other thinkers, writers or artists. 
Bradley Stephens exemplifies this trend with his text Victor Hugo, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
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and the Liability of Liberty (2011), drawing into question definitions of the term 
(liberty) that is not only central within literature and Existentialism, but that also is a 
word that is widely employed (in multiple of its definitions) and often abused in 
contemporary society and politics. Stephens brings together two authors from two 
consecutive centuries to successfully highlight the continuing importance and 
limitations of the theme of liberty. Similarly the present thesis seeks to demonstrate, 
through its division via key terms, not only the thematic convergence of Dada and 
Existentialism but also the continuing importance of the themes and movements 
alike. Stephens’s focus on the novels of Hugo and Sartre thus represents a significant 
inspiration for my choice of the centralisation of literary texts. Sonia Kruks assesses 
Beauvoir and politics in her 2012 text Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity, 
taking on a single thinker and a single theme (ambiguity being a central term in 
Beauvoirian thought), but also using them to confront the practicalities of politics. 
The text will be useful to the thesis as a whole, as an insight into a shared thematic 
concern, as well as an application of Existentialism outside of its core philosophical 
field. 
The desire to combine art and philosophy, as well as comparing movements 
from similar domains, is also evident in recent literature. Morris (1993) suggests a 
strong link between art and Existentialism, in her work based on a Tate Gallery 
exhibition of artists of the post-war period. I seek to differ from this approach, in 
order to avoid a simple temporal and geographic cohabitation of thinkers and artists 
in their shared experience of post (Second) World War French cultural life. Instead 
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the thesis will show fundamental theoretical interaction between – and yet outside of 
– Dada and Existentialism. Beyond the copious number of texts assessing Dada 
alongside Surrealism, Pegrum (2000) and Sheppard (2000) investigate Dada in the 
context of Modernism and Postmodernism. Sheppard devotes sections of his text to 
Dada and Futurism, Dada and Expressionism, and Dada and Mysticism. Pegrum’s 
notions of Dada as ‘Voicing the Other’ and ‘Visions of Change’ will be particularly 
pertinent to the delineation of Dada’s desire to offer a positive alternative to 
modernist life.  
Papanikolas (2010) addresses Paris Dada in relation to Anarchism, and in 
particular anarcho-individualism. Papanikolas productively investigates side by side 
two radical, reactionary movements, relating Dada as a ‘wilful negation of history at 
the center of a debate over the role of artistic tradition in the creation of a new 
modern age’ (2010: 65). I aim to prove, particularly through Chapter Four’s analysis 
of Dada and its context, that Dada did not entirely negate its past, but rather 
selectively reacted against and incorporated the ideas of its predecessors in this 
‘creation of a new modern age’. Additionally, nihilistic destruction (negation) does 
not constitute Dada’s singular facet: close analysis will show that the development of 
Dada’s artistic identity was complex, contradictory and multidimensional. 
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The Ambiguity of Authenticity 
[T]he existentialist imperative of authenticity calls on people, not to perform or desist from any 
particular actions, but only to choose decisively and without illusions 
(Cooper in Crowell ed. 2012: 45) 
In beginning an analysis of Dada and Existentialism alongside each other, an 
initial concern seems to join them: if life is inherently meaningless, how, and why, 
am I to live it? How should I respond to the world in which I live? Are my actions 
futile, and do I have to be responsible for them? Camus writes that ‘[j]uger que la vie 
vaut ou ne vaut pas la peine d’être vécue, c’est répondre à la question fondamentale 
de la philosophie’ (MS: 17), and furthermore that ‘ce qu’on appelle une raison de 
vivre est en même temps une excellente raison de mourir’ (ibid.: 18). Through the 
exploration of our five key themes the thesis will assess the position of the individual 
in terms of their existing relationship with the world around them. Beyond this 
interrogation of meaning, the thesis will seek to draw out results of this thematic 
analysis, through a broader discussion of authenticity and, more specifically, the 
attainment of authenticity through ambiguity. 
Authenticity is a notion that is not explicitly defined in Existentialist thought,6 
but is undeniably implicitly central to it. We can build an Existentialist definition of 
authenticity through the word’s standard use. The term is defined as ‘of undisputed 
origin or authorship: genuine’, ‘accurate in representation of the facts; trustworthy; 
reliable’ (World English Dictionary), lending the term an air of objectivity that is not as 
much use to us as its element of individuality through its description as ‘genuine’. It 
                                                 
6 Sartre begins to mention the term in L’Être et le néant, only to claim that ‘la description [de 
l’authenticité] n’a pas [sic] place ici’ (EN: 106). Nonetheless, the term occurs eleven times across the 
text. 
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is instructive, however, that if we consult the word’s etymology, we can begin to 
make connections with the Existentialist sense, that is, the Latin ‘authenticus’, 
‘coming from the author’, and the Greek ‘authentikos’, ‘one who acts independently’ 
(ibid.). Here we have a much stronger sense that that which is authentic is that which 
relies upon the individual. We have established that the creation of values should lie 
in the individual. Sartre further develops this idea alongside the concepts of bad 
faith, good faith and through this, authenticity, towards the latter two of which an 
individual should aspire. As he states, ‘l’authenticité et l’individualité se gagnent’ 
(EN: 285). Furthermore, although authenticity is based in the individual’s subjective 
choices, free from external pressures, Sartre claims that striving toward individual 
authenticity has a reciprocal effect on others: ‘je me dévoile à moi-même dans 
l’authenticité et les autres aussi je les élève avec moi vers l’authentique’ (EN: 285).  
The relationship between the inherent freedom of the individual and their 
inevitable, inherent facticity is what characterises Beauvoir’s notion of ambiguity. 
Beauvoir’s definition of the term in its basic form largely matches a standard 
definition, that is, ‘vagueness or uncertainty of meaning’, or ‘the possibility of 
interpreting an expression in two or more distinct ways’ (World English Dictionary). It 
is this plurality of sense that unites the standard and the Existentialist definitions, 
particularly through its creative, epistemological, aesthetic, political and ethical 
potential. In a way that corresponds with the authentic individual’s constant 
development of self-definition, Beauvoir states that ‘dire qu[e l’existence] est 
ambiguë, c’est poser que le sens n’en est jamais fixé, qu’il doit sans cesse se 
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conquérir’ (MA: 160). Furthermore, she links ambiguity, through authenticity, back 
to a way of finding meaning and value in life: ‘Essayons d’assumer notre 
fondamentale ambiguïté. C’est dans la connaissance des conditions authentiques de 
notre vie qu’il faut puiser la force de vivre et des raisons d’agir’ (ibid.: 14).  
From the definitions of authenticity and ambiguity explored above we are able 
to draw some fundamental guiding principles. Firstly, there are elements to an 
individual that are concrete, defining themselves through facticity. Secondly, we 
should neither privilege these as our foremost traits, nor should we let them define 
us, especially since they are things that we cannot change. From this we can postulate 
that what is important for the individual is the authentic realisation of their own 
choice, a constantly developing assemblage of morals, opinions, and active decisions. 
Consequently ambiguity is not only inevitable but also desirable, a state of multiple 
interpretive possibilities. 
It is my aim in this thesis to delineate the extent to which Dada practices and 
theory identify with these definitions of authenticity and ambiguity. Through my 
thematic exploration of choice, alienation, responsibility, freedom, and truth in Dada 
and Existentialist texts, I will raise and discuss the following questions. How can we 
use Dada and Existentialist ideas to not only critique but to improve the human 
condition? Given the total revolutionary approach adopted by the two movements, 
are they rebelling for rebellion’s sake, or do they genuinely believe they have the 
potential to instigate change? How do the ideals and aims of the nature of revolt in 
these two movements compare to the outcomes? In pursuing analytical responses to 
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these questions I will posit that Dada and Existentialism both represent a 
fundamentally positive affirmation of humanity through the perpetual quest for 
authenticity, and that this authenticity is most effectively achieved through 
ambiguity.  
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- CHAPTER ONE - 
ME, MYSELF AND I: CHOICE AND INDIVIDUALITY IN THE 
MANY MASKS OF DADA 
The dadaist […] welcomes any kind of mask. Any game of hide-and-seek, with its inherent power to 
deceive. 
(FT: 65) 
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. 
(Melville 1892: 157) 
Art in Society, Art and Life 
The interdisciplinarity that is immediately apparent in any study of Dada expresses a 
unification and blending of art and life that is present throughout Dada and 
Existentialist thought alike. It is upon this that we may begin to explore the presence 
of philosophical currents in Dada, and an artistic side to Existentialism. Highlighting 
the importance of art to Sartre, Morris posits that ‘[c]reative endeavour was, 
naturally, of crucial significance to a philosophy which called upon man to seek his 
own essence, defining himself through his actions’, and further, that ‘Sartre drew on 
the artist as a paradigm for authentic existence’ (1993: 18). Morris’s mention of this 
close relationship through Sartre’s tabula rasa attitude toward the artist (‘personne ne 
peut dire ce que sera la peinture de demain’ (EH: 65)) speaks to Dada’s notorious 
desire to destroy and start anew. To this shared ‘fresh start’ approach we can add 
Sartre’s personal preferences within art for ‘light and ephemeral materials, hesitant 
and incomplete images, qualities that evoked notions of becoming rather than the 
fixity of ‘being’’ (Morris 1993: 19). While ‘light’ and ‘hesitant’ are not adjectives we 
would automatically associate with Dada, an insistence on ephemerality, 
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incompleteness and becoming is certainly apt in a movement that focused its 
abundant energy on the abstract and the new.  
Fundamentally these qualities rely on an additive and interpretive approach to 
the individual self: as Sartre states, ‘nous pouvons dire qu’il y a une universalité de 
l’homme; mais elle n’est pas donnée, elle est perpétuellement construite’ (EH: 61). 
This is something that is particularly actively explored in Dada art, especially 
through the use of multiple media and the physicality of Dada events. Van Meter 
Ames describes Existentialism as ‘fundamentally a philosophy of art and the artist’, 
and states that to the Existentialist ‘only the artist, or a person living like an artist, is 
really living […] The hero is the artist who shakes off habits, teachings and 
achievements, in continual revolt against whatever would confine or control him’ 
(1951: 252). The artist therefore maintains an evolving essence, while engaging with a 
constant revolt, a rebellion defined by its ‘principe d’activité surabondante et 
d’énergie’ (HR: 32). 
Through this initial alignment of art and philosophy, Dada and Existentialism 
both reveal an immediate insistence that ‘il faut partir de la subjectivité’ (EH: 26).7 
Both movements rail against conformity – within themselves8 as well as 
foregrounding such a principle in their tenets – as most explicitly expressed through 
                                                 
7 This particular phrase is Sartre’s own re-wording of his quintessential theory that ‘existence precedes 
essence’. Although Sartre technically defines this latter statement as applying to (human) 
consciousnesses, and as such the reverse applies to manufactured objects (production precedes 
existence), the fact that the objects studied in this chapter are to be conceived as representations of the 
self can be considered sufficient to incorporate while moving on from this paradox. 
8 This is enacted in both movements through their desire to reject labels, including ‘Dada’ and 
‘Existentialist’. 
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their views on systems. Tristan Tzara notably claimed in his 1918 manifesto that ‘[j]e 
suis contre les systèmes, le plus acceptable des systèmes est celui de n’avoir [sic] par 
principe aucun’ (in D3: 2). Mikel Dufrenne underlines that ‘Existentialism represents 
the perpetual revolt of subjectivity against systems, any system which objectifies and 
enslaves it’ (1965: 53). Through these two movements’ refusal of stultifying 
systematisation we can begin to investigate its opposite, individuality, and its links, 
through ambiguity, with authenticity.  
This first chapter sets out to assess artistic and philosophical approaches to 
individuality through the notion of choice. A key concept in French Existentialist 
thought, choice is important to the individual since beyond being a simple option, it 
is a process in which we are compelled to engage ourselves because ‘ce qui n’est pas 
possible, c’est de ne pas choisir’ (EH: 63); not choosing is a choice in its own right. 
While Sartre refers primarily to the need within an individual to choose the way in 
which they live their life (morally and physically), in order to fulfil the role of an 
authentic individual, we can also apply this to choice within artistic endeavours, as 
part of the construction of an authentic artistic identity. This underscores the 
importance of constant redefinition through choice, a developing self that does not 
allow itself to be concretely defined by external fetters. Additionally we might say 
that this continual (re)construction has a quality of Gilles Deleuze’s ‘paradox of 
infinite identity’ (2004: 4), whereby every existing being maintains a perpetual state 
of ‘becoming’, but never simply ‘is’. We will see that in both Dada and Existentialism 
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this constant state of becoming is fundamentally positive, because it allows the 
individual to engage in a continually mutable relationship with their own identity. 
Sartre’s comment on the perpetually constructed nature of humankind is 
readily applicable to the atmosphere of early Dada performances and exhibitions, 
especially those of the Cabaret Voltaire. From its beginnings in 1916, the Cabaret was 
a melting pot for a plethora of different arts, nationalities, and personalities, giving it 
a flavour of collage, collaboration, and a continually developing character, which 
Malcolm Green describes as a ‘synthesis of the modern’ (in Huelsenbeck ed. 1993: i). 
Ball himself summarised that the ‘sole purpose’ of the Cabaret was ‘to highlight, 
transcending war and nationalism, the few independent spirits who live for other 
ideals’ (Cabaret Voltaire: 5; my emphasis and translation), rejecting overt identification 
with the ideals of the warring nations, ideals that we can consider broadly externally 
imposed, and thus objectionable as passively accepted. The Cabaret was 
international and interdisciplinary, but predominantly performative, a constant 
active expression of changing thought. This performative element is important and 
instructive if considered as an interdisciplinary approach in itself, especially through 
the interest in masks from Dada’s beginnings, both as integral to a performance and 
as an artwork in their own right. Janco’s masks in particular are noted to have incited 
group frenzy: ‘in the relatively small space of the cabaret they ha[d] a sensational 
effect’ (FT: 64). An analysis of the various masks of Dada within their contexts will 
explicate their consequences beyond effect as given. 
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Leah Dickerman claims that the mask was a crucial source of inspiration for the 
Zurich group ‘car il permet de remettre en question la conception traditionnelle du 
portrait fondé sur la ressemblance physique’ (in Le Bon ed. 2005: 1011). Mimetic 
portraiture is but one of Dada’s list of ‘narratives’ scheduled for interrogation and 
destruction, a list considered to be to blame for having led to the wartime 
atmosphere that was the movement’s contextual backdrop. As Ball notes, 
The image of the human form is gradually disappearing from the painting of these times and all 
objects appear only in fragments. This is one more proof of how ugly and worn the human 
countenance has become, and of how all the objects of our environment have become repulsive 
to us. (FT: 55) 
This chapter will investigate the rejection of the traditional human form, as well as its 
replacement in fragmented form in the use of masks in Dada, through the work of 
Sophie Taeuber. Although it is notable that Taeuber herself was required to mask her 
involvement in Dada events, the chapter will suggest the role of the mask not only as 
simply dissimulatory, but also to move beyond this deception to posit the process of 
masking as an exploration and externalisation of a constructed, subjective identity, 
through the flexibility of the fragmented or hybrid image, as well as the notion of 
multiple masks as options for choice. As an extension of this, I will posit that the 
composite mask provides a pathway to aesthetic interdisciplinarity, as well as the 
ways in which the assumption of multiple art forms leads to something new, not 
only as the sum of its independent parts, but as a hybrid product. This hybrid 
product will be shown to fit with Sartre’s notions of perpetually constructed essences 
as part of a wider whole, a common ground that is nonetheless based in active 
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choice. Furthermore, as Sartre states, ‘[le masque] renvoie à des possibles [sic], à une 
situation dans le monde’ (EN: 128). 
The examination of selected Taeuber works will take place alongside other 
comparable Dada works, all of which display a thematic of masks and masking, as 
part of a wider investigation of the role of masks and dissimulation in Dada as a 
movement, exposing the assemblage of identity in all of its guises and wrappings. As 
such the works will maintain a predominantly artistic comparison (rather than 
chronological or geographic). The Dada-Köpfe [Dada Heads] (Zurich: 1918-1920) will 
be explored alongside Hausmann’s Mechanischer Kopf (Der Geist unserer Zeit) 
[Mechanical Head (Spirit of our Time)] (Berlin: 1919); the König Hirsch [King Stag] 
puppets (Zurich: 1918) will be examined in relation to Höch’s Dada Puppen [Dada 
Dolls] (Hanover: 1916); the dances and costumes will be evaluated in the context of 
their respective events, as well as alongside Janco’s masks. Finally, Taeuber’s Self-
Portrait with Dada-Kopf (Zurich: 1926) will be assessed in relation to Man Ray’s Noire 
et blanche (Paris: 1926).  
The discussion will take our analysis through the varying interactions between 
masking and identity, from replacement of the self (the Köpfe, puppets), through 
wrapping and embellishment of self, or self-as-mask (the dance and costumes), to 
self-alongside-mask. This is not to propose this order as a progression but rather a 
number of independent yet interrelating ways in which we might consider a group 
of aspects of expression-through-mask. The chapter aims to address the ways in 
which a fragmented self is not simply a broken entity, but a delicate balance of 
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expressive spontaneity and a complex collection of carefully chosen elements, a 
constant act of conscious choice. We will see how this foregrounding of subjectivity 
combines authentic choice through Sartre with the freedom of ambiguity through 
Beauvoir. 
Accounts of Dada by the movement’s adherents tend to gloss over Taeuber’s 
role in the group, labelling her ‘shy’, ‘thoughtful’, ‘unassuming’ or ‘quiet’ (in AA: 45-
46; 70), and relegating her to the background of artistic activities and events. Later 
accounts often reductively pair her with her husband Arp, a trend that is particularly 
inappropriate considering the Taeuber-Arps’ egalitarian and collaborational artistic 
relationship (see for example Krupp in Adamowicz and Robertson eds 2011: 157-67). 
Yet her widely interdisciplinary artistic creations are noteworthy even within a 
movement that is famously interdisciplinary itself. The frequent dismissal of Taeuber 
as a primary character by her fellow adherents has led to her neglect in the current 
field of research.9 However, on investigating accounts of her involvement and 
engaging in an analysis of her work it becomes evident that she enthusiastically 
embraced Dada’s energy and matched the endeavours of her male counterparts to 
produce new, innovative works and unleash pure, abstract expression.  
Furthermore as Willy Rotzler describes, 
Taeuber had already made attempts to express her esthetic ideas in all kinds of ways during the 
dada period […] thereby fulfilling the avant-garde requirements of integrating art in society 
and regarding all man’s creative impulses and skills as a unified whole. (1993: 86) 
                                                 
9 Notable exceptions include Hemus’s chapter dedicated to Taeuber in her 2009 monograph Dada’s 
Women, and Roswitha Mair’s biographical Von Ihren Träumen sprach sie nie: Das Leben der Künstlerin 
Sophie Taeuber-Arp (1998). The latter, however, has a self-confessed reliance on authorial fabrication. 
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Not only did Taeuber foreground a particularly well-rounded form of creation but 
she also actively articulated artistic theories: 
Only if we plunge deep into ourselves and try to be completely true will we succeed in 
producing things of value, living things, and at the same time work on creating a new style that 
is appropriate to us. […] Rules cannot be drawn up, not for form, and not for colour. (in Afuhs 
and Reble eds 2007: 36) 
Taeuber expresses tenets that we have already seen in Existentialist philosophy, 
through the desire for individuality by looking within rather than searching for 
external influence and rules. She advocates, through self-interrogation in art, a 
personal style that leads to personal values. Taeuber’s outlook of ‘creating a new 
style that is appropriate to us’ mirrors Sartre’s notion that the individual ‘existe 
d’abord, […] se définit après’ (EH: 29). In this way the example of Taeuber represents 
an ideal place to begin our comparison with French Existentialism. 
Richter notes that Taeuber ‘had acquired the skill of reducing the world of lines, 
surfaces, forms and colours to its simplest and most exact form’ (AA: 46), implying 
that this unassuming purity draws not only from the core of her character but also 
the essence of her work. Hemus reiterates this point, stating that 
What distinguishes Taeuber’s work as an artist from that of her contemporaries in Dada at the 
time is that her challenge to mimesis, and her interrogation of the language of the visual image, 
led her to employ the most pared-down geometric shapes. (2009: 73) 
The most productive result of the combination of Taeuber’s thoughts with those of 
Richter and Hemus is an insistence on the rejection of systems, a need to break 
(away) to create anew, particularly without the burden of superfluous 
ornamentation. Additionally Taeuber’s constant rearrangement furthers Sartre’s 
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tabula rasa desire seen above (EH: 65) in that not only can we not know the painting 
of tomorrow but also, by Taeuber’s standards, we may no longer be able to define it 
in the same way. 
Portraits and Playthings: Constructing the Dada Head 
Dada fait valser les têtes: portraits rectifiés […] travestis10 […], décomposés […], et autrement 
recomposés – car Dada se danse masqué. 
(Lemonnier in Le Bon ed. 2005: 934) 
Our first example of the Dada mask is Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe (1918-1920), a series 
of approximately eight11 coloured wooden sculptures of which we will consider two 
here: Dada-Kopf (Portrait of Hans Arp) (1918, Fig. 1), and Dada-Kopf (1920, Fig. 2).12 
Each under twenty-five centimetres tall (including their chunky bases), these 
diminutive sculptures are more than simple externalised heads, exhibiting 
characteristics of dolls or puppets, with simple, neat features and very little 
extending from their core shape. The Dada-Köpfe retain an overall ‘normal’ 
positioning of facial features – one eye on each side and a large, straight nose down 
the middle of the face – yet the surfaces are made up of geometric, coloured 
fragments. These coloured parts, through their direct application to the wooden 
head, form a kind of childish or theatrical application of make-up, or a provocatively 
violent war paint: a balance of ludic and aggressive interpretations characteristic of 
Dada. The identity of these heads is painted and applied to a surface in an abstractly 
assembled wrapping or mask.  
                                                 
10 This important choice of word will be further explored in Chapter Five. 
11 Anne Lemonnier (in Le Bon ed. 2005: 934) highlights that most of these sculptures, like much Dada 
work, were lost. One of the lost heads can be found photographed in Merz 6 (63). 
12 Hereafter referred to as Portrait of Hans Arp and Dada-Kopf respectively, for ease of differentiation. 
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The hourglass-shaped bases of the Dada-Köpfe introduce a performative doll 
metaphor through their ease of being held or played with, and through this inviting 
movement. This rendering of the model into a doll foregrounds a spontaneous and 
improvisatory feel to their identities, interpreted and reinterpreted at each moment 
of play, like Sartre’s notion of the mask as referring to possible situations of the 
world (cf. EN: 128). Furthermore the notion of the base as a handle forms such a 
relationship as a hand mirror, their faces taking the place of the reflective surface. We 
are reminded through this interaction of Schwitters’s Assemblage on a Hand Mirror 
(Hanover: 1920/1922, Fig. 3), whose surface is covered in a collage of fragments 
instead of the smooth reflective glass that one would expect from the original object. 
Any space between attached items is painted over, blocking all reflective possibility. 
Both Taeuber’s and Schwitters’s works in this respect act as a form of both choice and 
control over the reflection of the self. As Lemonnier states describing the Dada-Köpfe, 
‘[c]es sculptures reflètent en miroir plusieurs visages de Sophie Taeuber’ (in Le Bon 
ed. 2005: 934). By maintaining this personal element, the artist is able to present a 
composed representation, yet from which the viewer can draw any number of 
interpretations of the artist, the work, or themselves. 
The comparison of Taeuber’s Köpfe to handheld mirrors can be instructively 
analysed alongside Sartre’s statement that ‘il n’y a pas entre ces deux aspects de mon 
être [être-pour-soi/être-pour-autrui] une différence d’apparence à être, comme si 
j’étais à moi-même la verité de moi-même et comme si autrui ne possédait de moi 
qu’une image déformée’ (EN: 92). The head provides a frank objectification and 
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extension of the self into a fragmented appendage. Appearance and being become 
one and the same in this constructed self-image as an ironic interrogation of the 
‘image déformée’ that the other has of the self. Both Taeuber’s and Schwitters’s 
objects perfom, through their foregrounding of the active nature of looking at oneself 
in the mirror, Sartre’s notion of the ‘look’ (EN: 292-341), by which we struggle with 
the idea of the other as subject, and consequently the self as object. Furthermore, 
there are rippling consequences of the other’s look, notably through transformation 
of both the self and of the world: ‘Le regard d’autrui m’atteint à travers le monde et 
n’est pas seulement transformation de moi-même, mais métamorphose totale du 
monde’ (EN: 308; original emphasis). 
In an extension of this mirroring of the single head, the two analysed here 
display a certain consistent crossover of features that may lead us to believe that they 
form a set, drawing from this that the unnamed Dada-Kopf loosely represents Taeuber 
herself. Hemus supports this through gender stereotyping in reasoning that the wire 
and bead embellishments make this the ‘female’ head (2009: 57). While Hemus 
presents this as a plain fact, I would instead consider this simple and obvious 
difference between the two heads an ironic comment on the part of Taeuber, 
highlighting that the only difference between the artist and her husband is the 
societal assignment of gendered accessories. The Taeuber-Arps are known for their 
deliberate ambiguity through their highly collaborative works. Furthermore, the 
sculptures remain faithful to Dada’s rejection of mimetic portraiture as neither bears 
any ‘real’ resemblance to the Taeuber-Arps. A small, humorous likeness may be 
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posited between the Portrait of Hans Arp and its subject, who share a high forehead 
and receding ‘hairline’. Richter describes Arp as his model for his ‘head fantasies’, 
because of ‘the classic oval shape of his head and his triangular cubist nose’ (AA: 80). 
Nonetheless we can consider this inspiration as a simple springboard for the 
destruction of mimesis. 
The Dada-Köpfe broadly reject most distinctive markers of external identity, 
rather like later conceptions of the cyborg such as Donna Haraway’s, which Matthew 
Biro summarises as ‘defin[ing] a fundamentally hybrid form of human identity that 
undermined traditional distinctions between gender, race and class’ (2009: 5). The 
only remaining marker of the heads seems to be their status as human, but it is an 
altered, as well as only partial, human. Robert A. Varisco refers to the face as ‘the 
anatomical region which we use to measure identities against one another’ (in 
Peterson ed. 2001: 286). Is this Dada’s rejection of, or dismissal of the possibility of, 
the ‘measuring of identity’? We may posit that  Dada’s destruction of normalcy, 
through the destruction of socially constructed measures and boundaries of identity, 
was to be considered the only route to freedom of the individual. These two heads’ 
mimetic relations to each other, as well as their ambiguous representation of their 
author, externalise both self and other, eternally self-reflecting from an ‘hors de soi’ 
position. 
In contrast with their shared characteristics, the two Dada-Köpfe differ in their 
implications of emotional content. The frowning features of Portrait of Hans Arp point 
to an aggressive provocation which is not present in Dada-Kopf, whose pale, unseeing 
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eyes – one of which is not only barely perceptible but also upside down – both blend 
into the geometric arrangement of the head’s features in a blank or unreadable 
expression. Dada-Kopf is considerably more abstract than its partner, with its 
structural shape (including its off-white, bony nose) forming the only symmetrical 
unity between the pair. If we consider Dada-Kopf to be a portrait of Taeuber, should 
we assume that the self-portrait is necessarily vaguer than that of another, or that it 
simply leaves room for (re)interpretation and change? This builds on Sartre’s notion 
of the differing self-image with the ‘image déformée’ that the other sees, while not 
necessarily being dependent on negative connotations of this description.  
This ambivalence and engagement with aesthetic freedom can be said to ‘point 
to a liberation from reality which, in addition to [the] humorous stylistic qualities, 
can be considered a pertinent Dada feature’ (Riese Hubert in Sawelson-Gorse ed. 
1999: 535). We might unpick the definition of this ‘liberation from reality’ to posit 
Dada’s liberal or ambiguous relationship with reality that allows for a creative 
modification of the world. In the context of the liberation of our relationship with 
reality we can consider in Taeuber’s Dada works a creative modification that 
liberates reality itself. This capitalises on Sartre’s statement that ‘le monde apparaît 
comme pure distance de soi à soi’ (EN: 288). If the world appears as this distance 
within the self, constant reinterpretation of reality works precisely within this gap 
from within and without.13 
                                                 
13 We will further discuss Dada’s reimagining of reality in Chapter Two. 
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An instructive point of comparison in our analysis of the Dada head is 
Hausmann’s Mechanischer Kopf (Der Geist unserer Zeit) (Berlin: 1919, Fig. 4). This head 
is also wooden, but unpainted. This bare simplicity highlights its status as a 
commercial, reproducible object (it is a hat maker’s dummy head, and in this respect 
might be labelled an assisted or rectified readymade14), and has the simultaneous 
function of allowing contrast with the objects that embellish its surface. This 
replacement head, like Taeuber’s sculptures, functions as a base on which to build 
(for instance, hats). Like its Taeuber counterparts, the head retains normal 
positioning of facial features, but differs in that these features are actively designed 
to represent a human face.  
A singular and striking way in which Mechanischer Kopf diverges from this 
human resemblance is that it has no optic detail: like Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe, it has 
blank, unseeing eyes. This foregrounds the fact that it is a generic face: not meant to 
represent any particular individual, its role is simply to display objects placed on it. 
Notably, although the head is demonstrably generic, it is not geometrically perfect: 
the left eye is a little lower than the right, the nose is not straight, and the head itself 
is a slightly misshapen oval.  This serves to highlight the delicate notion of ideal 
proportion, upon which ‘correct’ or generic human features are designed (and which 
can often hinder accuracy in portraiture, since real human faces usually diverge from 
these standards). In this way Hausmann’s head functions more like an early self-
portrait of Pablo Picasso (cf. Self Portrait of 1900), where deviations from expectation 
                                                 
14 For more on readymades in relation to Duchamp, see Chapter Four. 
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are both disquieting and personal. Additionally this misleading from the 
symmetrical, as well as the lack of ocular functionality, plays with the look of the 
other in a similar way to the comparison with Schwitters’s hand mirror. The other 
through this face distorts expectation (we anticipate it mirroring our own), and its 
blank stare prevents it from completing the look. If we build our self-image through 
its relationship with the view of the other, this blankness disrupts our ability to 
relate. 
Hausmann’s Mechanischer Kopf parodies the notion of the face as primary 
reference point in measuring identity, through attaching mechanical measuring 
instruments all over its cranial surface (although instructively not obscuring the main 
aspect of the face). This has the effect of simultaneously externalising and 
reciprocating the measuring of identities. Angela Lampe tells us that Hausmann 
wrote of having ‘découvert que les gens n’ont pas de caractère et que leur visage 
n’est qu’une image faite par le coiffeur. Je voulais, précise-t-il, dévoiler l’esprit de 
notre temps, l’esprit de chacun dans son état rudimentaire’ (2007: n.p.). Unlike the 
Taeuber Dada-Köpfe, Mechanischer Kopf has no stand or base, but simply sits on its 
neck. It can do this where the Dada-Köpfe cannot, because of its maintenance of 
human proportions (Taeuber’s require bases because their ‘necks’ are slim poles). 
However, this means that interaction with the object is necessarily more direct than 
with the Taeuber heads. If we are to consider both types of head as playthings or 
objects of manipulation, the Hausmann must be held by its main ‘body’, whereas the 
Taeuber heads can be held by their stands. This is made yet more complicated in the 
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case of Hausmann’s sculpture, since to hold it entails working around its various 
appendages. This plays upon the vulnerability of the self in its ‘état rudimentaire’.15 
The blankness of the look of the externalised self as other is replaced by this direct 
and active contact. We might argue in this respect that art (especially of this kind) 
allows for a realisation and thus resolution of Sartre’s paradox that ‘je suis hors de 
moi sans pouvoir jamais ni la [that which is outside of myself] réaliser ni même 
l’atteindre’ (EN: 326). 
The fragmented construction created in the mask function of Taeuber’s and 
Hausmann’s head sculptures foregrounds a concern with the fragility of the body, 
especially if we are to consider the wartime context of their creation and the 
proliferation of the human-machine hybrid body, as well as the aesthetic 
representation of military horrors in such works as those by Otto Dix, whose ‘war 
cripples’ are adorned with extensive, yet ostensibly useless, mechanical prosthetics.16 
This is additionally transferred to incapacity in the heads: the presence and normal 
positioning of (some) sensory organs is contradicted by their lack of connection to 
their functions, and the notable lack of ears and mouths in Taeuber’s, and of course 
hands in both artists’ work, quite literally cuts off the remaining senses.  
This deprivation extends to emotion and expression, and with no bodies to 
carry the senses’ resonance the expression of the sculptures is concentrated in, and 
confined to, its source. The combination of these characteristics visually 
                                                 
15 We will see more on the deliberate foregrounding of vulnerability in Dada Film in Chapter Two. 
16 For more on war injuries and prosthetics and their relationship with the avant-garde, see Amy 
Lyford (2007). 
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demonstrates Arp’s description of Dada’s creative style: ‘While guns rumbled in the 
distance, we sang, painted, made collages and wrote poems with all our might’ (in 
AA: 25). Arp’s depiction of deferral of fear through creation is evoked here in the 
Dada-Köpfe through the apparent hasty arrangement of their eclectic collections of 
features. However, this seeming recklessness conflicts with the measured care with 
which Taeuber worked, amplifying the encapsulation of panic through disturbingly 
calm application. 
The notion of confinement is particularly pertinent if we consider the context of 
Taeuber’s creations, wartime Zurich and its locked-in position in continental Europe, 
as well as Hausmann’s position in a belligerent nation (Germany). Additionally, both 
foreground the rejection of language, which, particularly because of its intrinsic link 
with dominant narratives, was something that Dada considered to be one of the 
problems of modern civilisation (cf. FT: 70; 76).17 Without hair or bodies, both 
Taeuber’s and Hausmann’s head sculptures are exposed and raw, but also boldly 
new and autonomous, not dependent on limbs or attachments to transmit their 
message. This bottling up of senses and emotions, a de- and re-construction of 
language, is both rebellious and creatively enhanced. We might rephrase this in 
Camus’s words, when he states that ‘[l]orsque le cri le plus déchirant trouve son 
langage le plus ferme, la révolte satisfait à sa vraie exigence et tire de cette fidelité à 
elle-même une force de création’ (HR: 338). 
                                                 
17 The rejection of language(s) is especially pertinent in Switzerland, which has an impressive four 
official languages. 
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Beyond their interpretation as a comment on the brutality of war, Taeuber’s and 
Hausmann’s sculptures present an altered manifestation of a (de)constructed self, 
one that is at once provocative and highly evocative. All three heads foreground a 
tension of emotive concentration that we might liken to Camus’s ‘cri le plus 
déchirant’ through a shared sense of severance. The crosswiring  effect produced by 
the redirection of expression is also similar to that invoked by the central figure of 
Edvard Munch’s Skrik [The Scream] (1893), whose cry is described as ‘no longer an 
aural event, but something synaesthetically felt and recognised in nature’ (Heller 
1973: 87). The foregrounding of chromatic ambiguity in Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe 
suggests that the gesture of their own synaesthetic scream is both reactive and a 
source of creation. We can posit that this captures an assemblage of the self as 
gesture that is not restricted to language. As Ball remarked, ‘[l]anguage is not the 
only means of expression. It is not capable of communicating the most profound 
experiences’ (FT: 76).  
The scream’s cross-sensory articulation can also be analysed in terms of 
chromatic ambiguity: Taeuber’s non-natural use of colour disrupts expectation in a 
way so strikingly unique as to imitate the synaesthete’s private realm of perception. 
In particular her use of blue and green shades, not normally seen on the natural face, 
can be interpreted as expressive additions, especially as they are located around the 
eyes, the point by which we might presume to perceive reality. Instructively, 
Taeuber’s use of green across her two heads contrasts with Henri Matisse’s famously 
unusual use in his ‘green stripe’ painting of his wife (La Raie verte, 1905), in that 
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Matisse nevertheless used the green streak as an artificial shadow line, whereas 
Taeuber’s use is predominantly geometric: the face shows no reliance on the 
traditional notion of a lighter and a darker side, or in Matisse’s case, a cooler and a 
warmer side. In this respect Matisse remained within the realms of traditional 
portraiture; Tauber broke away from it. 
The heads we have analysed present an external mask that foregrounds a 
singular body part, in a partial, but independent, externalisation of the self. While it 
is unsurprising that the head should be selected for this role, it highlights the 
dialectic of head-as-thinking and face-as-representing. However, it is more likely 
within its Dada context that this is a parody of traditional Cartesian philosophy, as 
all of these head sculptures, as surfaces and as vessels, reject mimetic portraiture and 
contain nothing but the solid wood that makes up their material structure. This is 
particularly apt for Hausmann’s head, as the instruments covering the object are 
fixed in place and, with the exception of the forehead’s tape measure, measure 
nothing. Additionally, since the tape measure indicates the distance between brow 
and ‘hairline’, it could be a simple reference back to hat making. The head itself is 
labelled ‘22’, reminiscent of Ball’s poem reciting costume with its blank face and 
number 13 (Fig. 5). As Lampe describe’s Hausmann’s sculpture, ‘un morceau de 
mètre de couturière et un petit carton blanc portant le chiffre 22 sont collés sur le 
front, car, comme l’affirme Hausmann, “l’esprit de notre temps n’avait qu’une 
signification numérique”’ (2007: n.p.). The label simply introduces a frustrating 
collection of misleading semiotics.  
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We might consider that this numeric nonsense acts, beyond the aforementioned 
rejection of mimetic portraiture, as a wider refusal of the representation of the self in 
relation to the past. Both of these rejections work to deliberately refuse the bad faith 
of the self that is trying too hard to imitate an externally constructed identity (cf. 
Sartre’s waiter who plays at being a waiter (EN: 94)). Lemonnier writes that Taeuber’s 
heads are situated ‘à la frontière entre les arts appliqués, la sculpture et la peinture’ 
(in Le Bon ed. 2005: 934). In just one work, Taeuber embraces significant 
interdisciplinarity. While Hausmann arguably only dabbles in sculpture through his 
Mechanischer Kopf, the use of measuring instruments shows implicit integration of 
other disciplines, including mathematics, biology and phrenology. This fragmented 
method of composition can be considered a selective foregrounding of desirable (and 
even undesirable) aspects, resulting in a hybridity with a strong indication of 
personal value(s), as well as the underlying desire for choice. In their adjustments 
from the ‘normal’, these works constantly assert their authors’ desire for subjectivity 
and, through this, for authenticity. 
Puppet, Poupée, Puppen: Manipulating the Human Figure  
Owing to its extraordinary capacity to absorb empathy, […] the doll is the first figure to impose on a 
child the experience of estrangement. Staring blankly, it offers a comforting presence while cruelly 
inflicting a silence both un-comprehending and incomprehensible. A pivotal figure in human 
development, the doll prefigures relationships with others and, subsequently and figuratively, with the 
spaces of architecture and the world.  
(Koss 2003: 734) 
Taeuber’s 1918 König Hirsch [King Stag] marionettes (Figures 6-13) were 
designed for an adaptation of Carlo Gozzi’s play Il Re Cervo (originally 1762). The 
play itself revolves around conflicting amorous connections and characters vying for 
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power, expedited by magical means of deception (see Gozzi 1989). Taeuber’s puppets 
are assembled from cones and cylinders, many reminiscent of cotton reels, perhaps a 
reference to her work in textiles, or to Dada’s creative use of unexpected materials, 
including the playful incorporation of ‘rubbish’ into artistic works. Although they are 
wooden like the Dada-Köpfe, the puppets exhibit a certain fluidity in their multi-
jointed movement. Richter described them as moving ‘with a grace not of this earth’ 
(in Motherwell ed. 1989: 288): not being subject to gravity allows them far greater 
capacity for agility and unrestrained leaping than the human dancer. This grace, 
along with creating an alternative world of the puppet stage, reinforces the Sartrean 
idea explored in the heads of otherness as transforming the self as well as the world 
(cf. EN: 308).  
Further advantages of the puppet are depicted in Heinrich von Kleist’s ‘On the 
Marionette Theatre’ (1810): 
puppets have the advantage of being for all practical purposes weightless. They are not afflicted 
with the inertia of matter, the property most resistant to dance. The force which raises them into 
the air is greater than the one which draws them to the ground. […] Puppets need the ground 
only to glance against lightly, like elves, and through this momentary check to renew the swing 
of their limbs. (Herr C. in Kleist and Neumiller 1972: 24) 
Although Kleist’s descriptions predate Taeuber’s puppets, important shared 
elements can be drawn from this citation. The flexibility of the König Hirsch 
characters’ limbs certainly gains from their reduced contact with the ground, which 
can be used as a point of resistance to curve the limbs without the puppets needing 
to support their own weight. This facilitates a more abstract construction as well as a 
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unique interdisciplinarity which ‘combines Laban’s geometric dance principles, the 
black humour of Dada and the mechanics of textile production’ (Fell 1999: 271).  
Hemus highlights that the use of puppets ‘allows the artist to investigate the 
total removal of the human subject or body, replacing it with a manipulatable object’ 
(2009: 61). I would argue that instead of total removal and thus absence of the human 
subject or body, the puppets allow an externalised yet continuing presence of the 
self, especially as ‘manipulatable object’. The distance or height created through this 
effort to be ‘hors de soi’, along with Gozzi’s thematic of deception, allows identity to 
be presented as object to be manipulated, not only representing but also constructing 
identity through the intentionality of artistic gesture. Additionally, the manipulation 
of the rules (of physics) through the ostensible irrelevance of gravity builds upon our 
notion of Dada and Existentialist rejection of systems. 
The puppets have been likened to a group of insects, from the striped, bee-like 
Dr Komplex (Fig. 6) to the spidery Wache [Sentry] (Fig. 7), as well as the segmented 
bodies of most of the puppets (Minges 1996: n.p.).18 This lends the characters a 
sinister, ‘creepy crawly’ quality, as well as the delving into the foreign, microscopic 
world of insect life. We can also associate these Kafkaesque transformations with the 
prosthetics seen so widely on victims of the First World War, and which we saw on 
the Dada-Köpfe. Almost entirely constructed from articulated appendages, the 
puppets form assemblages of identity, retaining an eerie and unnatural movement, 
not to mention the ghost-like capacity of their ‘flight’. Though their main structural 
                                                 
18 Characters will be refered to in italics to emphasise not only on their fictional nature, but also their 
function as individual artworks in Taeuber’s œuvre. 
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material is wood, they depend on tiny metal links between the segments to maintain 
their swinging motions: their movements are simultaneously limp and precisely 
controlled. The puppets are liberated from human concerns (gravity, normal 
distribution of joints), but are still constrained to passively respond to another’s 
force. This combines chance and deliberate choice in a way that provides a 
productive arena for subjective creation. In this way the relationship between choice 
and its situation corresponds with Beauvoir’s theory that ‘le monde nous renvoie le 
reflet d’un choix qui se confirme à travers ce monde qu’il a façonné’ (MA: 53). Our 
relationship with the world is subjective and situational, but also reciprocal. 
Like the Dada-Köpfe, the puppets are hairless, though they all wear hats: a choice 
of feature that appears to signify relative social standing. Golden headwear, with its 
clear regal connotations, ranges from König [King] Deramo’s (Fig. 8) slightly 
unconventional crown, and the golden antlers of Hirsch [Stag] (Fig. 9), to the high 
intellectual status of Freud (Fig. 10), Dr Komplex, and Tartaglia (Fig. 11) the King’s 
Prime Minister. Within this set there is variation between the intricacies of royal 
headwear, and the simple, smaller ornamentation of political or psychological 
power. Angela (Fig. 12) and Truffaldino (Fig. 13), on the other hand, wear plain, 
coloured hats but have alternative signifiers, their tulle and feather accoutrements 
denoting a different kind of social role. Truffaldino’s feathers give a clear reference to 
his profession of birdcatcher. He also has two hands per arm, which we can presume 
to be an advantage in his line of work, or which could indicate a link between his 
character and his name, which literally translates as ‘swindler’. 
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Angela’s adornment alludes to her status as König Deramo’s future bride, most 
obviously through the use of the colour white, but also in that tulle is a common 
fabric in wedding dresses.  Renée Riese Hubert argues that this use of fabric suggests 
a scopophilic gesture (in Sawelson-Gorse ed. 1999: 535). I disagree, since the body 
underneath is already clothed, insofar as the puppets’ bodies are painted, with no 
bare wood visible. The body and clothing are one. Taeuber’s attachments then play a 
positive associative role, as small, extra indications of character. I would also argue 
that although scopophilia has been read into the attitudes and work of the movement 
in a more general sense, Taeuber’s individual work and character do not necessarily 
lend themselves to it. In some respects, applying translucent fabric over an opaque, 
block version of the same (or similar) colour serves to amplify colour and texture, 
rather than encourage a penetrating gaze. This is particularly so since the latter 
would be more effectively evoked by the use of contrasting colour.  
These physical markers perform an interrogation of the meaningfulness of 
symbolic connotations, ironically displayed through their abstract construction. It is 
significant and instructive that the Dada interpretation chooses to substitute Gozzi’s 
magician and apprentice with Freud and Dr Komplex (Riese Hubert in Sawelson-
Gorse ed. 1999: 534), replacing magical scheming with contemporary psychological 
manipulation. Furthermore, the use of a play whose plot centres around deception, 
masks and disguise projects Dada’s love of play and façade through the spontaneous 
momentum of its performative roots in the Cabaret Voltaire. The performance of this 
complex relationship through the puppet at arm’s length is illustrative of the positive 
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expression of an internal distancing of the self. As Beauvoir states, the individual ‘ne 
se rejoint que dans la mesure où il consent à demeurer à distance de soi-même’ (MA: 
19). Notably sustaining this alignment with Beauvoir, Taeuber’s (and, as we will see, 
Höch’s) dolls do not claim to be a form of escapism through this distance, for as 
Beauvoir relates ‘se mettre “dehors”, c’est encore une manière de vivre le fait 
inéluctable qu’on est dedans’ (MA: 96). The puppets maintain a simultaneous 
position of inside and outside, literal suspensions of being. 
The way in which these characters mimic and mock contemporary 
psychologists demonstrates Dada’s typical rejection of grand narratives and systems 
such as psychoanalysis. One of Dada’s pet peeves, psychoanalysis is condemned by 
Tzara in the movement’s eponymous publication: ‘La psycho-analyse [sic] est une 
maladie dangereuse [qui] endort les penchants anti-réels de l’homme et systématise 
la bourgeoisie’ (in D3: 2). Tartaglia parodies this opinion in his most important 
moment, at which he is attributed the line “Kill me, kill me. I have not analysed 
myself and can’t stand it anymore!” (in Dickerman ed. 2005: 31). This parody of 
mental states and treatments foregrounds Dada’s attachment to states of madness as 
reactions to trauma. Several members had avoided conscription through feigning 
madness, and consequently it might be suggested that they came to identify with this 
mental state, where it seemed to them that it was the world itself that had gone 
mad.19 Additionally, we may wonder whether the parody of narratives, especially 
the dominant theme of psychoanalysis, puts the puppets into the theatrical role of the 
                                                 
19 Furthermore, feigning madness was a strategic and inherently sensible means of staying alive in a 
wartime situation: in this respect, madness = sanity. 
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fool, who traditionally is able to call into question societal norms without facing the 
punishment associated with such an action. The fool performs societal concerns, 
externalising them to the point of condemning or denying them. As Juliet Koss states 
on Bauhaus theatre, ‘[b]lending child's play with serious adult activity, performances 
could serve both as entertainment and as psychological ventilation’ (2003: 728). Dada 
puppetry (and its performance more widely) does just this. 
This notion of play as both escape and ventilation allows us to compare 
Taeuber’s puppets to Hannah Höch’s Dada Puppen [Dada Dolls] (1916, Fig. 14), 
predominantly through their role as passive playthings, but also as full-body 
externalisations of the self. It is notable that Höch’s role in Dada, though arguably 
more acknowledged than Taeuber’s, is also often downplayed by her male 
counterparts. Richter describes her as ‘quiet’, and a ‘good girl’, noting that ‘[h]er tiny 
voice would only have been drowned by the roars of her masculine colleagues’ (AA: 
132). Since ‘Puppet’ (a word notably similar to the German ‘Puppen’) and ‘doll’ share 
a common etymology through the Old French popette (‘little doll’) and in turn from 
the Latin pupa (‘girl, doll’) (Online Etymology Dictionary), we may consider that both 
Taeuber and Höch used this particular medium to reject the uninvited ‘good girl’ 
image assigned to them. This again demonstrates a desire to throw off an assumed 
image created by the other – even if this was by their fellow (male) Dadas – based 
upon a societally created stereotype.  
Unlike Taeuber’s puppets, Höch’s Puppen are constructed from fabric, board 
and beads, so lose some of the (literal and metaphorical) ‘wooden’ qualities of the 
61 
 
König Hirsch characters. Höch’s dolls are furthermore not controlled by strings, 
demanding either lesser interaction (moving the doll as a whole instead of a sum of 
its parts), or greater interaction (physically handling the limbs instead of tugging on 
strings) on the part of the user, a contrast that we have seen between Taeuber’s and 
Hausmann’s Heads. This differing involvement in combination with Höch’s choice of 
beads as a decorative material initially suggests greater similitude with Taeuber’s 
Dada-Köpfe, yet the beads go beyond adornment in Höch’s case. Here they act as 
dividers between body parts, both through being more markedly extrusive, and also 
through contrasting their hardness with the softness of the stuffed, fabric bodies. The 
beads loosely perform the role of extremities, often rendering more abstract the body 
parts’ original functions. In this respect they perform the same manipulation of 
senses as we saw in the Dada heads: supplanting eyes, mouths and hands, these 
beads replace traditional representations of the senses with hardened, restricted 
shapes. As with the Dada heads, this alteration of sensory function gives the dolls an 
air of confinement or blockedness. 
Like Taeuber’s puppets, Höch’s Puppen are fragmented: their divisions are 
highlighted by changing colours and conform structurally to pattern pieces in 
dressmaking (for example, sleeves, bodice, skirt). They maintain for the most part a 
normal division of human anatomy, lacking Taeuber’s ‘multijointed’ approach. 
Notably though, both Dada Puppen are embellished at the neck, something that 
introduces a conflict of implicit severance of the head from the body. These 
embellishments cut off and constrict, without literally severing. This conflict is 
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something that we have seen carried across from Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe and puppets 
which divide and re-combine in constant manipulation of expression.  
Physically the Puppen are less androgynous than the König Hirsch puppets, with 
the exception of their hair, which maintains a mid-level length not unusual in either 
gender.20 The dolls maintain the pinched waists of a traditionally ‘feminine’ figure, as 
well as being dressed in skirts. However, the curved female figure was notably 
rebelled against in the Western world in the 1920s, so while ‘maintaining’ this aspect 
it may also be one of parody. As Hemus explains, ‘[w]ith mismatched eyes and 
straggly hair, they appear clownish and grotesque. Their breasts, made out of 
circular fabric and beads and sewn on the outside, give them an overtly sexual 
aspect’ (2009: 121). This does not necessarily give the dolls a conclusively negative 
image; Maud Lavin states that Höch’s ‘androgynous images depict a pleasure in the 
movement between gender positions and a deliberate deconstruction of rigid 
masculine and feminine identities’ (1990: 67). Furthermore, ‘[Höch’s] representation 
of androgyny introduced a radical and non-hierarchal sexual ambiguity’ (ibid.: 79). 
In this respect, Höch’s Puppen are aggressive but egalitarian: by caricaturing sexual 
difference, the artist allows for a levelling of identities, as we already saw in the 
Dada-Köpfe and their accessories. 
This mockery and breakdown of gender binaries can be compared to Taeuber’s 
parody of psychoanalysis through the König Hirsch characters. Both the puppets and 
the dolls perform a blurring of traditional boundaries which enables an ambiguous, 
                                                 
20 Both Taeuber and Höch wore their hair in a cropped style, an established sign of independence. 
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constructed identity through this external representation. Gustaf Almenberg states 
that Dada ‘sought to provoke or even alienate the spectator’, unlike Participatory Art, 
which ‘invites the spectator to contribute her or his own creativity in order to 
experience it’ (2010: 13-14). Through the puppets and dolls analysed here, however, I 
disagree with this claim. It is precisely their focus on manipulation and play that can 
be said to provoke the spectator into contributing their own creativity. Furthermore, 
the ability, through the puppets, to create these creatures while remaining hidden 
behind the strings allows the artist to take an outside view of their own identity. 
These creations provide a fundamental othering of the self, and as Sartre claims, 
‘[p]our obtenir une vérité quelconque sur moi, il faut que je passe par l’autre’ (EH: 
59). The puppets allow for a flexible and positive reciprocity of self and other from 
this self as other.  
Hemus states that ‘[i]deologically, the use of puppets questions agency and 
authorship, foregrounding questions about the artist’s role, as well as about self-
determination more broadly’ (2009: 62). We can connect this to the puppets’ 
exemplification of the cabaret performance style: by acting out roles and constructing 
a façade as new assemblage for artistic expression, the performer-as-puppet projects 
and enacts a deliberate blurring of truth, reality, current self and potential self. As 
‘kinetic’ or ‘participatory’ art (Almenberg 2010: 54),21 Taeuber’s puppets dissolve the 
boundary between art and the artist, embracing a carnivalesque play between the 
                                                 
21 Almenberg points out that, as Participatory Art, Dada works such as Taeuber’s also had a significant 
impact on the audience, taking away the role of ‘passive spectator’ and replacing it with that of an 
‘intended provoké’ (2010: 55). 
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reality of the artist and the concept of the character, versus the concept of the artist 
and the concrete art work.22 This is embodied in a contradiction between the 
apparent ultimate freedom of the puppet, which is nevertheless controlled by its 
strings. 
Sartre’s account of the look specifically describes the notion of seeing the other 
as ‘rien d’autre qu’une poupée’ (EN: 293), a rendering of the other’s ‘thingness’ that 
enables us to perceive our own existence as object. The puppets and dolls we have 
looked at can be used to represent an extension of the external mask. Both Taeuber’s 
and Hausmann’s head sculptures showed an externalisation of the face, as well as a 
focus on the masking of thought and emotion. Through the puppet and doll figures, 
we can transfer this notion of masking to its representation by the full body. 
Executed in miniature, these Dada bodies can be seen in full, as well as in relation to 
their surroundings. Their status as figurines permits their manipulation, either by 
strings with the puppets, or by direct manipulation of the dolls’ soft bodies. This 
allows for a distancing from the self and an emphasis on the assemblage of features 
from without. Additionally, it creates a space for the self to be viewed as other, a 
creative interrogation of identity. We will now see how this distance is maintained 
when viewed from within. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 This is an area on which pressure is maintained across Dada work, as we will see through Chapter 
Three’s ‘characters’, as well as in a wider sense of performed identity in Chapter Five. 
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Fabric Faces and Musical Mimesis: Performing the Mask 
Mlle. S. Taeuber: bizarrerie délirante dans l’araignée de la main vibre rhythme rapidement ascendant 
vers le paroxysme d’une démence goguenarde23 capricieuse belle. 
(Tzara in D1: 16) 
Taeuber’s dance and costume design is an integral part of her interdisciplinary 
œuvre. Unfortunately, much of her work in these areas has become inaccessible 
either through the inherent ephemerality of the medium or the lack of recording 
technology at the time of performance. Her work was also under-documented due to 
objections made by the Zurich School of Applied Arts (where she taught) regarding 
her involvement with a group like Dada, a connection that was considered 
inappropriate due to the movement’s disorderly and provocative nature. In this 
respect her continued involvement with the movement in masked form showed a 
desire to reject externally imposed behavioural constructs in favour of an actively 
chosen existence, in the manner of the Existentialist tenets of individuality and 
authenticity demonstrated thus far. The little that we know of Taeuber’s work in 
these areas comes through accounts from fellow Dadas, as well as very few 
remaining photographs (see Figures 15-16). Both of these types of records are 
problematic to evaluate with any objective certainty: Dada accounts are known for 
fabrication (as well as distinct lack of documentation of female participants), and it is 
often (deliberately) problematic to identify the dancer behind the mask, especially 
when records rely on the aforementioned Dada accounts. 
                                                 
23 ‘Goguenard’, according to the Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, combines 
‘goguette’ (‘propos joyeux, plaisanterie’) with the suffix ‘-enard’ (‘menteux’), giving us the sense of 
enjoyment in deception certainly foregrounded in Dada dance and costume. 
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A further problem encountered in assessing Taeuber’s Dada dancing is 
elucidated by Jill Fell, who relates that ‘[t]he difficulty in isolating Taeuber’s 
individual contribution to the Dada group effort is that the concept of uplifting the 
individual over a combined effort ran contrary to her personal philosophy as an 
artist’ (in Adamowicz and Robertson eds 2012: 17). I do not entirely agree with this, 
given the extensive individuality promoted by the artist, yet Taeuber’s unwillingness 
to highlight a single individual illustrates the Existentialist tendency toward equal 
coexistence. Building upon the insistence of the equality of differing personal values, 
Sartre states that  
la première démarche de l’existentialisme est de mettre tout homme en possession de ce qu’il 
est et de faire reposer sur lui la responsabilité totale de son existence. Et, quand nous disons que 
l’homme est responsable de lui-même, nous ne voulons pas dire que l’homme est responsable 
de sa stricte individualité, mais qu’il est responsable de tous les hommes. (EH: 31) 
It is precisely this complex relationship between the individual and the group that 
makes Taeuber’s role in the events of Zurich Dada so important and instructive. This 
section will investigate the role of costume as mask, of body as mask, as well as mask 
as expression through movement and dance, both for the individual and as group 
activity. 
Janco retrospectively described Taeuber’s performance style as ‘jerky and 
syncopated expressions exactly like the chords of good jazz or the restrained and 
dignified sadness of American blues’ ([1957] in Verkauf ed. 1975: 23). Janco’s 
depiction of Taeuber’s movement is instructive if we consider its implications as 
reproducing the improvised (yet structured) excitement of jazz and the expressive lilt 
of blues. Janco specifically compares Taeuber to the chords of jazz, perhaps the most 
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structured element underneath the fluid and winding solo part(s) of this particular 
musical form. Additionally, while jazz music gives the impression of embracing 
freeform style, especially through improvisation, it remains grounded in (and 
restricted by) patters of tonality and rhythm. Structure and organisation are two 
fundamental principles across Taeuber’s work as well as within her own personality, 
so we may presume that this juxtaposition of excitement and structure was one on 
which Janco chose to capitalise. 
Taeuber danced not only to music but also alone in ‘silence’ (in terms of lack of 
deliberate, organised sound) – as was Laban’s style24 – and to poetry read by Dadas 
at the raucous soirées. The relationship of Taeuber’s dancing with music and silence 
enacts Camus’s theory that 
Le monde n’est jamais silencieux; son mutisme même répète éternellement les mêmes notes, 
selon les vibrations qui nous échappent. Quant à celles que nous percevons, elles nous délivrent 
des sons, rarement un accord, jamais une mélodie. Pourtant la musique existe où les 
symphonies s’achèvent, où la mélodie donne sa forme à des sons qui, par eux-mêmes, n’en ont 
pas, où une disposition privilégiée des notes, enfin, tire du désordre naturel une unité 
satisfaisante pour l’esprit et le cœur. (HR: 320) 
In this respect Taeuber’s dancing brings out the less obvious elements of music put 
forward by Camus: vibrations and underlying structures that are often overlooked in 
the focus on melody. Furthermore, both Taeuber and Camus underline the 
mutability of music and sound, and of sound and movement. Taeuber’s work can 
certainly be interpreted to ‘tire[r] du désordre naturel une unité satisfaisante pour 
l’esprit et le cœur’, through her careful constructions as well as the evident pleasure 
                                                 
24 For more detailed research on Laban and music, see Vera Maletić (1987: 160). 
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she gained from systematic unity and harmony. As Taeuber herself expressed, ‘[a] 
strong, discriminating sense of color is a constant source of joy’ (in Rotzler 1993: 89).  
We can imagine the effect of this unity alongside the idea of Taeuber dancing 
accompanied by (or accompanying) Dada poetry, especially if we consider the 
medium of the sound and simultaneous poems that were read at the cabaret. For 
example, Tzara, Huelsenbeck and Janco’s L’Amiral cherche une maison à louer (1916, in 
Cabaret Voltaire: 6-7) is structured in a way that removes attention from a traditional 
‘melody line’. Of particular relevance in this work is the sonority of the verse: it is not 
only in three-part linguistic ‘harmony’ but is also polyphonic, inherently 
representative of Dada’s tendency for being ‘orchestrated noise to a dulling melody’ 
(Allen in Foster ed. 1996: 60). 
Through L’Amiral’s air of incomprehensibility, the poem creates a substitute 
sonic universe where the combined sound overrides its constituent parts.  Because of 
this dense construction of albeit ‘rampantly independent’ voices (Forcer in Tarantino 
and Caruso ed. 2009: 194), L’Amiral rarely has a striking ‘melody’, bar occasional 
moments where only one voice is active, yet the final measure (‘l’amiral n’a rien 
trouvé’) again can be said to ‘tire[r] du désordre naturel une unité satisfaisante…’: 
despite the negative content, the voices are in complete unison. Thus its playful 
idioglossia reflects the rebel both in its creation of a new world and in its rejection of 
dominant (multi-)linguistic structures. Taeuber’s dancing foregrounds this play of 
disorder and unity: the fragmented costumes and the jerky, ragged movements are 
predominantly meaningful through their composite form. Like the voices in L’Amiral, 
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the collection of contrasting fragments (aim to) provide a substitute ‘out of this 
world’ option for the self, or ‘option for consciousness’ (Pichon in Pichon and Riha 
eds 1996: 15).  
This poem, especially in relation to the events of the Cabaret Voltaire more 
broadly, is an instructive comment on otherness. As T. J. Demos elucidates, 
the poem became a cosmopolitan stage for multilingual interaction, nonhierarchically 
intermingling the plural speech of displaced subjects – words inevitably mixed with others from 
different languages, each continually invaded by an otherness not only foreign but also an 
integral part of the poem. One striking conclusion is that belonging and foreignness become 
identical, as the poem dismantles the exclusionary basis of national identity. (in Dickerman and 
Witkowsky eds 2005: 12) 
Fundamentally it can be said that it is from the basis of this multi- and inter-
linguality that Dada’s interdisciplinarity thrived, creating a composite mask hinging 
on a core sense of belonging and foreignness as identical, coexisting displacements 
on which to build a constantly mutating, heterogeneous whole. Furthermore, the 
rejection of standard linguistic sense as well as a focus on the primary medium of 
sound implies, as we saw through Taeuber’s thoughts on art, a refusal of the ‘rules’ 
that represent obstacles in the way of the dialogue within and without the self. 
Taeuber’s experience as a dancer proves an influence across her art: a certain 
grace and flow in her fabric constructions, as well as movement in the puppets that 
mimicked, if not enhanced, her ‘hundred-jointed’ gestures and ‘fantastic movements’ 
(FT: 102). It is instructive that Taeuber would have been one of the only trained 
dancers at the Cabaret: Fell writes that ‘[t]he Dada creed demanded no dancing skill 
from the performers’, but also that the interaction between the Laban dancers and the 
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Dadas resulted in a ‘cross-pollination of skills and ideas between the two groups’ (in 
Adamowicz and Robertson 2012: 17). This likely had a positive effect on the hybrid 
identity of Dada. Ball ‘implies that she made herself into a puppet’ (Fell 1999: 278), an 
object manipulated at will by the poet and the gong beat(er). The dance is then not 
only influenced by the expression of the dancer, but also interprets the medium of 
vocalised poetry and the simultaneously percussive and enharmonic qualities of the 
gong.25 It is this constant multi-directional flow of influence that gives Taeuber’s 
work such artistic and philosophical weight. It remains difficult to tell which, if any, 
was her primary art form, and her interdisciplinarity lends itself to Dada’s preference 
for constantly evolving, hybrid identities, as well as the sense of ‘becoming’ that we 
saw through Deleuze, and the perpetual constructedness of identity seen through 
Sartre (cf., for example, EH: 26).  
Taeuber’s dancing is inextricably linked to her costumes, which have further 
been tied to Janco’s Dada masks through the ludic performances and antics of the 
Cabaret Voltaire: ‘Taeuber’s dances, as she acted out the spirit of the mask, generated 
real excitement with their sharp, absurd angles and jagged aggression, recreating the 
energy of the primitive and soaring towards apparent delirium’ (Fell 1999: 283). Yet 
for all the references to Taeuber’s movements being jagged, sharp and jerky, Emmy 
Hennings described her thus:  
her walk and all her movements were full of natural grace and charm. A pupil of the Laban 
school of dance, there was nothing stiff or rigid about her. But even her almost playfully 
                                                 
25 Because gongs are enharmonic, they produce the whole spectrum of pitches simultaneously. In this 
respect they offer a ‘hundred-jointed’ gesture of their own. 
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confident control of her limbs was surpassed by her control of her spiritual being, which had no 
trace of anything exaggerated or overdone (in Rotzler 1993: 85) 
We must assume then that the aggression of the dances required great input and 
control on the dancer’s part. Ball’s accounts detail the masks’ effect on the performer 
– ‘not only did the mask immediately call for a costume; it also demanded a quite 
definite, passionate gesture, bordering on madness’ (FT: 64) – and elements of these 
masks are visible in the rare photographs of Taeuber’s dancing.  
In one photograph (Fig. 15), Taeuber wears a costume designed by Arp, with a 
mask by Janco. The jagged costume mirrors the sharp, bold edges of the mask, and 
both display a collection of shards of material. The arm tubes, while in some ways 
restricting the motion of the elbows and wrists, impose a different kind of movement 
on the dancer. Freest at the shoulder, the arm loses some of its hinging motions and 
foregrounds a pendular swinging action reminiscent of the puppets with their metal 
links. Although the arms are still able to bend, they are made heavier and more 
imposing on their lower ends, finished off with menacing claws. The bodily 
wrappings give the impression of a collage of rags, and in this photo the legs are left 
in the dark,26 their invisibility lending itself to a floating, ‘abstract, guignolesque 
dance’ (Fell 1999: 271) shared with the puppets. These elements combine to suggest a 
whirling, ragtime play of colour, form and sound: a constant tension between playful 
fragmentation and immaculate structure present across Taeuber’s work.  
                                                 
26 This aspect is reminiscent of Man Ray’s Portemanteau (1920), which uses a black stocking against a 
black background to mimic removal of the lower limb. However, the Taeuber photo conveys a 
dynamic sense of movement, whereas the Man Ray photograph is posed and static. 
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Ball wrote of Janco’s masks that their ‘varied individuality inspired us to invent 
dances’ (FT: 64). Furthermore, a passage within his diaries leads us to wonder 
whether the dancer described refers to Taeuber in our photo: 
The dancing figure starts from the crouching position, gets straight up, and moves forward. The 
mouth of the mask is wide open, the nose is broad and in the wrong place. The performer’s 
arms, menacingly raised, are elongated by special tubes. […] Long, cutout [sic], golden hands 
on the curved arms. The figure turns a few times to the left and to the right, then slowly turns 
on its axis, and finally collapses abruptly to return slowly to the first movement. (FT: 64)27 
This unique description, through its likeness to the costume worn by Taeuber, 
potentially represents one of the only accounts we have of the physical gestures that 
made up Taeuber’s dancing. The ambiguity of identity raised by Taeuber as masked 
dancer is instructive as an externalisation and interrogation of formal characteristics 
of an individual, as well as their relationship with their temporal and social context. 
As Ball states, ‘[w]hat fascinates us about the masks is that they represent not human 
characters and passions, but characters and passions that are larger than life. The 
horror of our time, the paralyzing background of events, is made visible’ (FT: 64-65).  
Ball’s description of this quintessential Dada mask event at the Cabaret Voltaire 
not only foregrounds the externalisation of ‘larger than life’ characters and emotions, 
exploring close up the concerns of the time, but also shows how the mask brings the 
wearer ‘hors de soi’ through its demand for ‘madness’. We can draw together this 
reference to madness with Tzara’s description of Taeuber as evocative of a certain 
‘démence’, which breaks down etymologically to de + mens = out(side) of one’s 
mind (Online Etymology Dictionary). Additionally, this notion of madness provoked 
                                                 
27 It is instructive that Ball’s depiction of the dancing figure is markedly gender neutral, since this 
supports our notion of the levelling of identities discussed earlier. 
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by the masks fits with Sartre’s idea quoted earlier, that of the other having a 
‘deformed image’ of the self in relation to one’s own self-image. This flitting between 
deformity and fragmentation opens up possibilities for a more ambiguous (and 
flexible) self. 
Taeuber’s own ‘Hopi Indian’ full-body costumes (Fig. 16) provide a stark 
contrast with the Janco-Arp costume discussed above.28 Unlike the ragged splinters 
of Janco’s mask, Taeuber’s own masks recall some of the geometric shapes, colours29 
and lack of blending or shading that we saw in the Dada Heads. The costume that 
Taeuber wears is complete with beads as accessories, like the Dada-Kopf we 
compared to a portrait of the artist, and more loosely, the Dada Puppen. Like Janco’s, 
the masks are larger than a human head, but instead of the elongated facial mask 
which sits on the surface of the face her box-like creations appear to entirely 
encompass the head. Additionally, they seem to be made from coloured fabric, 
unlike Janco’s use of paper, cardboard and paint. Taeuber’s full costumes then retain 
a certain fluidity from head to body: where Janco and Arp’s mask/costume 
combination gives the impression of a fragmented collage of jagged shards, 
Taeuber’s full costume represents a systematic unity (‘unité satisfaisante’?) within its 
division into geometric shapes. We might additionally wonder if and how this would 
affect the dances produced when wearing the different costumes, if the dancing was 
                                                 
28 For further detail on the history of the Hopi Kachina doll, see Harold S. Colton (1959). The fact that 
Taeuber chose to incorporate elements of another culture’s dolls into her costumes draws the doll 
metaphor forward from the Heads and puppets into her dance. 
29 Although photographs of these costumes are in black and white format, Taeuber’s sketches indicate 
that the masks were designed to continue both the patterns and the colours of the costumes. See for 
example Schick, Kornhoff and von Asten eds (2009: 38-39). 
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indeed inspired by the masks and costumes. The collage of shards would certainly 
make a noisier dance than if wearing fabric costumes. 
Arp’s costume to go with Janco’s mask looks improvised, whereas Taeuber’s 
body costume is composed and structured within standard clothing construction 
(again, like the Dada Puppen), and respects the natural contours of the body (thus 
presumably not greatly hindering movement). Instructively, the single exception to 
the ‘human-shaped’ aspect of this design is the head, which represents the costume’s 
most unnaturally constructed part. What is the significance of this marked inflation 
of the head, and distortion of facial features? We are reminded of the foregrounding 
of these aspects in the Dada-Köpfe (and the Mechanischer Kopf), and the constant 
centralisation of the measuring of identity through the face, as well as the 
psychological notion of the location of the self in the head. 
The masks, costumes and their wearers examined above create a series of 
reflections which are nonetheless independent of mirrors, recalling Sartre’s depiction 
of the inevitable influence of definitions of the self through the other in his Huis Clos. 
Sartre’s play is entirely set in a room with no reflections, forcing the inhabitants to 
see themselves through each other. The character Estelle even questions her own 
existence through not being able to see herself, saying that ‘quand je ne me vois pas, 
j’ai beau me tâter, je me demande si j’existe pour de vrai’ (HC: 44). In contrast with 
the room in Huis Clos, which ‘is no room at all, but rather the open arena of 
incriminating exposure and persecution’ (Simon 1963: 66), we can posit the room(s) 
of the Cabaret as an exploring ground: its activities are exposed, but as a means of 
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catharsis through the highlighting of the ‘horror of our time, the paralyzing 
background of events’ (cf. FT: 65). Additionally, while the characters of Huis Clos are 
doomed to an eternity of ‘incriminating’ reflection, the Dada mask was used as a 
means to create an alternative visage and identity. 
Taeuber’s need to mask her participation in Dada events, both physically and 
pseudonomically, gains new freedom from this close relationship with façade. 
Through Dada’s fluctuating relationship with masks and the truth, we are reminded 
that, ordinarily, we see a mask and expect to be deceived. Sometimes, however, what 
you see is what you get. As expressed by Sartre, ‘il faut prendre les choses comme 
elles sont’ (EH: 73-74). These masks and their relationship with truth and deception30 
are intrinsically linked to the relationship with the other, as well as the self as other. 
Indeed as Sartre states, ‘la structure du monde implique que nous ne pouvons voir 
sans être visibles’ (EN: 357). We have seen that in Dada art, the notion of selfhood is 
often projected outside the self, as in the Dada Heads and puppets, where traditional 
mimesis is rejected in favour of fragmentation, and yet where the human aspect is 
maintained to the extent that we can view it is an intention of the exploration of 
identity.  
Sartre’s concept of the look is fundamental to the experiences described in this 
chapter. The transfer of the objectivity of the other to the objectness of the self to the 
other creates a mutual need for the reassessment of identity as a whole. The masks in 
particular provide a creative externalisation of the performed self, an ‘hors de soi’ 
                                                 
30 Truth and deception will be discussed more fully in Chapter Five. 
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position that allows for increased emphasis on individual choice, and awareness of 
its effects. As George Ross Ridge comments on Huis Clos, ‘there are no mirrors in the 
salon because no one can look at himself objectively; each dresses the different 
mannequins of his own personality for the other two’ (1957: 437). While this may be 
indicative of bad faith in the case of Garcin, Inès and Estelle, the Dada performers’ 
dressing, through costumes and masks, displays attributes of Sartre’s definitions of 
choice, and the authenticity of forwarding characteristics that one has chosen without 
the pressure of external fetters. Through Garcin and Inès’s respective comments that 
‘on est ce qu’on veut’, and ‘tu n’es rien d’autre que ta vie’ (HC: 90) Sartre prefigures 
his own later statement that ‘l’homme n’est rien d’autre que ce qu’il se fait’ (EH: 30). 
The notion of the look is an intrinsic part of being-for-others, by which we create our 
relationships around how others make us feel. Ball related that ‘each one of us [tried] 
to outdo the other in inventiveness’ (FT: 64): through this competition the dancers 
were able to feed off and build upon each other’s creativity. Through this constantly 
fluctuating awareness of self and others, a new, ever becoming, changing and 
adapting identity is formed. 
Conclusion 
[L]a photo devient le masque des apparences extérieures, et le masque semble révéler des vérités 
intérieures 
(Dickerman in Le Bon ed. 2005: 1011) 
Through our analysis of the use of masks in the work of Taeuber within its 
Dada context, we have seen varying levels of interaction with the self: expansion, 
extension, and externalisation. These have demonstrated reciprocity between the self 
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and the mask and self as mask. One final notion to consider is the self-alongside-
mask, which can be analysed particularly productively through two photographs of 
Taueber entitled Self Portrait with Dada Kopf (1920 and 1926, Figures 17-18) and two 
photographs of Kiki of Montparnasse entitled Noire et blanche (Man Ray: 1926, 
Figures 19-20). Taeuber’s two self-portraits contain the same subjects, that of Taeuber 
with another 1920 Dada-Kopf (not discussed here), but differ greatly in mood of 
composition. The 1920 portrait (Fig. 17) shows a smiling Taeuber, frank and 
unadorned, half-hidden on her left-hand side by the Dada-Kopf. The 1926 photo (Fig. 
18), in contrast, shows a significantly more wrapped, unsmiling version of the artist. 
Taeuber wears a collared top, a bowler hat and a lace veil over her face.31 The Dada-
Kopf sits at a similar angle and distance from her face, but covers its right-hand side. 
Man Ray’s Noire et Blanche is a set of two photos of Kiki of Montparnasse alongside 
an African mask,32 one of which is a negative of the other. It is immediately useful to 
address these images as a pair because, as their title indicates, they play on the 
black/white binary in a way that the use of the negative extends.  
                                                 
31 We have seen that the use of translucent fabric can have varying effects on the surface upon which it 
sits. In this case the veil has a simultaneous effect of dissimulation and highlighting, its patterns 
interacting with the facial features of the artist in a way that does not obstruct her mouth, nose or eyes, 
and yet which adds further facial divisions across the cheek that share characteristics with the Dada 
Heads. 
32 Both the use of this mask and the anonymous nature of its own artist or background highlight 
Dada’s somewhat naively condescending/colonial use of ‘primitive’ cultures. However, we can 
interpret this tendency as a search for a lost or former self, a redemption for the horrors of the day 
through tracing a more innocent art and way of life. Additionally, despite the negative connotations 
we might associate with this kind of appropriation, we might view it as part of Dada’s rejection of 
early twentieth-century societal convention, through its levelling, if not privileging, of non-European 
art, especially through its use as an aesthetic inspiration rather than exploiting its ‘authentic’ artefacts 
for monetary gain. As Camus states, ‘[c]haque révolte est nostalgie d’innocence et appel vers l’être’ 
(HR: 139). Dada performs an ambiguous position ‘somewhere between the two strains [of] the 
‘civilised’ and the ‘primitive’’ (Pegrum 2000: 119). 
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Both artists highlight the fragile symmetry of the human face, as well as its 
expressive capacity. Each Taeuber photo hides a different side of her face, yet 
underlines a similarity between the two pictures. It is the facial covering that changes 
the mood of the picture, and which also renders Taeuber’s neutral expression 
gloomier or heavier. This is also the case in the blank expression of Kiki in Noire et 
blanche, which although unsmiling remains open and calm. The contrast between the 
two Taeuber photographs, as well as in comparison with the pair that make up Noire 
et blanche, highlight the many levels on which a mask can operate. The mood of the 
two ‘self-portraits’ is drastically different, depending on the layers of mask present. 
The veil in the Taeuber pictures, and the use of the negative (both chromatically and 
spatially) in the Man Ray photographs, foreground a difference in intended 
perception controlled by the artist.  
Beyond their presentation as self-alongside-mask, we can also view these 
photographs (and photography more broadly) as a self-outside-itself, or a self-
without-itself. This is most notably through the notion of non-identicality with the 
self: the photograph exactly reproduces an image of, yet is not, the subject, 
simultaneously demonstrably ‘same’, yet externalised from the self. This embodies 
two Sartrean paradoxes. Firstly that ‘[à] la limite de la coïncidence avec soi, en effet, 
le soi s’évanouit pour laisser place à l’être identique’ (EN: 112). Secondly, that  
l’apparition du regard est saisie par moi comme surgissement d’un rapport ek-statique d’être, 
dont l’un des termes est moi, en tant que pour-soi qui est ce qu’il n’est pas et qui n’est pas ce 
qu’il est, et dont l’autre terme est encore moi, mais hors de ma portée. (EN: 307) 
79 
 
From this we can posit that the photograph represents this limit of the self, especially 
if we consider that a photograph can easily outlive an individual. 
Through our analysis of a selection of Taeuber’s art, we find a unique and 
distinctive interdisciplinarity where artistic media are treated as part of an organic 
whole. As incorporative of so many techniques (and we must remember that Dada 
was only one of Taeuber’s many commitments, both in terms of profession and 
artistic movements), Taeuber’s œuvre proposes a full expressive possibility through 
art. Rotzler remarks that ‘[o]nce she had found the form, it became viable only when 
it was used in different contexts and fulfilled specific purposes. Thus the form 
assumed a universal character and became the cornerstone of a harmonious whole’ 
(Rotzler 1993: 90). This multi-directional flow between media simultaneously 
reminds us of, and encourages us to question, notions of mask as self and self as 
mask.  
In the work we have analysed here, emphasis is put on this relationship: behind 
every face is another; fragments are neatly arranged yet the cracks remain 
highlighted. Realist portraiture is rejected in favour of collages of abstract fragments. 
‘Free’ movement is ever dependent on chain links, yet this facilitates the extension of 
normal human capacities of motion. Clothing is reflective of faces, blurring the 
boundaries of the human form between surface wrapping and body. In turn the body 
becomes a ‘fluid screen, capable of reflecting back a present constantly undergoing 
redefinition and transformation’ (Chadwick 1996: 257), but also for the projection of 
multiple or hybrid identities, where the surface is not always the real face, and where 
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the mask and the face can become one. Fragments or aspects of identity can be 
collaged and layered to reflect genuine individual choice, a self-assembled self-
image. When identity is malleable, the individual can always remain authentic in 
themselves, building and remodelling at will as an expression of the self in flux.  
This chapter set out to respond to one of Sartre’s central Existentialist tenets, 
that ‘il faut partir de la subjectivité’ (EH: 26), as well as to apply his theories of the 
‘look’ to Dada articulations of self and other. From our examples of Dada works and 
events, we can certainly confirm Dada’s desire to foreground the personal creation of 
values. Although critics of Existentialism often deem this quality indicative of a self-
interested quietism, we must not consider it an introversion taken to the point of 
indifference towards the wellbeing of the other or indeed the world. Beyond this 
introspection, we can discern in Dada and its critics the need to apply its own theory 
to humanity more broadly. Micheline Tison-Braun states that ‘la révolte dada 
implique une conception positive de ce que l’homme et la vie devraient être’ (1977: 7; 
original emphasis). This can be used in conjunction with Sartrean subjectivity, in that 
‘en créant l’homme que nous voulons être, [on] crée en même temps une image de 
l’homme tel que nous estimons qu’il doit être’ (EH: 31-32).  
The chapter has initiated the thesis’s overarching aim of investigating the ways 
in which the Dada movement in general, and its art works in particular, proleptically 
react to the crisis of the post/modern individual in a way that aligns with a new 
philosophical outlook, particularly that of the French Existentialists. The use of 
interdisciplinarity and a constant sense of ‘becoming’ has begun to posit the 
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importance of ambiguity in Dada work and philosophy. The mask has been shown to 
form a central aspect of early Dada, geographically through the Zurich hub, and 
specifically through Taeuber, but also weaves its way throughout the movement, as 
we have seen through our Taeuber-satellite examples. Through both positive and 
negative aspects of fragmentation and assemblage we have seen how Existentialist 
notions of choice are important in Dada plastic arts and performance, contributing to 
the movement’s conception of selfhood in the artistic world. We will now move into 
the exploration of a singular art form, film, in order to analyse notions of reality, 
building upon this first chapter’s sense of the necessity to be ‘hors de soi’ to assess 
alienation in Dada cinema.  
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Figures 1-2: 
Dada-Kopf (Portrait of Hans Arp) (1918), Dada-Kopf (1920) 
Sophie Taeuber 
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Fig. 3: 
Assemblage on a Hand Mirror 1920/1922) 
Kurt Schwitters  
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Fig. 4: 
Mechanischer Kopf (der Geist unserer Zeit) (1919) 
Raoul Hausmann  
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Fig. 5: 
Hugo Ball Reciting his Sound Poem 
1916 
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Figures 6-9 (c/w from t/l): 
König Hirsch Puppets 
Sophie Taeuber, 1918 
Clockwise from top left: Dr Komplex, Wache, König Deramo, Hirsch 
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Figures 10-13 (c/w from t/l): 
König Hirsch Puppets 
Sophie Taeuber, 1918 
Clockwise from top left: Freud Analytikus, Tartaglia, Angela, Truffaldino  
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Fig. 14: 
Dada Puppen 
Hannah Höch, 1916 
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Fig. 15: 
Masked Dada Dancer (Sophie Taeuber?) 
Costume by Marcel Janco and Jean/Hans Arp, 1916 
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Fig. 16: 
Sophie Taeuber and Erika Schlegel Wearing ‘Hopi Indian’ Costumes 
Costumes by Sophie Taeuber, 1918-1920 
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Figures 17-18: 
Self-Portrait with Dada Kopf: 1, 2 
Sophie Taeuber, 1920, 1926 
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Figures 19-20: 
Noire et blanche: 1, 2 
Man Ray, 1926 
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- CHAPTER TWO - 
‘HOW AM I NOT MYSELF?’ ALIENATION AND REALITY IN 
DADA FILM 
Tempor(e)ality and Alienation 
In his writing on the perception of temporality, Sartre deconstructs the notion of past 
and future, stating that ‘le passé n’est plus, l’avenir n’est pas encore, quant au présent 
instantané, chacun sait bien qu’il n’est pas du tout, il est la limite d’une division 
infinie, comme le point sans dimension’ (EN: 142). This insistence on the present is 
critically visible in cinema, which not only alters our sense of temporality, but its 
illusion of movement also masks an infinite division of life into snapshots, frames 
and ‘dimensionless’ reference points, allowing a temporary disengagement with 
lived experience of the world, a disconnection from standard associations and 
participation in a creative interpretation of reality. Dada film,33 an abstract 
assemblage of flickering fragments, diaphanous distortion and constructed 
continuity, builds a rhythmic remanence that modifies perception with the view to 
destroy traditional narratives and blur artistic boundaries and reality.  
Dada film embraces cinematic representation while revealing it as a construct of 
technology: this ambivalent relationship allows for a self-referential, self-critiquing 
approach that exposes the notion of truth as subjective and malleable. This approach 
constantly interrogates the notion of perception-as-construct as an extension of the 
Sartrean concept of the ‘look’ instigated in Chapter One, foregrounding an 
                                                 
33 While strictly speaking the notion of ‘Dada’ film is anachronistic, Elsaesser puts forward a number 
of compelling reasons to retrospectively consider and label several films in this way, including the 
testimony of Dadas such as Richter (see Kuenzli ed. 1996: 13-27). It is for these reasons, as well as a 
personal opinion of the presence of Dada characteristics in the films studied in this chapter, that I will 
apply the Dada label to several works. 
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externalisation of the Dada self ‘[en] se projetant et en se perdant hors de lui’ (EH: 
76). This use of vocabulary is instructive as it overlaps with that of film, through the 
use of ‘(se) projeter’. This is useful if we are to consider film as a projection of the self 
outside of the self, especially in relation to Sartre’s notion that the individual is 
‘constamment hors de lui-même’, giving an additional layer of alterity to this 
outsiderness. 
This second chapter will investigate interpretations of alienation and the 
perception of reality in four Dada films: Man Ray’s Le Retour à la raison (1923) and 
Emak Bakia (1926), Léger and Murphy’s Le Ballet mécanique (1924) and Clair and 
Picabia’s Entr’acte (1924). These four films will be analysed as presented (including 
assigned accompanying music) on the Re:Voir DVD. The music for Entr’acte and 
Ballet mécanique were both written for purpose, Emak Bakia’s involved post-
production selection from Man Ray’s private collection (informed by, but not 
identical to, the original screening conditions), and Le Retour à la raison was and 
always has been silent. The chapter will follow Chapter One’s structure by 
maintaining a core focus on the work of Man Ray in interaction with a set of 
satellites.  
These films will be scrutinised while drawing on their parallels with Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty’s theories of perception and temporality, particularly through 
manipulation of both concepts as alienation of the self from reality. Man Ray 
achieves the effect of alienation through disconnection with reality not only through 
filming objects as external and physical presences, but also through working directly 
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onto the film reel in the form of his ‘rayographs’. Léger and Murphy combine the 
filming of ‘real’ objects with shapes created and modified on frames, incorporating 
not only text but also colour, meticulously applied to their flickering geometric 
shapes. Clair and Picabia experiment with reality through speed and direction, 
manipulating both to question the viewer’s perception of time.  
In this chapter we will see that Dada film manipulates time, movement, and 
materiality to assemble meaning through patterns in, and essentially infinite 
alterations of, perception and reality, including aphasia,34 pareidolia,35 and a 
synaesthetic cross-wiring of senses.36 The chapter will respond to this manipulation 
to ask: how does direct and indirect contact with the photographic film (through 
rayographs, chromatic alterations, and visual effects) alter the incredibly individual 
notion of the perception of space and time? Through this deliberate distortion of 
meaning, does Dada impose an aesthetic of perception, or anaesthetic of perception, 
an obliteration of reality or an alternative option? How should I continue to perceive 
myself, if I cannot be sure of the fundamental basis of my own perception? We have 
seen that Tzara, Camus and Sartre all considered the fundamental necessity of a 
viewpoint from a position outside of oneself (cf. Tzara in Buot 2002: 35; MS: 36; EH: 
76). I will investigate the implications of being outside of oneself alongside the notion 
                                                 
34 Aphasia is a disorder in which the sufferer experiences disruptions in their ability to produce and 
interpret language. 
35 Pareidolia is a phenomenon which describes the way in which we might read images into others in 
an effort to impose order on the chaos of the world. A common example is the perception of 
recognisable shapes in clouds. 
36 Synaesthesia is a condition in which an individual experiences unusual sensory connections. A 
common example is seeing colours on hearing sounds. 
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of alienation, and starting from an existential question from a popular contemporary 
film: ‘How am I not myself?’.37 
Filtering Reality 
It is not so much the reality of the matter and its problematic solidity, as its representation of 
landmarks to designate space, making us conscious of it through time and our own existence, which 
attaches the thing of representative form to our mental life. 
(Tzara in Schwarz ed. 1971: 104) 
Reality only begins at the point where things peter out. 
(FT: 53) 
Man Ray had his own unconventional and active way of viewing and (re-) 
interpreting film, filtering reality to suit his abstract approach. Describing his 
behaviour during cinema visits, he says ‘[j]’ai inventé un système de prisme que 
j’adaptais sur mes lunettes: je voyais ainsi, en couleurs et en images abstraites, des 
films en noir et blanc qui m’ennuyaient’ (in Hammond ed. 2001: 133). Ado Kyrou 
relates that ‘Man Ray has told me that if a film bores him he spontaneously 
transforms it by blinking his eyes rapidly, by moving his fingers in front of his eyes, 
making grilles of them, or placing a semi-transparent cloth over his face’ (in ibid. 
2001: 131). Man Ray’s application of his unique filter to film is clearly reproduced in 
his own work, forming his individual idea of how the world should appear.  
By adapting the work of others with physical filters such as his hands, Man Ray 
can be said to fulfil Tzara’s above focus on designations of space through his 
phalangeal ‘landmarks’ to individualise the films to his own time and experience. 
These aspects are primarily evident in Le Retour, which is predominantly made up of 
                                                 
37 I ♥ Huckabees (2004): this quotation, within the general purview of the film, foregrounds an 
exploration of the nature of authentic identity. 
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rayographs. Additionally, we can transfer Man Ray’s manipulation to Ballet 
mécanique which, although it does not use rayography, presents a rapid flickering of 
images reminiscent of Man Ray’s spontaneous transformations through blinking. 
Ballet mécanique is a tightly packed flurry of incessant movement, a film which 
highlights and drives to absurdity the process of repetition, and the way in which 
any movement, natural or machine, can be mechanised when (re)presented over and 
over. 
If we assume, via Merleau-Ponty (PP), that perception is learned through 
imitation and facilitated through experience, we still feel compelled to attach 
meaning to the meaningless and this will be done in an individualistic manner. This 
tension between experience and interpretation is evidenced in reactions to pictorial-
based psychological tests (Rorschach, Gestalt), in which images are predetermined to 
resemble certain objects, and which have two important contrasting results. Most 
individuals will respond in a similar fashion to the identification of the images, but 
not to the interpretation of the effect of these images on them as individuals. Indeed, 
a notable by-product of these tests is the designation of non-standard responses as 
problematic. The fact then that images in Dada film (particularly rayograph images) 
often do not ostensibly carry a preconceived definition compounds the 
individualistic reaction to them.  
Extending from this, we can posit movement of images as paradoxically 
assisting recognition, or improving perception, while presenting a decontextualised, 
false relation of movement to reality. Emak Bakia creates this effect by frequently 
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presenting objects that are perfectly recognisable, but non-functional (for example, a 
rotating shirt collar with no shirt or wearer). The use of objects in this way plays with 
their function in a similar way to the readymades: decontextualised, they become 
objects of aesthetic contemplation in their own right. While traditional meaning is 
never entirely lost, it becomes secondary, in these sequences, to the new sense 
provided by these dancing shapes. 
Deleuze states that ‘cinematographic movement is both condemned as 
unfaithful to the conditions of perception and also exalted as the new story capable 
of “drawing close to” the perceived and the perceiver, the world and perception’ 
(1992: 57). Dada film embodies this paradox: the movement of images gives the false 
impression of providing context and sense to the objects, while clarifying nothing at 
all. This delicate balance between the habitually interpretable and the bewildering is 
reflected by Merleau-Ponty: 
Si la liberté ne souffre en face d’elle aucun motif, mon être au monde habituel est à chaque 
moment aussi fragile, les complexes que j’ai nourris de ma complaisaince pendant des années 
restent toujours aussi anodins, le geste de la liberté peut sans aucun effort les faire voler en 
éclats à l’instant. (PP: 505) 
This ability of the free act to ‘faire voler en éclats’ is particularly applicable to the 
scattered, fragmented nature of many of Dada film’s non-habitual images, and their 
effect on our dependence on habits of perception. Even Entr’acte, which is 
constructed around a form of narrative, is distorted to such an extent that it carefully 
(and ludically) destroys our sense of reality. Similarly, Ballet mécanique incorporates a 
Cubist Charlie Chaplin, who is identifiable as such but is demonstrably ‘not himself’. 
Notably he ends the film being made to ‘voler en éclats’. 
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Le Retour is made up largely of rayographs: images produced by placing objects 
directly onto the photographic film and exposing them as pictures, ‘contact imagery’ 
(Adams Sitney 1979: 100) that allows objects to be inscribed directly onto the film, as 
if being experienced immediately and physically by the lens or eye, and thus 
significantly reducing the distance between, or ‘drawing close’, the perceiver and the 
perceived. These images produce an eerie effect of simultaneous presence and 
absence, and of past and present, a suspension of being in time. As Knowles explains,  
The rayograph process provides a perfect example of a suspension since the images are literally 
suspended between presence and absence. The black background is the ultimate representation 
of nothingness, whilst the white imprint of the image delineates only where the object was. 
(2009: 72)  
Thus Man Ray appears to simultaneously remove any distance between the (image 
of the) object and the camera and remove the object entirely. What we perceive to be 
the object is simply a (physical) memory of it. Through the realisation of this visual 
trick we are left with a gap in perception, or an anti-perception: we perceive the 
object precisely through its lack of being. In a sense, then, the rayographs align with 
Sartre’s theory that ‘il s’agit de constituer la réalité-humaine comme un être qui est ce 
qu’il n’est pas et qui n’est pas ce qu’il est’ (EN: 93).  
We may thus posit that Man Ray’s ‘contact imagery’ provides the closest means 
possible to overcoming the eye/camera divide through its ambiguous relationship 
with absence. The rayographs are created, and viewed, purely through play of light. 
Le Retour’s combination of rayographs and ‘real’ filming lends a certain artificiality to 
real objects, and a reality to the directly exposed objects. Fusing these two positions 
of the camera, there is a point in Emak Bakia at which the camera is thrown into the 
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air, thus becoming involved in the finished film, a disinterested participant as both 
subject and object through its absent physicality in this bizarre shot. Man Ray plays 
with this presence in his self-referential act that yet relinquishes authorial control, 
making the spectator more aware of the processes, and subjective creativity, of 
looking and seeing. 
What is the significance of the removal of the camera from the photographic 
process? The direct physical contact with objects leads us to be tempted to view all 
cinematic shots in this new way (as flattened images), reducing depth of perception, 
as well as highlighting the mechanical process of cinema. How is the experience of 
perception affected by the use of juxtaposed sequences and unrelated, if not 
unrecognisable, images? We have seen that we learn to interpret the world through 
experience, so perhaps we do not recognise some of these objects because we have no 
experience of them from this unique perspective: ‘there is a rupture between the 
image and the object to which it refers’ (Knowles 2009: 105; my emphasis). In this 
way Man Ray succeeds in breaking down visual expectations, and with it standard 
patterns of association and disassociation.  
There is a correlation between rayography and Christian Metz’s analysis of film 
through his discussion of photography and Barthes: 
When we look at a photograph, says Roland Barthes, we do not see a presence “being there” – 
for this definition is too loose and can be applied to any copy – but a presence that “has been 
there.” “We therefore have a new category of space-time: place present but time past – so that in 
still photography there is an illogical conjunction of here and then.” This explains the 
photograph’s quality of “real unreality”. (1974: 5-6; original emphasis)  
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Barthes’s designation of the photograph as displaying something as ‘here and then’ 
fits with the rayographs’ rendering of objects simultaneously present and absent, in 
that the image is a simple remanence of an object that was present. The rayograph 
seems to answer the question ‘How am I not myself?’ with another question: ‘Where 
was I myself?’. Furthermore, this space/time rupture renders the image ‘étrang[ère] 
à [elle-]même’ through its non-coincidence with self, an extension of the 
photographic non-identicality that we saw in Chapter One. 
Like Man Ray, Léger expressed the desire to overexpose objects to reveal them 
in a new way. This is notably done through two effective techniques. Firstly, through 
excessive repetition, Léger noted that ‘I wanted to amaze the audience first, then 
make them uneasy, and then push the adventure to the point of exasperation’ (in 
Kuenzli ed. 1996: 4). Secondly, through exaggerated close-up viewing, ‘[v]ous les 
verrez tous ces fragments grandis cent fois, devenant un tout absolu, dramatique, 
comique, plastique, plus émouvant, plus captivant que le personnage du théâtre d’à 
côté’ (Léger in Robertson 2011: 20). Through such close viewing we are presented 
with a paradox: the objects become ‘un tout absolu’ by their filling of the screen, and 
yet the limits of the screen often remove their natural edges. Through this the objects 
become simultaneously less identifiable (much like a sound with its attack removed), 
and a new whole in terms of their abstract assemblage, rather than a product of their 
traditionally quantifiable representational expectations.  
Robertson states that 
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Although the film relies on the human body and everyday objects, the use of extreme close up 
and the rhythmic editing of its sequences decontextualizes these elements of reality and 
emphasizes them as pure form (2011: 21). 
Both Léger and Man Ray’s exposures evade meaning by their extremely close focus: 
their ‘pure form’ becomes more important than any meaningful association. 
Merleau-Ponty states that ‘[q]uand, dans un film, l’appareil se braque sur un objet et 
s’en rapproche pour nous le donner en gros plan, nous pouvons bien nous rappeler 
qu’il s’agit du cendrier ou de la main d’un personnage, nous ne l’identifions pas 
effectivement’ (PP: 96; original emphasis). However, Man Ray and Léger rarely give 
us a view of the initial object: since we are forced to perceive purely in close-up, we 
cannot remember and instead have to find a way to identify what we see. Merleau-
Ponty relates the close-up to the reinterpretation of the ‘blank’: ‘en regardant 
attentivement la neige je décompose sa “blancheur” apparente qui se résout en un 
monde de reflets et de transparences’ (PP: 255): we de- and reconstruct the pure form 
of the screen to produce new subjective possibilities. 
Ballet mécanique shares Le Retour’s foregrounding of visual absence through a 
delight in manipulation of imagery, particularly through swinging or rotating 
objects, and reflective surfaces. These reflective objects play on presence and absence 
through their status both as object to be observed, and surface on which to perceive 
shapes, play of light, and even occasional views of the camera and authors. Ballet 
mécanique additionally exhibits an emphasis on verbal, written distortion. Although 
there is little written content, the single sequence, centred around the sentence ‘on a 
volé un collier de perles de 5 millions’, is layered with significance. This is a subtle 
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but not infrequent characteristic of Dada film, and while perhaps a residual 
attachment to traditional narrative, its lack of context usually removes our ability to 
relate to it, thus contributing to its destruction. It was reported in Vogue that the use 
of this sentence ‘is upsetting because one’s mind, hampered by literature, concludes 
that there must be meaning in it, whereas there isn’t’ (anonymous author, cited in 
Marcus 2007: 287). We might instead say that while the presence of disjointed written 
language in Dada film foregrounds a frustrating collection of linguistic shards, these 
fragments nevertheless carry semantic residue. The statement of ‘on a volé’ is 
therefore either (or both) declaimed as an impartial, independent event, objectively 
presented in clear white figures on a black background, or simply a starting point for 
a number of other interpretations. 
The sentence itself makes explicit reference to removal, notably of a very 
valuable necklace. However, the absence of currency means that we are only 
presented with a large number, of empty significance. The fragmentation and 
repetition of this phrase adds to the sense of absence, as various pieces of 
information are removed, as well as altered. The number 5 is on one occasion 
replaced by a 3, bringing into question the validity or value of the theft. An insistence 
on the ‘0’ figure visualises this nothingness on several levels, fitting with Sartre’s 
claim that ‘le néant introduit la quasi-multiplicité au sein de l’être’ (EN: 172), 
multiple levels of nihilation that yet stem from the same source. Not only does the ‘0’ 
figure often follow the fragment ‘on a volé’, thus negating the incidence (or the sense 
of accomplishment) of the theft entirely but, if this insistence on the white rounds is 
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representative of the constitutive pearls of said necklace, the shapes are yet hollow 
and empty. Finally we could interpret this succession as a rapid blinking of eyes or 
gaping mouths in shock (or sardonic enjoyment) at this bold claim. 
This use of both visual and verbal absence and removal gives rise to a feeling of 
aphasia. As Merleau-Ponty describes the condition,  
quand il s’agit de troubles de l’intention verbale, comme dans la paraphasie littérale, où des 
lettres sont omises, déplacées ou ajoutées, et où le rhythme du mot est altéré, [il s’agit] d’un 
nivellement de la figure et du fond, d’une impuissance à structurer le mot et à en saisir la 
physionomie articulaire. (PP: 237) 
Through this levelling of the figure and the background, our conventional ability to 
balance grounds is disrupted, and the consequent sense of removal effectively 
disconnects objects and sequences from potential meaning. Often partial meaning is 
given without indication of how to fill in the gaps, attempting to give us not 
nonsense but no-sense. We have seen this displacement through the ‘on a volé’ 
sequence in Ballet mécanique, but it is also particularly explicitly explored in Le Retour, 
which introduces a piece of ‘writing’ entirely made up of word-shaped blocks of 
black. The word-shaped blocks are suspended toward the out-of-field, in a state of 
simultaneous presence and absence. It is as if every word has been redacted, perhaps 
a humorous play on the idea of Ball’s ‘Verse ohne Worte’ [Poems without Words].  
Le Retour includes handwritten shapes in negative as rayographs, on which the 
artist’s name is faintly inscribed and fleetingly presented, and the writing is made 
significantly less legible not only because it is backwards, but also because of their 
placement within the frame (that is, the frame becomes a cut-off point). The 
familiarity of handwriting is alienated from its usual function as the asemic becomes 
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the ‘tout absolu’. The constant tension between presence and absence in these films 
provides a third option, that is, neither present nor absent, but both. We have seen 
that the resulting effect of aphasia relies upon a removal of meaning, yet our films 
show us that sense remains: a creative sense that stems from the viewer. We will now 
look at a further example of the creative manipulation of perception: varying levels 
of consciousness, through memory and dream. 
Emerging Realities: Dreams and (Mis-)Remembering 
[L]e souvenir nous présente l’être que nous étions avec une plénitude d’être qui lui confère une sorte 
de poésie. 
(EN: 154) 
Tant qu’on admet le rêve, la folie ou la perception, au moins comme absences de la réflexion […] on 
n’a pas le droit de niveler toutes les expériences en un seul monde, toutes les modalités de l’existence 
en une seule conscience. 
(PP: 342) 
On several occasions within Emak Bakia we are presented with the idea that 
preceding material may have been false, imagined, or dreamed. For example, in a 
sequence that plays on the eye/camera relationship, a woman in a car has false eyes 
over her lids; later, natural lids open to natural eyes; later still, eyes painted on 
eyelids open and close as if to render completely ambiguous the notion of 
awakeness, as well as the objectivity of seeing. This layering can be used to illustrate 
an ‘anti-nivellement’ of experiences and consciousness in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s 
description of the alternative worlds of dreams, reality and perception. As Edward 
A. Aiken describes, ‘[b]oth the eye of the camera (its lens) and the painted eye are 
boundaries between the inner world of dreams and memory and the outer world of 
wakefulness and history’ (1983: 243). Man Ray expressed the desire to blur 
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boundaries in this way when he described his artistic methods. He writes that ‘I 
photographed as I painted, transforming the subject as a painter would, idealizing or 
deforming as freely as does a painter’ (2012: 143). This method is evident in the 
painting of eyelids: filming and painting were part of the same creative process. The 
feeling of dream-like lack of explanation is exaggerated by the film’s single intertitle, 
which reads ‘La raison de cette extravagance’, and is followed by a sequence which 
does nothing to explain the preceding sections. This ludic reference to reason while 
displaying the opposite is carried through from Le Retour, whose title implies that the 
film is the result of such a return. But a return from what? Is the disorder of Dada the 
return from a more disturbing external world? 
Throughout Emak Bakia, narrative is implied but rarely satisfied. Knowles 
writes that ‘[c]onventional film relies heavily on memory for the piecing together of a 
gradually building narrative’ (2009: 98), and Nichols that narrative ‘overcomes the 
fetishizing lure of spectacle’ and ‘supplies techniques by which to introduce the 
moralizing perspective or social belief of an author’ (2001: 589; 591). Emak Bakia’s 
refusal of narrative, through its continual insistence on waking, sleeping and re-
arranging fragmented memories, demonstrates Dada’s desire not only to embrace 
and project spectacle but also to repeatedly overwrite reality with multiple 
alternatives, perhaps as a response to the trauma of its time. Such responses are 
present in the photomontage works of many German Dadas: replacing parts of the 
imagery of war and destruction with comic alternatives provides a ludic rejection of 
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the events of the time of Dada, as well as an expressive venting seen through our 
puppets and dolls. 
The reconstruction of memories additionally serves to change the present, 
which in turn leaves the future open as ‘la possibilisation continuelle des possibles’ 
(EN: 164). Stephen Foster states that ‘Man Ray’s objects permit initiation into the 
possible; they never demand it; they rarely ask for it’ (in Peterson ed. 2001: 192): we 
can extend this designation of ‘object’ through photography and especially 
rayography, where the printed surface is the final result and not the object itself. We 
might assume that if Dada film lacked narrative, by Nichols’s extension it also lacks 
morals to impose on the viewer. However, through Man Ray’s film and Foster’s 
analysis, we can posit instead that Dada simply did not wish to moralise. 
Entr’acte plays with the idea of memory and dream by distorting sequential 
action through repetition, and through the use of unreal speed and unnatural visual 
effects. Unlike Emak Bakia (and much Dada film), Entr’acte engages with narrative, 
yet it does this specifically through a ludic sequence of events which is consistent 
only in itself. This creates a feel of dreaming or mis-remembering, through the 
engagement with absurd events that nevertheless retain a sense of logical consistency 
in context. Sometimes we view events from an external or bird’s eye point of view, at 
other times we are ‘actively’ involved through the use of first person (for instance, 
we can perceive ourselves to be present on the rollercoaster, whereas we watch the 
events of the chess game as a passive spectator). To this we can apply a playful take 
on Sartre’s theory of the look as reciprocally objectifying of others and the self (EN: 
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292-341), as well as representing an active engagement with the self from within and 
without (as initiated in Chapter One).  
Entr’acte is structured around a journey turned on its head. It begins with a 
funeral procession (an ending), and ends with a false ending, the expulsion of a 
character through a screen marked “FIN”, only to be kicked back whence he came. 
This final scene contains humorous connotations of birth or emergence through the 
bursting through of the character: an enforced new beginning through the (literal) 
destruction of ‘the end’. The narrative progression speeds up as the film evolves, not 
only reducing any feeling of control over this dream, but also playing with the 
perception of the passage of time.38 This notion of bodily journey as well as changing 
perspective can be compared to Merleau-Ponty’s statement that 
quand je m’absorbe dans mon corps, mes yeux ne me donnent que l’enveloppe sensible des 
choses et celle des autres hommes, les choses elles-mêmes sont frappées d’irréalité, les 
comportements se décomposent dans l’absurde, le présent même, comme dans la fausse 
reconnaissance, perd sa consistance et vire à l’éternité. (PP: 203-04) 
Entr’acte creates a narrative in which the body folds in on itself, foregrounding a 
sense of ‘irréalité’ that devolves over the course of the accelerating film into a 
timeless absurdity. 
In addition to this ludic relationship with dream and reality, through its use of 
superimposition Entr’acte engages in a sense of pareidolia. This is done most notably 
through a building structured from columns, which then multiply and are set in 
                                                 
38 This additionally correlates with the concept of time seeming to pass more quickly with age, by 
virtue of a time value constantly representing a smaller percentage of a lifespan. Thus, we perceive 
action and events as passing more quickly as the life of the film comes to a close. 
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motion. This not only makes us question their directionality and purpose, but also 
allows us to see other things developing from their distortion. For instance, at one 
point the columns are made to look like stairs, at another a grid or chess board. 
Another instance of pareidolic superimposition is the filming of an ominous looking 
pair of upside-down eyes over water, with the addition of the movement of a 
ballerina dancing. Though the eyes stare statically at us, we are given the impression 
of blinking motion through the fluttering of the ballerina’s skirts. The ‘look’ is 
distorted by our own misperception. This pareidolia is strengthened by the film’s 
obsessive rhythm which, as Turvey writes, ‘functions – along with plastic properties 
such as shape and texture – to encourage the spectator to notice abstract similarities 
between the mechanical and the non-mechanical objects the shots depict’ (2011: 59). I 
would argue that it is more than this: the rhythm functions to disrupt our perception 
of connections between objects in order that we reorganise reality for ourselves. 
Through our analysis of these effects it is clear that when we are confronted 
with visual ambiguity, we are inclined to instinctively invent and impose our own 
sense of logic on what we see. In the opening sequence of Le Retour, we are presented 
with a set of grainy rayographs which Man Ray made by sprinkling salt and pepper 
across the film strip. The setting in motion of these prints provokes ghostly white 
images to form across the gritty screen even though beyond the arbitrary sprinkling 
of fragments, there can be perceived to be ‘nothing there’. Through the animation of 
areas of increased density, we can perceive in these ‘whiter’ parts a shapeless form 
moving from left to right, followed by a flutter of particles that suggests a 
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kaleidoscope of butterflies. Described as ‘une curieuse chute de neige métallique’ 
(Kyrou 1963: 174), these sequences allow Man Ray to elevate mundane fragments of 
reality by exposing them close-up, animating the inanimate, and inviting new 
expressive possibilities. These enlargements allow us to see objects in a detail that we 
would not normally perceive, as well as allowing objects to be ‘revealed – and 
reveiled, […] in all their fulsome, hieratic mystery’ (Hammond ed.: 7). Man Ray 
exchanges the goal of the faithful reproduction of reality for one of re-interpretation, 
seeking to replace commonly accepted normalcy with a constructed perception, or an 
evolving, creative receptivity.  
The multifaceted interpretability of these images allows for new, multiple truth 
through ambiguity.39 This relationship between truth and reality creates composite 
perception that is both additive and interpretive. Dada film plays on memory and 
dream in a similar way as it does on presence and absence: the world is presented in 
such a way that we are made to believe we are dreaming, but that does not indicate 
what aspects are to be considered ‘waking’ reality. Merleau-Ponty states that ‘[s]ans 
le réveil, les rêves ne seraient que des modulations instantanées et n’existeraient pas 
même pour nous’ (PP: 345). Thus ambiguity of waking reality puts our perception 
into a state of simultaneous position of presence and absence, ‘suspended’ like the 
rayographs.  
                                                 
39 This ambiguity is also present in Dada plastic art, for instance in the work of Arp, whose ‘radically 
simplified forms open them up to various possible interpretations which sometimes conflict with their 
designated labels’ (Robertson in Adamowicz and Robertson eds 2011: 88). 
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A further extension of the worlds of dreaming and waking is afforded via the 
notion of darkness and light. Sartre describes a particular example of this through 
blinking in his Huis Clos: 
Un clin d’œil, ça s’appelait. Un petit éclair noir, un rideau qui tombe et qui se relève: la coupure 
est faite. L’œil s’humecte, le monde s’anéantit. Vous ne pouvez pas savoir combien c’était 
rafraîchissant. Quatre mille repos dans une heure. Quatre mille petites évasions. (HC: 17-18) 
Sartre’s character presents a description of the blink of an eye which reminds us not 
only of Man Ray’s filtering techniques (including blinking) but also of the cinematic 
process itelf, which our minds perceive to present image after image but which 
actually totals over a third darkness. We are generally not consciously aware of the 
‘coupure’ that blinking imposes, nor are we conscious of the darkness that separates 
the cinematic images. In fact, it is thought to aid our perception of movement.40  
Man Ray plays on our perceptions of dark and light, bringing in – especially 
through Le Retour – a strong contrast between light and shadow or, as Levy describes 
it, ‘painting with light’ (1936: 22). An extension of the theme of presence and absence, 
Man Ray’s use of light and shadow evokes the aforementioned images of the Gestalt 
method, and invite us to question, through the use of both images and their 
negatives, whether we are seeing an object or its surroundings. As Sartre tells us, 
‘[a]ucun objet, aucun groupe d’objets n’est spécialement désigné pour s’organiser en 
fond ou en forme: tout dépend de la direction de mon attention’ (EN: 44). There is a 
deliberate misdirecting of attention within Dada film: despite the inevitable linearity 
of the film strip, we are not given direction in which to guide our viewing of a 
                                                 
40 This is notably disrupted in contemporary cinema’s recent experiments with HFR, which received 
mixed reviews as the process was found by many viewers to be disorientating. 
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collage of image sequences. We have seen that through this ambiguity of light, 
shadow and shape, we sometimes imagine movement, and of course with the 
rayographs we are always viewing an object in its absence: we see it only through its 
shadow of being. 
Notably, most light used in Man Ray’s films is artificial, which contributes to 
the constructed nature of the cinematic process, as well as being indicative of both a 
fascination for modern life and a desire for artistic control. However, Le Retour 
demonstrates a manipulation of the indeterminacy of natural light: a nude female 
torso turns back and forth in the light filtering through a slatted blind in a way that 
gently stripes and distorts the body. Ramona Fotiade highlights that ‘[t]he moving 
torso serves as a screen on which shadows of the curtain pattern are projected’, and 
that this creates a ‘stunning transformation of the human body into a quasi-spectral 
apparition, through the play of light and shadow’ (in Adamowicz and Robertson eds 
2012: 90). This (literally) embodies Levy’s description of ‘painting with light’, and 
highlights a certain grace not acquired through the use of artificial light. This grace is 
reflected when an egg-crate is suspended and turned, and its shadow forms as 
important a part of the frame as the original object.  
These sections contrast with the use of light and shadow in the rayographs, in 
the latter’s fixed, exposed nature. The moments of natural light go some way to 
disguising the mechanical nature of cinema and reversing the rayographs’ flattening 
of the field of perception. Both of these distortions playfully interact with perception 
in a way that brings into question the subjectivity of seeing: Sartre states that ‘le jeu 
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[…] enlève au réel sa réalité’, and that ‘le jeu, en effet […] délivre la subjectivité’ (EN: 
626). Dada film foregrounds the usefulness of play through its ability to highlight the 
fragile status of the ‘real’ appearance of ‘reality’, and to release a greater sense of 
subjectivity based in choice. 
While rayographs demonstrate a fascination with the manipulation of light and 
shadow through the flattening of images, Emak Bakia extends this into an 
interrogation of the shades of separation, breaking down this binary through the use 
of focus and blurring. A particular point of importance is a sequence in which a glass 
cube is rotated, all the while moving in and out of focus. This has the effect of 
reducing the object to a 2D construction, foregrounding the formal properties of the 
image and the effect this has on the composition of the screen. We are made aware of 
the shapes and surfaces of objects, which then become a play on light and shadow, 
disassociating with the meaning or function of the object itself, as well as the idea of 
figure and ground (as we saw through Sartre and Merleau-Ponty). We become aware 
of the objects’ shared edges with their environment as part of a greater pictoral 
whole. The use of mirrors and prisms furthers this flattening: distorting shapes to 
render them unrecognisable patterns on the surface of the screen, in perpetually 
subjectless self-reflection as a reinterpretation of time and space. Combined with 
varying speeds of image rotation, the process highlights the necessity of slower 
movement in allowing for ‘the formal details of the object to be absorbed’ (Knowles 
2009: 80). This notion of absorption of qualities of the object continues our tension 
between learned and active perception. 
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In an additional connection with Man Ray’s playful light and shadow painting, 
we see briefly in Emak Bakia the filming of windows, through which light and 
shadow are allowed to pass and play. However, in this case the windows initially 
appear as the white shapes they form on the surface of the film rather than as 
transparent means of viewing the world. Similarly, we do not perceive them as 
reflections (which would be one means of explaining their opacity). Rather, the most 
immediately recognisable shapes dominate, especially in continuation of the 
rayographs and Man Ray’s presentation of objects as geometrically symmetrical.  
This presentation privileges a reduction of depth of focus over the interpretation of 
these objects in their practical function, perhaps because of their movement, which 
disrupts perception through the distortion of anticipated qualities of the object.  
Man Ray’s use of shadow also leads us to question the nature of ‘blank’ in film: 
can it be either white or black? We can relate this to the nature of viewing through 
either projection onto a white screen, as would have been the case at the time, and 
viewing today on a television or computer screen, which is black, backlit in a way 
that reverses the direction of projected light in relation to the viewer and thereby 
plays with our notions of looking and being seen, and in extension, our notions of 
self as subject and object. In both cases the physicality of the screen is unaltered 
through the performance: any modifications are illusory. Knowles describes light as 
‘formless’ and shadow as having ‘defined contours’ (2009: 130). However, we might 
argue that Man Ray creates a balance in which we are not able to objectively identify 
the defining focus of attention, thus making both light and shadow occupy the same 
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level of formlessness through their mutual dependence. The point at which light and 
shadow meet is often foregrounded, especially when images are used both as 
originals and in their negative (and as we saw in Chapter One’s photographs). 
Moreover if the inversion of absence is also absence, these objects are only 
perceivable as memory. As Merleau-Ponty states, ‘[l]’intérieur et l’extérieur sont 
inséparables. Le monde est tout au-dedans et je suis tout hors de moi’ (PP: 469). 
Our analysis of limits and contours in light and shadow leads us to scrutinise 
the idea of edges and frames. The frame, in terms of the edges of the screen, presents 
shots as ‘slices of space’ that are ‘not just to be seen’: they are ‘legible as well as 
visible’ (Deleuze 1992: 25; 12; ibid.), hence our inherent desire to see (or ‘read’) things 
in formless images, a pareidolic effort to make sense of chaos. We saw in Chapter 
One the importance of the reciprocity of looking; here it is transferred from looking 
to seeing, and from seeing to interpreting. But the frame is also important because of 
what it excludes. Thus even though the sequences of rayographs appear illogical and 
their content aleatoric, the selection of images in Le Retour gain significance from 
having been chosen, and the content of those images as cut off at a certain point. We 
have also seen that the presence of particular content can then lead us to remember 
things that were not technically there.   
This tension is additionally instructive when considered in the context of Le 
Retour’s original screening, where the film broke several times. This not only 
introduced additional edges for the viewer through cuts, but was also a source of 
appreciation for Man Ray, who wrote that the breaking ‘may have induced the public 
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to imagine that there was much more to the film, and that they had missed the 
import of the Return to Reason’ (2012: 262). Man Ray’s playing with edges reminds us 
of the ‘idea that the frame need not constitute the fixed edges of a work, and the 
related notion that the canvas [screen/frame] can be considered as simply a 
convenient extract of a much larger whole’ (Lejeune 2012: 142). Man Ray’s work 
plays on a tension between images that have been selected, and images that are 
simply part of a larger pattern. 
Beyond the frame is the out-of-field, which Deleuze claims ‘refers to what is 
neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present’ (1992: 16). This is 
made particularly explicit in the ‘merry-go-round’ sequences of Le Retour, which 
focus on the movement of the lights on the top of the construction, cutting out the 
mechanism which makes this movement possible. This is also cut out when the 
camera is moved to ride on the merry-go-round: we see the ‘outside’ passing by, yet 
we cannot see what makes us, in the point-of-view shot, move.41 Although the two 
types of filming initially seem very different, there remains a certain consistency 
between the contact and non-contact imagery. While there is a difference in 
movement – the rayographs have a flickering effect; the ‘real’ objects revolve – when 
it comes to the framing of the content, there is a notable shared quality. That is, the 
notion of the frame as not only containing, but also cutting off.  
Of the non-contact imagery, only the egg-crate is seen in its entirety, and even 
then only briefly, as well as remaining attached to the line by which it spins. All other 
                                                 
41 We saw a similar effect created in Entr’acte with its manipulation of personal perspective, 
particularly through the rollercoaster sequence. 
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objects are cut off before their edges: in this respect the photographic film creates 
new edges where there was continuity, giving a level of artistic control, as well as a 
feeling of continuity between the two different kinds of ‘close up’ filming. This 
notion of being outside of the field of vision can be related to the notion of self and 
other, and through this, to an anxious sense of alienation. Through the out-of-field’s 
constant presence a gaze beyond the viewer’s control is created. Additionally, the 
edges of the screen create a keyhole not unlike Sartre’s example of the ‘look’, 
whereby the individual is alienated from themselves through being viewed in this 
overtly active looking position. Sartre writes that ‘l’aliénation de moi qu’est l’être-
regardé implique l’aliénation du monde que j’organise’ (EN: 302; original emphasis). 
Thus Dada film’s notion of cutting off and viewing through the keyhole constituted 
by the frame places the viewer in a constant state of uncertainty of their relationship 
with (the representation of) reality. 
We have seen the use of geometric shapes in Ballet mécanique as alterable 
repetition, but they can also be considered templates, or frames. Their translucent, 
coloured middles select a part of the frame to be viewed, yet are only altered by 
colour. A similar use of frames within frames can be seen through the use of shapes 
that move over a face, dividing it into fragments and creating slices of space through 
slices of face. Deleuze’s comments on the out-of-field are particularly relevant here: 
at any given moment sections of the face are ‘neither seen nor understood’, but 
‘perfectly present’ (in the case of the face we write in its missing parts through our 
relationship with our experience of ideal proportion). Yet since at any moment the 
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out-of-field can (and does) become in-field, the frame is misleading and ambiguous: 
everything is simultaneously both present and absent. It is the frame and the edges of 
field that move, rather than the content. This is compounded when the woman 
changes her expression, then combines passing a hand over her face while again 
changing expression. The further division of the screen means that frame, content, 
and frame within content are all in motion simultaneously, something that is 
extended when combined with the aforementioned kaleidoscopic vision produced by 
prisms, which subdivide the frame while multiplying its content.42 This has the 
additional effect of multiplying the look by multiplying the ‘keyhole’, made 
particularly evident through the use of a human subject.  
Beyond the effects of the visual out-of-field, Emak Bakia demonstrates a 
linguistic out-of-field in the scenes where words made up of lights pass the screen, 
but are cut in various places to deprive us of their whole message. The messages 
appear to be advertisements for events, with examples such as ‘chaque soir à ‘magic 
city’’ which are playfully inviting but never fully informative (knowing what 
happens in ‘magic city’ necessitates external familiarity with the fairground of this 
name). Meaning is either lost or must be replaced, yet no indication is given of the 
content of this replacement. We have seen this emphasised in the film’s single 
intertitle, ‘La raison de cette extravagance’, which is almost a complete sentence, yet 
lacks both the written information required to complete it, and the visual continuity 
                                                 
42 We also see the edges of the frame that the woman holds and moves over her face. Another example 
of a frame within a frame is the ‘on a volé’ sequence, when focus is put on the ‘0’ figure. The round 
makes a frame, but simply frames part of the black background. Essentially, it frames (highlights) 
nothingness itself. 
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to support it.43 Knowles writes that ‘[t]he nonsensical nature of the bulletin seems to 
refer to the illogical progression of images, since they both evade conventional 
cinematic systems of signification’ (in Adamowicz and Robertson eds 2012: 83). We 
can then designate the intertitle as even more illogical: it makes no sense by itself and 
it does nothing to explain the ‘illogical progression of images’. The relationship 
between edges and frames and the out-of-field expands our aforementioned 
explorations of presence and absence. The out-of-field is simultaneously present and 
absent, and this latter is particularly strongly highlighted through its inaccessibility 
to the viewer in the finished product of the film. 
Merging Realities: The Superimposition of Time and Space 
Man Ray described Emak Bakia as ‘[a] series of fragments, a cine-poem with a 
certain optical sequence mak[ing] up a whole that still remains a fragment’ (1927: 40), 
imparting upon it an additional, yet implicit, layer of signification. Fragments always 
imply a temporally displaced whole, either as a thing that once was or a thing that 
will be, in the Deleuzian ‘paradox of infinite identity’ (2004: 4). This gives a 
multifaceted and assembled memory to the construction of the sequences, linking 
memory and poetry by a ‘plénitude d’être’ (EN: 154). The fragmentation that Man 
Ray achieves allows for the replacement of narrative with episodes, memories or 
dreams, and through montage as ‘the determination of the whole […] by means of 
continuities, cutting and false continuities’ (Deleuze 1992: 29).  
                                                 
43Aiken notes that ‘[t]he motion and the cryptic nature of the worded electric sign also form a bridge 
between the opening titles and subsequent worded shots’ (1983: 242). This simultaneously provides a 
sense of continuity and a false sense of meaning, in a very Dada manipulation of reality. 
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This fragmentation of the whole is emphasised in Le Retour, which is structured 
in such a way that difference is highlighted strongly. Two of the ways in which this is 
effective with the rayographs is the juxtaposition of singularity with multiplicity – as 
in the single tack and the scattered nails – and also through symmetry of shapes and 
frames. The nails are identical and perfectly symmetrical, whereas the tack becomes 
deformed and asymmetric, something which is underlined by its solo appearance. 
Yet through its deformation, the tack forms a fragmented whole of black and white 
parts, a highly individual, contained multiplicity as instructively seen in our analysis 
of Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe. We also see a number of springs filmed, as well as an 
isolated single spring. The multiplicity draws out a focus on the undifferentiated 
mass; when one is singled out, we are more aware of the object’s formal qualities 
(and lack thereof through the spring’s non-habitual fixity), as well as those of the 
screen itself. Shared edges begin to break down the idea of foreground/background, 
adding to the idea of positive and negative space. 
Ballet mécanique plays on the possibility of multiplicity through the repetition of 
the singular, especially in relation to the mechanisation of human aspects. Faces and 
bodies are made into objects, and human actions are rendered objective, alienating 
the notion of the self from its humanity. A particularly explicit mechanisation of the 
human is the scene portraying a washerwoman’s ascent of a flight of stairs. The 
repetition of this action initially gives an impression of ease, since the heavy burden 
is able to be transported several times with no extra effort. However, it 
simultaneously gives a sense of strain on the viewer, or ‘exasperation’ (as we have 
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seen Léger describe it). In a sense the task is depersonalised: it becomes a source of 
mass irritation beyond its original function of personal and individual endurance. 
Also notable is the reduction of the sound at this point: not in terms of volume, but in 
terms of texture. The repetition is highlighted all the more by its simplicity.  
Colour in Ballet mécanique is subtly used to alter repetition: we are aware of a 
flickering between circles and triangles, and assume them to be identical and 
repeating. However, the coloured versions demonstrate a difference within this 
uniformity. Blotches and inconsistencies indicate the fact that each of these frames 
has been individually hand-painted. This very human difference contrasts with the 
synthetic multiplicity acquired from the use of mirrors and prisms: the repetition is 
precise and ostensibly identical,44 and yet we are less inclined to believe it. The 
artificial multiplicity strikingly raises the impression of the subjectivity of vision, 
with its tendency to ‘correct’ the imperfection of the coloured shapes as incorporated 
into our sense of progression. In contrast the cubist fragmentation of objects via their 
reflections is left to stand out. Although we do not understand it, we accept the 
aporetic symbolism of the geometric shapes, while we question the fragments even 
though they carry more signifiers.  
Within the context of shapes we can note a difference in the treatment of 
dimensionality. Some shapes, as we saw with the tack, are flattened and given a two-
dimensional quality, highlighting their contours as part of the surface of the 
                                                 
44 As well as self-referential in its self-replication. This reaches disturbing proportions when a repeated 
action of a machine is viewed through the prism, multiplying its insect-like limbs without revealing its 
purpose. The motion is not affected when the machine is moved around as a whole: it simply 
continues indefinitely. 
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photographic film. Others, as in the building blocks used in Emak Bakia, are used in a 
three-dimensional function, allowing for a greater depth of field (and perception?), 
and furthermore are used to build other things. The building blocks are stacked and 
assembled to form a somewhat abstract building: meaninglessness is foregrounded 
though functionality is implicit. These blocks are all symmetrical and yet are stacked 
in such a way that resembles a quasi-organised chaos. They are also placed in front of 
– and from a surface perspective, also on top of – a two-dimensional image, creating 
a tangle of visual imagery and implying a hierarchy of dimensions (in this case, 3D 
over 2D).  
We have seen that the disjointed feel evoked by fragmentation is accentuated by 
the use of textual ‘markers’ such as ‘La raison de cette extravagance’. This can be 
compared to the rayographs’ suspension of presence and absence through lack, as 
well as through the use of superimposition, which creates a different kind of 
suspension through multiplicity, stretching the limits of perception ad absurdum. 
These superimpositions maintain a translucency that presents the objects as ghost-
like quasi-presences, a gradual build-up of visual residue on the image and a 
remanence of fragmented memories. This fragmentation highlights the lack of 
narrative through Le Retour and Emak Bakia, but also the action contained within 
these fragments. Through both of these treatments of multiplicity, repetition and 
varying dimensionality we are reminded of Sartre’s notions of the non-possibility of 
identicality, or coincidence with self as seen in Chapter One. Perhaps a subconscious 
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awareness of this alienation is what makes watching these films so disruptive of our 
normal state of perception. 
Emak Bakia foregrounds an insistence on perpetual (physical) movement as well 
as a playful disruption of the idea of time. These aspects fit with a dimension of 
becoming which Deleuze describes as ‘a pure becoming without measure, a veritable 
becoming-mad, which never rests’ (2004: 3). Movement’s direction is continually 
distorted: turning motions are made to look like sideways motion through the 
stillness of the screen as the images move by. Mobiles are created by suspending 
objects which initially appear to turn freely, and yet are always dragged back to 
repeat by the cinematic process. Even the filming of waves on a beach is denatured 
when the camera is upturned, reversing sky and sea, and with it, our notions of 
forward/backward motion. The filming of waves on a beach may initially imply a 
foregrounding of the endlessly repeating and timeless motion of the water. Yet the 
turning of the camera makes us conscious of our own place in this movement, and 
simultaneously creates a start and end point for the sequence, since it is neither a 
smooth circle, nor is it repeated.  
This alinearity and distortion of space is reflected and exaggerated in the next 
sequence showing a group of fish in unidentified water, which loses the rhythm of 
the sea and generally slows the mood to a sluggish, directionless flow. This 
disruption of our perception of motion can be grounded in Sartre’s discussion of 
motion, in which ‘si le mouvement est un accident de l’être, le mouvement et le repos 
sont indiscernables’ (EN: 247). Through its setting in motion of immobile objects 
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(particularly through the rayograph), and its immobilising of repeated motion 
through its fixing in the frame, Dada film deconstructs our ability to distinguish 
between movement and rest as described by Sartre. 
We might expect Entr’acte, which engages most fully (of our four films) with a 
sense of narrative and time, to reduce the tension between the visible and the out-of-
field, the comprehensible and the no(n)sensical. However, it exploits this assumption 
of familiarity and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of perception’s grounding in experience by 
playing with both unreal speed and illogical progression. Mourners begin their 
procession by leaping after the coffin in exaggerated slow motion only to speed up in 
a race against the cart. The whole film builds from expanded time to an ever 
increasing pace, ending in the almost total lack of control of the rollercoaster ride 
(which is yet still constricted to its tracks). The coffin is presented before the victim 
meets his fate, and the same victim is later found to be alive, reflecting the 
aforementioned manipulation of the journey sequence, as well as birth and death. It 
is instructive that when the victim then climbs out of his coffin he has become a 
magician, and proves this by vanishing the coffin and his spectators one by one, then 
solemnly doing the same to himself. Notably, though, while the others disappear 
immediately on the touch of the wand, the magician himself fades out. This sequence 
of events plays with the notion of “FIN” as much as the end proper does. This fading 
makes us aware of an implicitly different relationship with this particular character – 
are we to relate ourselves to this protagonist? This anxious attachment to the central 
character then suggests that we are much less able to conceive of our own non-
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existence than that of others. Indeed, Sartre notes that ‘l’existence même de la mort 
nous aliène tout entier’ (EN: 588; original emphasis). 
Entr’acte’s manipulation of time is compounded by the frequent compression of 
space, predominantly by the use of superimposition. From the film’s opening 
sequence this compression is foregrounded in the use of cramped and tangled 
rooftops, which then regain their singularity and space only when projected into 
small shop windows. This along with the shifting columns and the face 
superimposed over water gives an impression of reduced space, through being 
trapped or drowning. All of these features relate to the building blocks in Emak Bakia: 
though less neatly stacked than the children’s blocks (in that they are trying to 
occupy the same space, rather than fitting together), they sit on top of each other as 
the blocks sit on top of the two-dimensional human figure. These superimpositions 
seem to humorously realise Sartre’s statement that ‘je vois tous les êtres au travers’ 
(EN: 639), and Merleau-Ponty’s view that ‘l’homme superpose au monde donné le 
monde selon l’homme’ (PP: 229). Through this layering, superimposition 
foregrounds the subjectivity of (the perception of) reality. 
Another occasion on which space is compacted is when the coffin hurtles down 
the road of its own accord: at this point the frame is mirrored at its centre, and 
appears to bend inwards from both sides. This represents a compression of both time 
and space, as the cart is at its fastest and squashed in on itself (in fact, the vehicle 
itself cannot be seen at this point). This compression of space can be contrasted with 
the rayographs, whose compression flattens the depth of field. That of Entr’acte 
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builds on the depth of field, but compresses from the surrounding angles of its sides. 
Space is manipulated in a way that disrupts the relationship between objects. As 
Sartre claims, ‘[l]’espace n’est pas le fond ni la forme, mais l’idéalité du fond en tant 
qu’il peut toujours se désagréger en formes, il n’est ni le continu ni le discontinu, 
mais le passage permanent du continu au discontinu’ (EN: 220). The examples we 
have seen through Dada film emphasise space’s status as ‘idéalité du fond’: the use 
of mirrors and prisms (quite literally) reflects its ability to ‘désagréger en formes’, or 
indeed ‘faire voler en éclats’ (cf. PP: 505). 
Through these examples temporality is also broken down and replaced with 
visual effect, building an altered sense of time and movement, as well as highlighting 
the forced nature of the passing of time in film, through its physical passing by when 
projected. How does the perception of temporal progression change with the 
manipulation of space and movement? Does repetition give us a false sense of 
memory? The flickering of images in both films gives the impression that being and 
memory are fleeting, in line with Sartre’s claims that ‘tout est présent’, ‘le présent est 
une fuite perpétuelle en face de l’être’ and that ‘l’être est partout et nulle part: où 
qu’on cherche à le saisir, il est en face, il s’est échappé’ (EN: 143; 158; 177). Often 
double exposure and superimposition is of incomplete shapes or images – for 
instance, legs without bodies and collars without shirts – leading us to question 
whether this technique makes the images more complete, or simply highlights their 
lacking, or ‘fuite perpétuelle’ as slices of space and time. Each image can be 
considered a slice of the present, perpetually self-replicating and self-replacing. 
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However, to move beyond this duality, it might be said that the fragmentation and 
superimposition of images neither completes them nor denigrates them. Rather, it 
presents them as hybrid and encourages their perception as such. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the fragmented entity is not to be considered broken, but rather an 
abstract assemblage of a new whole. 
Coexisting Realities: Tactility and the Sound of Silence 
The merging of realities can be expanded to consider the simultaneous 
coexistence of multifaceted meaning through deliberate ambiguity. This is shown 
particularly strongly through experimentation with the potentiality of objects of play, 
especially in Man Ray’s films, such as in the sequences involving dice, part of a string 
instrument, and building blocks as from a child’s toy box. In their fragmented forms, 
they are made to dance in a play of false movement, but are almost entirely removed 
from their original purpose. The objects are ‘forced to find new conditions for their 
reality’ (Foster in Peterson ed. 2001: 187). Their ludic movements remind us of 
Duchamp’s readymades, especially his Roue de bicyclette (1913), where objects are 
altered and suspended as repurposed mobiles, and invite interference. Yet both of 
these constructions are ironically removed from Dada’s ‘Please touch’ policy, the 
former through its role as a film sequence, and as such ‘belong[ing] to a game largely 
played ahead of time’ (ibid: 184), and the latter through its itchingly static 
presentation out of reach in its multiple gallery homes. Notably, though, the wheel is 
not physically out of reach: the distance is maintained by the institutionalisation of 
the art work and the consequent unspoken rule of non-interaction. Through the 
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museum context, objects of this tactile nature move from interactivity to 
interpassivity.45 
We could argue that Man Ray’s selection of objects enacts a transfer of his 
aforementioned filtering of reality. Something that is particularly notable, if not 
immediately apparent, is the transfer of a tactile element explored by the use of 
grilled fingers and cloths into a regular viewing of the film. The nature of these 
objects is to be touched, picked up, held, played with, and made to produce 
(numbers in dice, sound in instruments, compound forms in the building blocks). 
Here they are reassigned to include other purposes and short circuit the senses. We 
can compare this intersensory (mis)interaction to Merleau-Ponty’s description of our 
inherent incorporation of multiple senses: 
Cette tache rouge que je vois sur le tapis, elle n’est rouge que compte tenu d’une ombre qui la 
traverse, sa qualité n’apparaît qu’en rapport avec les jeux de la lumière, et donc comme élément 
d’une configuration spatiale. D’ailleurs, la couleur n’est déterminée que si elle s’étale sur une 
certaine surface, une surface trop petite serait inqualifiable. Enfin, ce rouge ne serait à la lettre 
pas le même s’il n’était le “rouge laineux” d’un tapis. (PP: 27) 
Whereas Merleau-Ponty describes the senses working together to perceive this 
‘rouge laineux’ – through our associations of the visible with qualities such as texture 
– Man Ray encourages alternative combinations.  
A clear example is Le Retour, which neither has music nor references sound in 
its title, yet the content of the film itself very strongly references multiple senses. This 
is evident right from its construction: 
                                                 
45 For more on interactivity and interpassivity see Žižek in Wright and Wright (1999: 102-110) 
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On some strips I sprinkled salt and pepper, like a cook preparing a roast, on other strips I threw 
pins and thumbtacks at random; then I turned on the white light for a second or two, as I had 
done for my Rayographs. (Man Ray 2012: 260) 
This quotation not only evokes the sense of touch (from the sprinkling of rough-
edged objects), smell (through the use of the word ‘roast’) and taste (through the 
allegorical comparison with the preparation of a meal), but also creates a sense of 
sound in the scattering of hard objects onto the surface of the film strip. Many of 
these senses are carried across to the viewing process through their creation of visual 
noise, particularly the salt-and-pepper sequences, which provide an image of white 
noise (a source of irritation for many contemporary viewers). This evocation of 
crowding gives a visual overload transferable across the senses, especially through 
the intrinsic linking of white noise with both sight and sound. This intense 
combination of senses creates a quasi-synaesthetic reaction, through presenting only 
the visual but effectively evoking the other senses. 
Man Ray’s filming of objects as a ‘game largely played ahead of time’ is 
particularly explicit both in his rayographs that are strategically placed in series 
before playing, and with the filming of the manipulation of objects beyond their 
original or traditional purpose. We might say that the game that is planned with his 
films – especially the two analysed in this chapter – is a deliberate rewriting of 
anticipated moves in an effort to subvert expectation, and putting play entirely into 
the hands of the artist. This is particularly apparent in the use of dice in Emak Bakia, 
objects which are normally symbolic of chance and/or risk, here simply placed rather 
than allowed to land, and later split into halves to completely remove their original 
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shape and purpose. If the dice lose some of their inherent multiplicity from not being 
thrown, they gain some of it back through being sliced and recombined.46  
This repurposing is furthered by the decapitated scrolls, in that any sound that 
the string instrument may produce is removed by its lack of strings and body, and 
overwritten with the film’s post-production montaged soundtrack. This effect is 
reproduced in a scene with a pair of (bodiless) dancing legs which appear to be 
accompanied by a banjo. Although the illusion is given that the banjo is producing 
the sound that we and the dancer hear, again it is external. The instrument is thereby 
rendered doubly mute, silent itself and written over with an alternative that is 
strikingly similar to the original, comparable enough to initially convince the listener 
that their visual and aural perceptions are aligned. Additionally, in some ways this 
creates a new level of fragmentation, because we are initially convinced that we are 
perceiving a unified sensory whole, only to realise the deception. Most of the music 
is obsessively rhythmic, linking seeing and hearing back to tactility through music’s 
tendency to have a physical effect on the body, both through following the beat, and 
specifically through the physicality of sonic vibrations. 
Another instance of muted reality in Emak Bakia is experienced in a sequence 
where a woman mouths unrecognisable syllables at the camera. The lack of sound – 
though arguably no more misleading than non-diagetic sound – most obviously 
represents this mutedness, yet another layer of frustration is applied when we cannot 
                                                 
46 We are reminded here of the title of Mallarmé’s famous poem: ‘un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le 
hasard’. Notably, Mallarmé also slices and distorts the shape of the poem, distributing the words 
across the page almost like a rayograph construction. For more on Man Ray and Mallarmé, see Man 
Ray (2012). 
131 
 
even interpret the movements of her lips, despite clues from facial expressions (for 
example, raised eyebrows for surprise or expectation) which then come up empty. 
We saw through Ballet mécanique’s insistence on written nothingness a feeling of 
aphasia: this moment evokes a more explicit, physical sense of this distressing effect, 
in that we have partial information and are unable to fill in the gaps, giving us not 
nonsense but no-sense. The levelling of figure and ground that we saw in Merleau-
Ponty’s description of aphasia (PP: 237) is foregrounded here through the human 
figure that becomes nothing more than a collection of shapes on the filmic screen. 
The combination of women that Man Ray presents who are silent and in various 
stages of (false) consciousness recall the suffocating inability to speak when frozen 
with fear, dreaming or being underwater. This additionally marks a point of 
comparison between the women and the superimposed fish, through opening and 
closing motions of the mouth and staring eyes in the former, and gaping mouths and 
lidless eyes in the latter. 
The disruption of movement, direction and time is exaggerated by the use of 
music in Emak Bakia (further contrasting this film with the silent Le Retour), which is 
itself formed into episodes, yet with no apparent link to the ‘action’ of the film. This 
is due to the film having originally been silent, with the music added later from Man 
Ray’s own record collection. The greater part of the film is accompanied by light-
hearted jazz,47 which is then countered by the use of significantly more classical 
                                                 
47 This choice of genre is instructive as it is the exception to the general lack of attention paid to music 
by the Existentialists. McBride writes that ‘jazz came to be regarded, at least during the period of the 
“existentialist offensive,” as a particularly appropriate existentialist form of music, perhaps in part 
because of its “contingent,” improvisational nature – its refusal to follow a fixed, unalterable score’ (in 
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music after the intertitle break. The use of these two distinct genres plays with the 
aforementioned hint of dreaming, yet we are not given any indication of which is to 
be considered normal, and of course neither type has any direct interaction with the 
filmed sequences. As such the music occupies an ‘out-of-field’ position of sorts, a 
level of simultaneous presence and absence similar to that of the rayographs and 
superimposition, as a layer of abstract diegesis which has been applied to create the 
final product. In this respect the editing process takes on an important role in 
highlighting firstly the artificiality of the medium, and secondly the levels of 
authorial control and the impact this has on the interpretation of meaning in their 
product. This authorial control can be interrogated by the fact that we occasionally 
(and seemingly accidentally) catch glimpses of Man Ray. While the incorporation of 
the artist cannot conclusively be defined as deliberate, especially as the occurrences 
are reflections rather than direct filming, the fact that he did not remove this 
reference implies a lack of desire to fully remove himself from the process.  
Music as abstract diegesis and its role in the out-of-field can be contrasted in 
Emak Bakia and that of Ballet mécanique and Entr’acte. While all three were originally 
silent, the latter two had purpose-written scores, only applied later. The difference 
made on the viewing of the films without and with their accompaniment is 
considerable, as sound is an integral part of our perception of the world around us. It 
has already been mentioned that Ballet mécanique’s soundtrack (written by George 
Antheil) is entirely percussive, which fits with the nature of the film’s anxiety-
                                                                                                                                                        
Crowell ed. 2012: 63). We saw in Chapter One that Taeuber’s dancing was deemed to match the 
expression of jazz through the pair’s shared improvised/structured composite form. 
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inducing flickering, as well as mechanical in the case of several instruments, 
dehumanising all aspects of the work. This is exacerbated by the use of a siren, which 
goes off at several points throughout the film. Additionally, the siren adds an 
exaggerated element of indeterminate pitch, thus adding to the ambiguity of the 
ensemble as well as the inability to relate to the sounds. The rapidly changing 
imagery and manic percussive wall of sound compound with the sonic remanence of 
the sound of the siren to produce an effect of alienation through anxiety. However, as 
we saw through close up viewing of objects and the resulting de- and re-construction 
of form through Merleau-Ponty’s example of snow, we can continue through this 
into sound to find our own interpretive experience: ‘de même on peut découvrir à 
l’intérieur du son une “micro-mélodie” et l’intervalle sonore n’est que la mise en 
forme finale d’une certaine tension d’abord éprouvée dans tout le corps’ (PP: 255).  
Entr’acte’s music (written by Erik Satie), though arguably more ‘human’ than 
Ballet mécanique through the use of non-automatic instruments, also focuses on a 
neurotically rhythmic approach, which is inherently and inevitably transferred to a 
certain tactility.48 This is not only done through rhythm but also through pitch. For 
example, the sequence on the rollercoaster is accompanied by a motif in several 
different instruments that oscillates around pairs of notes. This creates a multitude of 
alarm-like sounds as the film races to its fastest point. The use of a short motif 
obsessively repeated reminds us of Léger’s desire to ‘push the adventure to the point 
of exasperation’. The exploration of music and tactility foregrounds the necessity of 
                                                 
48 Furthermore Ted Perry notes that Entr’acte was designed to provoke a kinaesthetic response (ed. 
2006: 75). 
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multiple senses to compose the perception and interpretation of reality. While the 
visual is often privileged, Dada films distort our reliance on vision to encourage the 
incorporation of other means of perception, as well as unusual combinations of these 
senses. 
These examples of sound and silence in film can be contrasted with another 
Dada activity and art form, that of the sound and simultaneous poems, where, 
instead of lacking information, we are bombarded with it. Yet the effect is similar: we 
have so much information that we are unable to process it, leaving us as wordless as 
the muted woman in Emak Bakia. We can compare this with Taeuber’s Dada-Köpfe, 
whose lack of ears and mouths yet bombardment of colours illustrate the 
problematic disorientation created from an insistence on either end of the spectrum 
of presence/absence of meaning. We might consider that overloading the senses in 
this way (somewhat unexpectedly) allows an increased blankness – and potential 
clarity – of mind from which to draw individual meaning.  
Merleau-Ponty states that ‘[p]arce que nous sommes au monde, nous sommes 
condamnés au sens’ (PP: 20; original emphasis). We are unable to perceive without 
imposing meaning on the world. Is it the responsibility of the spectator to find 
meaning or interpret these images and films? Merleau-Ponty’s statement reminds us 
of Sartre’s claim that the individual is both ‘condamné à être libre’ (EH: 39), and also 
condemned to choose (cf. EH: 63). Thus although the individual is born into a 
preconditioned set of logic and sense, they are responsible for assigning the value 
and hierarchy of meaning to their perception. Additionally, as is particularly strongly 
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highlighted through Dada art, singular meaning is not imperative, and multiple 
interpretation is often positively encouraged: ‘All true experiences of the works are 
equally truths’ (Foster in Peterson ed. 2001: 194).  
Conclusion 
La réalité-humaine est le dépassement perpétuel vers une coïncidence avec soi qui n’est jamais donnée. 
(EN: 125-26) 
The films studied in this chapter are influenced by several dichotomies – 
presence and absence, singularity and multiplicity, light and shadow, to name a few 
– in order to question the very basis on which we rest our notion of perception both 
in itself and of reality. Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes described Man Ray’s art as ‘one 
solution to the crisis of Reality which is outside everything tragic in existence’ (in 
Schwarz ed. 1971: 90). We might reflect on Ball’s comment at the beginning of this 
chapter in relation to reality’s occurrence ‘at the point where things peter out’, and 
compare this point to our dichotomies. Instead of viewing these pairs as two ends of 
a spectrum, we may consider the mid-point as a petering out of sorts, as we have 
seen particularly markedly in Man Ray’s work through its tendency to provide a 
blurred crossover of complementary opposites (for example, his highlighting of the 
grey area between light and shadow). This is furthered by the accompanying use of 
music, which appears as a simultaneous but separate reality, allowing for multiple 
coexistences of realities, added later as an extra layer of perceptive substance. On 
many occasions, the viewer is put in a position of perceptive ambiguity, and it is 
from this point of suspension that they must creatively interpret their own reality. 
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These examples of the manipulation of perception have been analysed 
alongside an Existentialist notion of alienation. Perception is a concept that maintains 
a tension between the assumption of inherence and the inclination to interpret. Dada 
film’s incessant highlighting of the construction of the cinematic image through time 
questions both aspects of this perception, drawing both the concept of film and the 
viewer themselves ‘hors de soi’ to externalise their relationship with reality. The 
suggestion through these films that observations and memories can be revealed to be 
false invites – or rather provokes – the spectator as ‘principal actor’ (Man Ray in 
Hammond ed. 2001: 133) to devise their own interpretation(s) of both cinema and the 
world as a malleable (re)memory. Foster writes that ‘[t]he approach to, and 
evaluation of [Man Ray’s] work, require of the spectator/critic an active and creative 
role throughout his or her transaction of the pieces; a role not unlike, in kind, that 
reflected in the artist’s own intentionality’ (in Peterson ed. 2001: 174). The constant 
replacement of ideas implies a reliance on a perpetually present state, or as Sartre 
claims, ‘[t]out se passe comme si le présent était un perpétuel trou d’être, aussitôt 
comblé et perpétuellement renaissant’ (EN: 182). Furthermore, the spectator can be 
considered to be the only source of ‘reality’ in a world of illusion, in a continually 
self-(re)constructing remanence of being. 
Chapter Two has developed the notion of subjectivity and choice introduced in 
Chapter One into the creative reinterpretation and projection of reality through Dada 
film. The works explored in Chapter One represented composite selves of fragments 
and contradictions, as such finished products for considered contemplation. Though 
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these works nevertheless offer constant opportunity to be (re)interpreted, the 
movement into the medium of film shows a development of the subjectivity of 
perception while offering a subject that holds a different level of presence and 
absence, a ‘quasi-multiplicity’ of negation (cf. Sartre) through its status as partly 
(over a third) blank yet undeniably present, creating logic of perception precisely and 
simply through the ephemerality of its motion.  
The example of Man Ray and the breaking of his film during a particular 
screening additionally introduces the notion of the film as event, a particular set of 
perceptive criteria that yet varies between individual viewers. Chapter Three will 
pick up where this less-explored notion left off through the (recording of the) trial of 
Maurice Barrès by members of the Dada movement, compared with Camus’s 
assessment of justice in L’Étranger. The chapter will interrogate notions of text and 
event, comparative experience for both actors and readers, as well as the 
philosophical implications of the trial as event by which an individual is brought 
under scrutiny. In this respect Chapter Three will carry through and continue to 
develop some of the concepts of reality as defined in the current chapter. 
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- CHAPTER THREE - 
BARRÈS VS MEURSAULT: RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE IN 
THE DADA LITERARY EVENT 
Il s’agissait de juger Maurice Barrès […] d’accuser Maurice Barrès d’attentat à la sureté de l’esprit 
(AB: 23-24) 
[J]’accuse cet homme d’avoir enterré une mère avec un cœur de criminel 
(E: 97) 
‘L’homme est pleinement responsable’ 
A critical consequence of the assignment of creation of values to the individual, as 
well as of the authenticity of those choices made without succumbing to external 
pressure, is the inherent responsibility over one’s choices, as well as the 
responsibility for the consequences of such choice. As Sartre remarks on this moral 
obligation, 
si vraiment l’existence précède l’essence, l'homme est responsable de ce qu’il est. Ainsi, la 
première démarche de l’existentialisme est de mettre tout homme en possession de ce qu’il est 
et de faire reposer sur lui la responsabilité totale de son existence. Et, quand nous disons que 
l’homme est responsable de lui-même, nous ne voulons pas dire que l’homme est responsable 
de sa stricte individualité, mais qu’il est responsable de tous les hommes. (EH: 31) 
Sartre’s comments on responsibility link in with our notions of choice and 
individuality from Chapter One, that is, for Sartre we choose under the belief that 
our choices are universally applicable. This allows Existentialism to refute charges of 
moral quietism, since it does not, through the placement of value judgement in the 
individual, advocate an ‘anything goes’ policy. Instead, it creates an implicit sense of 
mutuality, an invitation to ‘treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself’. 
Because of this, Sartre claims that ‘on peut juger […] car, comme je vous l’ai dit, on 
choisit en face des autres, et on se choisit en face des autres’ (EH: 67). The main basis 
on which this statement is founded is the notion of the judgement of the behaviour of 
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others against the notion of good and bad faith, which circles back round to our 
concept of authenticity being based in choices stemming from the individual. 
Through this Existentialist mode, therefore, ‘nous rappelons à l’homme qu’il n’y a 
d’autre législateur que lui-même’ (EH: 76). 
Notions of justice and responsibility stem from a long lineage of political and 
literary explorations of the concepts and their consequences. From the 1789 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen and the judicial defence of such rights, 
through the development of the intervention of the intellectual into public affairs of 
justice, to the interrogation of justice and punishment in literature, society has 
repeatedly demonstrated a preoccupation with the responsibility for an individual’s 
life and moral choices. It is perhaps through literature that we can best analyse this 
preoccupation: as an expression of the active and creative exploration of ideals, 
literary works can be used as a reflection of the advancing views of society. We can 
trace a post-Revolutionary concern for methods (and theory) of punishment to Victor 
Hugo’s Le Dernier jour d’un condamné (1829), which explicitly condemns the death 
penalty as hypocritical, reproducing the original crime through its ‘eye for an eye’ 
logic. Furthermore as Robespierre commented in 1791, ‘la peine de mort est 
essentiellement injuste […] elle n’est pas la plus réprimante des peines’ (in Royer et 
al eds 1995: 339). Hugo’s text highlights the fallibility of the justice system in the long 
term or as a complete system, since it simply upholds a set of laws based upon a 
temporally-specific, ‘objective’ moral code.  
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Dostoevsky would explore a similar theme forty years later in his Crime and 
Punishment (1866), in which the protagonist successfully evades the justice system, 
only to be overcome by guilt. It is only this guilt which means he is prosecuted, 
highlighting not only the inevitability of moral concerns, but also the chance of not 
being brought to justice in the event of insufficient evidence. Kafka’s Der Process [The 
Trial] (1925) would sixty years later evoke the absurdity of a judicial system in a way 
that would directly influence Camus’s writing,49 including the flexibility of truth, 
innocence and guilt. Kafka’s protagonist, Josef K, is never informed of the crime of 
which he is being accused, and, like Camus’s Meursault, struggles to follow his 
trial.50 Through these examples we are invited to question the possibility of justice 
through a systematic approach. 
As demonstrated by its literary and philosophical precedent, justice is a key 
concern in twentieth-century, and particularly Existentialist, thought. Camus’s rebel 
enacts the tension of being ‘[celui qui] oppose le principe de justice qui est en lui au 
principe d’injustice qu’il voit à l’œuvre dans le monde’ (HR: 42). Through this the 
rebel pits their inner, personal sense of justice against the injustice present in the 
world, the latter perhaps a result of institutional or external, generic justice. This 
opposition is expressed in Dada’s engagement with the philosophy of justice, 
through its rejection of oppressive societal constructs. We can interpret this as an 
aspiration to obliterate injustice in terms of freedom from oppression, but Dada also 
                                                 
49 This is expressed explicitly in Camus’s own analysis of Kafka, ‘L’espoir et l’absurde dans l’œuvre de 
Franz Kafka’, which he included as an appendix to Le Mythe de Sisyphe (MS: 169-87). 
50 In both cases this is metaphorically represented through atmospheric conditions: Josef K suffers 
from his dark surroundings; Meursault from the stifling heat and blinding sun. 
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opposes the system of justice in its own right, as is particularly clear through its 
mock trial of Maurice Barrès. This chapter will interrogate this Dada engagement 
with the notion of justice through the trial of Barrès in comparison with Camus’s trial 
of his protagonist, Meursault, in his 1942 novel L’Étranger.  
These two trials will be used to assess Dada and Existentialism’s interaction 
with justice both as a physical reality and a philosophical notion, and particularly the 
limits of such a concept, in alignment with its consequences for the idea of 
responsibility. Both trials occupy a unique position within literature and history: 
representing both literary events and literary texts, they invite a critique of justice in 
relation to degrees of reality and fiction.51 The key notions of responsibility and 
justice will be explored by scrutinising several elements of a trial – the crimes, 
charges, sentences, and the witnesses – in order to address the further consequences 
of systems of justice, including the individual’s place in society. These trials will be 
used to question the status of a system as ultimately powerful in the creation, control, 
and enforcement of societal rules. How are morals created, decided upon and/or 
systematised? What is the difference between these systematised morals and the 
ethics of the individual? Can a society ever claim to be acting justly, or authentically, 
if it judges others based on externally imposed ethics, ignoring the personal morality 
of the individual? 
  
                                                 
51 This is a notion that will be picked up again in Chapter Five in relation to the concept of truth. 
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Against Without For the Accused 
An instructive starting point in the indictment of these individuals is an 
analysis of their selection. Camus created Meursault to embody a certain set of 
principles and characteristics, and yet does not portray him as the traditional hero, 
nor any more than a distinctly average individual. The status of Meursault in the 
novel’s in-world society as ‘normal’ appears to be a deliberate attempt to 
demonstrate the constant potential for the unremarkable (unintentionally) to not 
conform, and consequently be pursued and executed by an external source of justice 
through the law.52 Highlighting Meursault simultaneously banalises crime and 
foregrounds the ease with which external moral codes can be broken. Through 
taking this process to its absurd extreme Camus reflects upon the threat posed by an 
amoral individual to tradition and societal normalcy, as well as the common need to 
expel such an individual on these grounds. 
In contrast with Camus’s protagonist, the figure indicted by Dada was a real 
individual, Maurice Barrès, and the underlying justification for his ‘bringing to 
justice’ is perhaps more complex. Barrès had been a literary role model to several of 
the young Paris-based Dadas (see Sanouillet 2009: 186-87), so we might wonder what 
prompted them to suddenly change their opinion of him in such an extreme fashion 
(and only two years before the author’s death). The writer and politician’s own 
change of heart and conversion to nationalism and anti-Semitism, including his vocal 
role in the infamous Dreyfus Affair, had occurred before the birth of most of the 
                                                 
52 A reader might not disagree that Meursault has done something wrong, yet inevitably is affected by 
his demise. 
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Dadas, and thus these young artists would have already been aware of Barrès’s 
history, implying that they had idolised him despite some quite major flaws. Was 
their objection then to Barrès’s lifetime inconsistencies? Did he disappoint the Dadas, 
because ‘[h]is early quest for identity ended in a retreat into the comfortable haven of 
cultural parochialism’ (Soucy 1972: 94)?  
We might consider that Dada’s own rampant search for identity inspired this 
outcry at the betrayal of one’s own values in favour of the path of least resistance. 
Additionally, Barrès belonged to a group of intellectuals once admired by the Dadas, 
but who contributed to ‘the bankruptcy of a language which could shamelessly 
attach itself to the gross and inhuman machinery of the war effort’ (Arnold n.d.: n.p.). 
To some extent, then, we can attribute Dada’s attitude to a generational grudge 
against the masters considered as having been unable to prevent, or unwilling to 
rebel against, the stagnation or rotting away of poetic identity, just as the movement 
resented the world’s national powers for having produced the conditions for war. 
In addition to the Dadas’ issues with Barrès it is instructive that he was a target 
for indictment by a wider audience, including both Camus and Sartre. While Camus 
retains an element of respect for Barrès, his text Maurice Barrès et la querelle des 
héritiers (in Camus 2006: 874-76) presents the slightly contradictory relationship that 
intellectuals have with this author. According to Camus, ‘[c]eux qui se réclament de 
lui ne sont pas dignes de son œuvre. Et ceux qui sont dignes de cette œuvre ne se 
réclament point de lui’ (ibid.: 874-75). In the same piece, Camus labels Barrès 
nostalgic, having ‘plus d’esprit que d’âme’ (ibid.: 875) and furthermore that ‘ce genre 
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d’hommes nous est aujourd’hui inutile’ (ibid.: 876), a conclusion that the Dadas had 
already expressed in withdrawing their respect for Barrès. Camus’s more serious 
consideration of Barrès’s legacy contrasts with Sartre’s depiction in La Nausée, where 
his protagonist dreams of spanking Barrès to the point of torture. Roquentin notes in 
his diary that ‘[j]’ai fessé Maurice Barrès […] nous l’avons fessé jusqu’au sang’ (N: 
91). Both Camus’s and Sartre’s presentations of Barrès point to a similar sense of 
deception to that of the Dadas: Barrès has been described as espousing elements of 
Existentialist thought in his earlier work, which is somewhat negated in his later 
engagements. Additionally, ‘[i]n contrast with later Existentialists such as Sartre, 
Barrès denied that existence preceded essence’ (Soucy 1972: 74-75), a fundamentally 
divisive difference due to the status of the phrase as a quintessential Sartrean 
Existentialist tenet. 
In considering the reasoning behind Dada and Existentialist criticism of Barrès, 
we might wonder why both movements foreground a humorous approach 
(particularly Sartre’s spontaneous spanking episode). Was Barrès’s life, in retrospect, 
so inconsistent that vicious caricature was the most useful interpretation of his 
person(ality)? The tendency within Dada critique toward general absurdity suggests 
the trial as a natural extension of the movement’s ludic nature. Within Existentialism, 
we may wish to define this parody as an efficient means of highlighting inauthentic 
behaviour through Barrès’s conflicting ideals. Both use parody in a way that we have 
already seen through Chapter One, that of the fool as a means to vent issues without 
fear of retribution. Through these differing means of reacting against Barrès, 
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especially through Dada’s very practical application, we can examine where Dada 
and Existentialist attitudes toward (in)authenticity, responsibility and justice 
converge, as well as the limits to this comparison. A comparative analysis of Dada’s 
trial of Barrès with the literary trial of Meursault will allow us to assess two forms of 
critique of society. The caricaturing of Barrès’s career can be used as a reflective 
criticism of a society which allows such intellectually changeable individuals to rise 
to positions of authority. On the other hand, Meursault’s reliably stable character 
emphasises the flippancy of the judicial system, as well as the inherent need to judge, 
sort and ‘fix’ individuals. 
On the stand, then, we have a well-known literary figure and historical grand 
homme, and a notably unnotable citizen, with no particular distinguishing 
characteristics other than ostensible indifference to life. Their greatly differing 
personas will be instructive in the discussion of their treatment through their 
respective trials, especially in their status as ‘equals’ before the law. Their 
authenticity as characters will be contrasted with the authenticity of their trials, 
particularly within the role of each as fictional.  
Barrès’s ‘trial’ took place on 13 May 1921, at the Salle des Sociétés Savantes, and 
was performed in his absence by the Paris branch of Dada, who accused him of 
‘crimes against the security of the mind’ (AB: 24). This ‘inimitable spectacle of 
intellectual justice’ (Ribemont-Dessaignes in Motherwell ed. 1989: 116) not only 
questioned the authenticity of an individual who finds it acceptable to betray one’s 
fundamental values, but also raised the issue of the validity of any judgement of said 
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individual. As Breton later explained, ‘[t]he problem was to determine the extent to 
which a man could be held accountable if his will to power led him to champion 
conformist values that diametrically opposed ideals of his youth’ (1993: 53). Despite 
this event having raised fundamental divisive issues in the group, a full, ‘official’ 
report was published in the Paris Dada journal Littérature, alongside other Dada 
literary works. In this respect the piece gains authority through being published, and 
authenticity through being classed among Dada works.  
This piece’s unique combination of engagement with traditional judicial 
structures and ludic roleplaying gives it the feel of an avant-garde play. However, 
responsibility is left with the reader on deciding where the piece lies on a scale of 
reality. This tension between the trial’s status as event, text, and event-as-text, 
underscores Dada’s desire to break down artistic barriers and leaves an ambiguous 
and/or multifaceted legacy for the work. The text referred to throughout this piece 
will be Bonnet’s 1987 L’Affaire Barrès (AB), because of its bringing together of texts 
relating to the trial. However, this chapter will treat the parts of the text taken from 
the ‘transcript’ of the trial as published in Littérature (L20, August 1921) as the ‘avant-
garde play’ aspect of the text, and Bonnet’s extra documents as supporting 
documents or accompanying notes. 
In Camus’s L’Étranger, the protagonist, Meursault, is arrested after having shot 
and killed a man in cold blood. Meursault’s nameless victim is set up as an 
anonymous pawn in society’s desire to persecute Meursault as a scapegoat, as the 
embodiment of its flaws. Camus continually reminds us that Meursault is brought to 
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justice because he does not fit in with the society of his time. As Sartre succinctly 
concluded in his account of Meursault, ‘c’est justement un de ces terribles innocents 
qui font le scandale d’une société parce qu’ils n’acceptent pas les règles de son jeu’ 
(1947a: 104). While the Barrès trial was an event that became a piece of literature, 
Meursault’s trial is an in-world event. As such, Meursault’s trial offers greater 
linguistic coherence, but maintains an absurd relationship with judicial precedent, 
and consequently a greater dependence on the perceived authenticity of social 
constructs than Barrès’s trial, which only maintains enough of a link to judicial 
structures to enact its scathing parody.  
‘Attentat à la sureté de l’esprit’ 
The transcript of Barrès’s trial begins with a lengthy indictment by Breton, who 
lists eight constituent crimes to the overarching accusation of ‘attentat à la sureté de 
l’esprit’. First he takes the time to introduce the writer, though his detailed 
explanation is little more than an objective, exhaustive list of the life events of the 
individual on the stand: 
Maurice Barrès, auteur des trois volumes réunis sous le titre Le Culte du Moi, de L’Ennemi des 
lois, de Huit jours chez M. Renan, écrivain décadent, propagandiste de l’école romane, auteur des 
Déracinés, de Colette Baudoche et d’une Chronique de la Grande Guerre, ancien socialiste, député, 
athée, un des piliers du boulangisme, un des lieutenants de Paul Déroulède, un des instigateurs 
de l’affaire Dreyfus, un des dénonciateurs de Panama, nationaliste, apôtre du culte des morts, 
président de la Ligue des Patriotes, académician, rédacteur à L’Echo de Paris, conférencier 
populaire, auteur de La Grande Pitié des églises de France, partisan de la revanche, l’homme de la 
statue de Strasbourg, l’homme de l’annexion de la rive gauche du Rhin, l’homme de Jeanne 
d’Arc, président d’honneur de cent soixante-quinze sociétés de bienfaisance […]. (AB: 25) 
In Chapter Two we saw a Dada tendency to give fragments of information without 
any indication of direction or overall sense. Here we are given a vast and varied list 
of characteristics, yet are not told which are to be considered most important, or even 
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positive and negative. From this we might consider that what is important here is 
that they are all considered to be true. However, we can further attribute it to Dada’s 
wide-ranging indictment of a whole host of ideologies and institutions. Breton’s 
listing takes on a similar style to that of Louis Aragon’s ‘Manifeste du mouvement 
Dada’ (1920), which details a number of Dada’s personal grudges to which it wishes 
there to be an end: ‘plus de religions, plus de républicains, plus de royalistes, plus 
d’impérialistes, plus d’anarchistes, plus de socialistes, plus de bolcheviques, plus de 
politiques […] enfin assez de toutes ces imbécilités’ (in L13: 2). Several of Aragon’s 
indicted ideologies (primarily through political alignments) are alluded to in Breton’s 
introduction, demonstrating from the outset an underlying structure of targeted 
characteristics. 
All of these highlighted attributes are implied to contribute to Barrès’s self-
definition as ‘un homme de génie’, given the juxtaposition of the list and Breton’s 
latter accusation. A further perceived unfair advantage of this is that Barrès’s status 
allowed him to be ‘à l’abri de toute investigation profonde, de tout contrôle, de toute 
sanction’ (AB: 25-26). The notion of an infallible, unchanging individual runs counter 
to both Dada and Existentialist tenets, as no individual should have this kind of 
intellectual immunity. A particularly strong point of contention across the trial is 
Barrès’s role as ‘président de la Ligue des patriotes’, an evident reference to Dada’s 
anti-nationalist stance. The phrase appears twice in Breton’s opening words, once in 
Tzara’s witness section, and once in Soupault’s plea, but then becomes an obsessive 
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focal point in Ribemont-Dessaignes’s closing speech, appearing seven times in quick 
succession.  
The neurotic repetition of this phrase parallels Meursault’s outburst at a similar 
end-point in the novel, where he angrily repeats the phrase ‘qu’importait…’ (E: 119). 
Both of these phrases in constant repetition invoke an aggressive revolutionary spirit, 
as well as being rendered equally meaningless through pushing them to the point of 
absurdity and highlighting their status as simply words lined up in a particular way. 
Meursault’s outburst opposes the chaplain’s position within organised religion just 
as Ribemont-Dessaigne’s rejects nationalist narratives. Instructively these two points 
represent not only apexes in the structure of their respective works but also points of 
lucidity in both. In the case of the Barrès trial it is a point of clarity amid typical Dada 
antics and in L’Étranger, it represents Meursault’s breaking point, but also the point 
after which he comes to certain realisations, such as the fact that he is happy in the 
face of death. Meursault confesses after his outburst that ‘je m’ouvrais pour la 
première fois à la tendre indifférence du monde. De l’éprouver si pareil à moi, si 
fraternel enfin, j’ai senti que j’avais été heureux, et que je l’étais encore’ (E: 120). 
These two outbursts show an energy achieved through rebellion, which reveals an 
ethics worth fighting for. 
The eight charges levelled against Barrès are illuminating on the part of Dada, 
since they (inadvertently) highlight concerns that plagued the movement. The first 
charge is that Barrès’s books are ‘proprement illisibles’, and as such ‘[il] a donc 
usurpé la réputation de penseur’ (AB: 26). This charge from a movement that 
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revelled in illogicity and distortion of meaning, as well as a healthy wariness of 
institutionalised thinking, exposes Dada’s preoccupation with theory as something to 
be simultaneously engaged in and rejected. Furthermore, the charge is indicative of a 
sense of disappointment in empty promises from this literary idol, ironically enough 
for a movement that claimed to be a lot of things, including ‘nothing’. The second 
charge is based in contradiction, claiming that Barrès led a bi-partite life in which the 
‘second Barrès’ betrayed the ‘first’, and that in changing so radically with the goal of 
becoming ‘un homme opulent’ he merely succeeded in becoming a ‘démenti formel’ 
(AB: 28).  
While contradiction is a primary characteristic of Dada, the objection here is to 
Barrès’s becoming something with which the adherents fundamentally disagreed. 
This can be linked to the third charge, which essentially re-expresses disappointment 
in Barrès’s conformism, particularly through servile and cowardly behaviour. His 
retreat into aggressive ideologies such as anti-Semitism and fascism shows a desire to 
be led by an overriding narrative that allows blame and fears to be assigned to a 
‘foreign’ enemy. Robert Soucy claims that on Barrès’s conversion to rootedness he 
also set out upon ‘a sharp contraction of his intellectual life, […] a deliberate 
narrowing of his cultural horizons’ (1972: 81).  This behaviour and the language used 
to describe it parallels Dada’s hatred for the stagnation of European behaviour that 
had led to international conflict. Additionally those who depend on 
patriotism/nationality for identity can be described as lacking authenticity or 
individuality in that they defer responsibility for their choices and rely on a 
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predetermined definition of selfhood based in facticity. This can be contrasted with 
the makeup of the original Dada group (though not necessarily the Paris branch), 
which welcomed a plethora of nationalities and revelled in the incorporation of 
multiple languages into its texts. Nationality of adherents was not important as long 
as they were (or wished to be) Dada, and notably nationalities of non-Dada centres 
are often incorporated into lists such as Walter Arensburg’s: ‘DADA est américain, 
DADA est russe, DADA est espagnol, DADA est suisse, DADA est allemand, DADA 
est français, belge, norvégien, suédois, monégasque. Tous ceux qui vivent sans 
formule, qui n’aiment des musées que le parquet,53 sont DADA’ (in L13: 16).  
The fourth and fifth charges relate to the consequences of empty promises (the 
Dadas’ own disappointment in Barrès), and the effects that a person’s life, especially 
that of a grand homme, has on others. The notion of effect on others expresses Sartre’s 
assertion that we choose our morals and actions based on the fundamental 
assumption that they are universally applicable. Thus Barrès had a series of beliefs 
that did not fit with this ideal, particularly through his increasing ‘cultural 
parochialism’, and his retreat into regional identity. This not only betrayed his earlier 
love of travel and foreign culture, but also Dada’s art sans frontières approach. 
Barrès’s cultural narrowing is presented by Breton in his reference to the ‘image 
d’Epinal’ which can be interpreted in two ways: an image of the town itself, situated 
not far from Barrès’s native Charmes/Nancy, or the eponymic prints produced there, 
                                                 
53 Arensburg’s choice of architectural point has a notable crossover with the terminology of judgement 
through ‘parquet’ as a part of the court. 
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which displayed an idealised and traditional, if not naïve conception of French 
values. 
The sixth charge accuses Barrès of having fallen into a 19th-century trend of 
analysis of the human soul, as well as a nihilistic and perpetual self-interrogation, 
whereas Breton claims that ‘le nihilisme ne peut aucunement être contemplatif’ (AB: 
31). This accusation highlights an instructive aspect of Dada’s own relationship with 
nihilism. We may wonder whether this moment represents a key point at which 
Breton wished to begin to distance himself with Dada, especially considering the 
consequent demise of the movement. Equally, and perhaps more importantly, we 
may consider that this is due to Dada’s status as nihilistic being mis-administered, 
and as such this accusation is a parody of its own perception. Charles Doty writes 
that in Paris, Barrès ‘fell into a nihilistic rebellion against all the conventions of his 
origins, education, and society’ (1976: 19), which is in keeping with Dada’s 
endeavour to go against all of the rotten aspects of the past. Perhaps Dada recognised 
Barrès’s nihilism as a futile part of his early life, and instead saw its own nihilistic-
adjacent qualities as something more like a creative nihilism (when) seen through to 
its end.  
The seventh charge is threefold, attacking Barrès not only on the grounds of 
having never been a free man, but also for having given the impression of being 
learned, and thirdly for his questionable wartime position. The former two sub-
charges respond to Barrès’s change of mind about the role of the intellectual when, 
having had a youth of reading as much as he could lay his hands on, he decided that 
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the intellectual should not have to be well-read to gain status, let alone through 
foreign literature. The latter goes hand in hand with his developing nationalism and 
his evolving concern for external enemies rather than his earlier preoccupation with 
internal foes.  
The final charge links with Camus’s later criticism of Barrès that he was all talk 
and no action: ‘les idées n’ont point de valeur en elles-mêmes; elles ne valent que par 
l’enjeu dont on les accompagne; et les idées de Barrès n’ont jamais été accompagnées 
d’aucun enjeu’ (AB: 32). This reinforces Camus’s later accusations: we may consider 
that both Dada and the French Existentialists reject Barrès on his lack of willingness 
to act. Furthermore, he seemed to later lose his ability to theorise, being accused of 
having a ‘closed mind’ by André Gide, Henri Massis and Jérôme Tharaud, and of 
‘intellectual relativism’ by Gide (Soucy 1972: 89; 105). These final three accusations 
run fundamentally counter to Dada activities: events and works indicate a good deal 
of cultural capital, as well as an expression of desire for creative, linguistic, and 
personal freedom. 
Through their chosen accusation of ‘[un] attentat à la sûreté de l’esprit’, the 
Paris Dada group tried Barrès on the grounds of what is, for all intents and purposes, 
a fictional crime,54 in that it would not stand up in a courthouse. Additionally, within 
the in-text world of the event it is a crime that is self-confessedly impossible to 
                                                 
54 It should, however, be noted that, in a linguistic turn that cannot be entirely coincidental, an 
‘attentat contre la sûreté de l’Etat’ (my emphasis) is a real and punishable crime. What, then, can we 
consider an ‘attentat contre la sûreté de l’esprit’ to entail? We are reminded of Orwellian 
‘thoughtcrime’, in which crimes can be committed simply by thinking against established order, yet 
through Dada’s parodic reversal, crimes toward the individual’s mind (beyond the crime of the 
policing of thought) become the most invasive and/or offensive. 
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commit: as Soupault pointed out in his speech for the defence, ‘il n’est pas plus du 
pouvoir de Maurice Barrès que de n’importe qui d’attenter à la sûreté de l’esprit’ 
(AB: 82). However, Dada’s indictment of their fellow literary figure was based in 
outrage at Barrès’s extreme change of ideals: he was perceived to have betrayed his 
own values, as well as those of several Dadas. As Ribemont-Dessaignes describes, 
‘après avoir entraîné la jeunesse dans le sens d’un individualisme total, il avait 
tourné casaque, brûlé ce qu’il avait adoré, et adoré les idoles les plus despotiques qui 
soient, le sol, la patrie, la race, et quoi encore?’ (1958: 139). In short, the fundamental 
character trait under judgement is the heinous crime of conformism, an engagement 
with inauthenticity which was not in keeping with Dada’s tenets both in the realm of 
rejection of narratives, and also in terms of the importance of the subjective 
individual that we saw in Chapter One. 
In a striking parallel with Barrès’s fictional crime, L’Étranger’s Meursault is 
accused – beyond his ‘official’ crime of murder – of having ‘enterré sa mère avec un 
cœur de criminel’ (E: 97). While intent is an important part of a ‘real’ crime, this 
accusation against Meursault rests on a tenuous relationship with mental precedent, 
and is not directly related to the crime for which he was arrested. Moreover, while 
hindsight allows us to take offence at the idea of the acceptability of murder on the 
grounds of colonial political climate, it is made clear in the novel that until 
Meursault’s indifference to society is uncovered his crime would not have induced a 
heavy punishment, and certainly not the execution awarded for this indifference. 
Meursault’s crime of murder, then, becomes secondary to his reaction to his crime: 
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that of apparent indifference, and with it, the presumption of guilt on other accounts. 
Meursault, in a state of incomprehension, does not hear his indictment,55 though later 
learns, still vaguely, that he is accused of being ‘“coupable de meurtre”… 
“premeditation”… “circonstances atténuantes”’ (E: 105; original formatting). This set 
of indictments does not provide any more meaningful an accusation than ‘attentat à 
la sûreté de l’esprit’ of which Barrès was accused, and its scattered, broken up 
presentation adds a level of panic and absurdity that we saw through fragmentation 
and manipulation of sensory information in Dada film. With the addition of the 
debilitating heat to which Meursault is subject during his trial (also an indirect cause 
for his original crime), he is not able to even try to follow his proceedings, whether or 
not he has the legal competence to do so. 
It is instructive to analyse Meursault’s crime in its deconstructed form, since the 
three parts occupy differing places within an Existentialist viewpoint. We have seen 
that murder is condemned, both explicitly through Camus’s discussion of the 
Surrealists (HR: 123), and implicitly through the notion that the soundest ethics is 
that of mutually applicable morals (murder being undeniably one-way). The second 
part of the charge, premeditation, can be argued to be a positive attribute, since it 
rests on a thought-out decision rather than spontaneous psychopathy, and taken out 
of context can be considered an authentic mode of thinking. The third provides a 
middle point, since it introduces an element of contingency to the crime. 
Nevertheless, overdependence on attenuating circumstances contains indications of 
                                                 
55 Barrès would equally have not heard his indictment in person, since he was absent from the 
proceedings. 
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inauthenticity since an individual’s facticity is unchosen and unalterable, thus not 
strictly something to be relied upon when making an active choice. 
The sentences of these two individuals share qualities through both their 
severity and their changeability, in that Barrès ‘received’ twenty years of hard labour, 
whereas Meursault is sentenced to death. Instructively, Breton apparently expected 
capital punishment for Barrès (Sanouillet 2009: 193), whereas execution would not 
initially have been Meursault’s punishment, and only comes into play late in the 
trial, by which point he is being punished for the crimes of others as well as his 
own.56 This matching discrepancy leads us to wonder which sentence is more severe 
or out of the ordinary, considering Barrès’s absence and lack of breaking any 
culturally ‘real’ law, but that Meursault’s colonial cultural climate dictated that his 
murder of the Arab would not normally have entailed execution. We may 
furthermore posit that if both of these individuals were brought to trial for not fitting 
a certain intellectual ideal, they are essentially being accused of the same crime. The 
judge in L’Étranger even suggests that Meursault’s intelligence is an inherent 
indication of guilt (E: 100): as such, he represents a threat to mass (herd) mentality. 
Because of this ironic relationship with intellectual precedent, both trials escalate to 
Kafkaesque57 dimensions through the piling on of unfounded accusations, giving us 
                                                 
56 Today, we may view capital punishment as not only barbaric, but also obsolete (since 1965 in 
England and 1981 in France, at least), but at the time of either trial, the death penalty was still a very 
real threat in France, despite being a target of protest since the Revolution. 
57 Because of the ludic yet threatening nature of the Dada trial, we may go even further and compare it 
to the absurdity of the court in Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, complete with nonsense, 
characters arguing for both sides, and of course regular outbursts of ‘Off with his/her head!’. 
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the impression of an absurd spectacle in which it is no longer possible to define who 
is being accused of what, and to ends beyond the accused’s control. 
The Witnesses 
Continuing the theme of the absurd spectacle, both trials analysed here diverge 
from the traditional in terms of witnesses, whom we might presume to be selected 
according to their particular status within the life of the accused. Meursault’s trial 
draws upon a needlessly all-encompassing witness list, ironically not lending the 
case any great clarity through its wide basis. In Barrès’s case the witnesses, several of 
whom had little to do with Dada (or Barrès himself), appear to be selected at random. 
Through this we might suggest that the witnesses in Barrès’s case are biased toward 
those who have a particular reason to parody the writer, an intellectual bone to pick. 
In both cases, the selection of witnesses (as we saw in the charges) reveals more 
about their in-world social group than about the accused. The indiscriminate choice 
of witnesses in Barrès’s trial, especially through the use of outsiders in the 
prosecution (Dada), further parodies the notion of justice, through conforming to 
structures or form while mocking content.  
Sanouillet describes that the witnesses (chosen by Breton) were ‘recruited here 
and there for rather obscure reasons’ (2009: 188), offering three explanations for 
these: in order for Dada to ‘claim a place in the sunlight’, to ‘flesh out the cast of 
characters’, or to weaken Tzara’s resistance to the event (ibid.: 188-89). This latter is 
ironic given that it is perhaps Tzara’s resistance during the event that led to the 
demise of not only the trial but also the movement itself, probably because of the 
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status of the trial as Breton’s effort to ‘instil a greater sense of purpose into Dada in 
the face of Tzara’s mockery of such authoritarianism’ (Ades and Gale: n.d.). 
Additionally, while using witnesses to ‘flesh out the cast of characters’ might simply 
add to the farce of the Barrès trial, the use of prestigious individuals ended up 
contributing to an increased reception of the event.58 In this respect, the trial as both 
text and event relies on a pre-defined conception of the participants’ social positions 
and personas through their established literary authority. We have already seen that 
Dada exploited even the least tenable links to famous figures to garner attention, 
whether it be positive, or (preferably) negative. 
Through the revealing nature of the choice of witnesses we may consider the 
questions asked of the witnesses as important as their responses. Additionally in 
both cases the fictional nature of the witnesses creates an instructive relationship 
with the events as literature: in the Barrès trial, the witnesses were actors and as such, 
do not claim a real-world link to the accused;59 in Meursault’s trial, the witnesses are 
as real as he is, yet the trial itself never actually happened. Thus in both cases a 
constant level of fictionality is maintained. We can compare the seemingly random 
selection of witnesses in Dada’s mock trial to Meursault’s wide-ranging set, many of 
whom do not know the accused very well. This reinforces the notion of the accused 
as outsider, and is replicated in the lack of familiarity with Barrès among his 
witnesses, the most extreme being Tzara, whose knowledge of Barrès apparently 
                                                 
58 This notion of a cast of characters or actors lends weight to our viewing the trial as an avant-garde 
play. 
59 The only exception to this is Rochelle, whose connection is absorbed into the fictive whole through 
the ambiguity and parody of the witness statements in general. 
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only extended to his name (Sanouillet 2009: 186). Tzara’s distance from the accused is 
reflected by Barrès’s own knowledge of the event: despite knowing of its occurrence, 
he showed no reaction to it (ibid.: 579n). Though he never mentions the trial, some 
five months before the event Barrès wrote briefly and rather positively of Dada in his 
Cahiers: ‘Nos dadaïstes veulent retrouver la fraîcheur, le neuf, le primitif […] C’est 
l’équivalent du retour au folklore, à l’ingénu, au spontané’ (Barrès 1950: 31). This 
statement, of which the Dadas would not have been aware, adds an extra element of 
parody in that Barrès, despite the accusations against him, seems to have been 
supportive of Dada’s own work, including his personal use of the possessive. 
Barrès’s first witness, Serge Romoff,60 starts the trend of not knowing the 
accused, admitting to this and not being familiar with the writer’s works or ideals. 
Additionally Romoff had little connection to Dada, rendering his testimony tenuous 
at best. Despite this, he claims that Barrès cannot be considered a man of genius, 
because the latter had ‘exercé une influence néfaste sur la collectivité’ (AB: 35). This 
notably reinforces the notion we have already evoked of Barrès as going against the 
Existentialist tenet of making choices that are applicable (beneficial) to the collective 
(EH: 31). Romoff accuses Barrès of ‘quite vulgar bourgeois anarchism’ (ibid.: 36) and 
destructive nationalism. Although he judges every man to be sincere, he feels 
indifferent to the idea of the death of Barrès, as well as expressing that the accused is 
detrimental to his life (ibid: 37).  
                                                 
60 Bonnet provides what we might call ‘character profiles’ for the non-Dada actors within the trial, as 
footnotes to the main text: ‘Serge Romoff (1883-1939), menchevik né en Ukraine, se réfugia à Paris vers 
1905; personnalité en vue dans le milieu des artistes et écrivain russes, il anime en 1922-1923 la revue 
Oudar, chronique des arts et des lettres’ (AB: 34). 
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How reliable is this testimony, when we consider that some witnesses, 
including Romoff, were apparently ‘grateful to [Breton] for dictating their answers to 
them’ (Sanouillet 2009: 191)? Is Romoff’s somewhat prompted testimony any less 
reliable than an autonomous Dada answer, coming from a movement whose 
fundamental tenets included farce and deception? Moreover, are statements 
attributed to him any better than any given testimony in a trial based on a crime 
concocted for personal and/or literary means? When compared to Meursault’s trial 
(or any other normal trial), we might interrogate the possibility of the triumph of 
justice, when individuals construct their statements based upon the advice of a 
lawyer whose sole aim is ‘winning’. Meursault’s lawyer advises him at one point to 
‘répondre brièvement aux questions qu’on me poserait, de ne pas prendre 
d’initiatives et de me reposer sur lui pour le reste’ (E: 86), proving that intimate 
knowledge of the legal system (and its loopholes) is often more valuable than truth 
itself. It is a reminder, perhaps, that narrative is no more controlled by the 
protagonist than judicial fate is in the hands of the accused individual. 
Giuseppe Ungaretti61 is the only witness to explicitly agree with the accusation 
against Barrès of ‘crimes against the security of the mind’, but claims that it was 
Barrès’s role to do so. Furthermore, Ungaretti states that ‘le mot volonté a plutôt un 
sens ironique dans la vie’ (AB: 48), focusing on the facticity of an individual to claim 
that destiny is not only beyond our control, but also in part down to chance. Despite 
                                                 
61 ‘Le poète italien Giuseppe Ungaretti (1883-1970), lié dans l’avant-guerre à Apollinaire, à Modigliani, 
aux cubistes, responsable à Paris en septembre 1918 d’un journal destiné aux troupes italiennes, y 
rencontre Desnos, Paulhan, puis tout le groupe de Littérature. Breton lui dédicace “Cartes sur les 
dunes” dans son recueil Clair de terre’ (AB: 48). 
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this, he states that ‘[l]a vie d’un homme ne peut être considérée que par les rapports 
qu’elle crée’ (AB: 49). These statements indicate a preoccupation with the paradox of 
being simultaneously free to and condemned to choose that we saw in Sartre’s 
concept of choice in Chapter One, as well as his theory that ‘l’homme n’est rien 
d’autre que ce qu’il se fait’ (EH: 30). Ungaretti’s preference for total indifference is 
not unlike Meursault’s relationship with the world, yet contains a negative element 
that is not part of Meursault’s outlook.  
Jacques Rigaut echoes Ungaretti’s (negative) Existentialist sentiment, in 
equating the optimism of revolt with absolute passivity, and advocating revolt while 
declaring it pointless (AB: 53). Nevertheless Rigaut highlights an ambiguity that 
might be said to foreground our aforementioned notion of the individual creating 
their own meaning. Breton’s questioning of Rigaut is additionally indicative of a 
desire to manipulate both the witnesses and the audience, lingering on the subject of 
suicide (irrelevant to Barrès’s case) and invoking issues that were not only applicable 
to Rigaut, but also to the audience (Sanouillet 2009: 191). Breton’s accusations then 
render the audience complicit in the judgement, as well as making them aware that 
the witnesses themselves are not immune to his scrutiny.  
In contrast with Romoff’s dictated Bretonian answers, Mme Rachilde’s62 
testimony is simply a statement on the nature of judgement, and does not even 
contain any questions from Breton. Rachilde’s bizarre appearance on the stand is 
                                                 
62 ‘Mme Rachilde (1860-1953) […] se fit connaître par de nombreux romans audacieux pour son 
époque, dont le plus célèbre est Monsieur Vénus (1884). Chroniqueuse abondante et influente, hostile à 
Dada, elle préconisait à son égard ‘Le Sourire silencieux’ (article publié dans Comœdia, 1er avril 1920) 
mais fut intéressée par l’idée même du “procès” Barrès’ (AB: 51).  
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indicative of a tentative relationship with Dada: formerly a strong adversary of the 
movement, she had recently been ‘“converted” by Picabia’ and appears to be wary of 
over-emphasising her ‘brand-new faith’ in public (both Sanouillet 2009: 189). 
However, Sanouillet notes that the newspapers’ depiction of the event described an 
attempted rescue of Dada from its abusive audience (ibid.: 190). We might conclude 
from this that her engagement was only to be on her own terms, particularly given 
the personally probing nature of Breton’s questions and their lack of relation to the 
case. We can compare this to the personal nature of the questions asked of 
Meursault’s witnesses that are relevant to the accused, but not specifically to the 
crime itself.  
Breton’s questioning of the Dada witnesses reveals both an indictment of the 
judicial system and moreover a desire to undermine Dada as a movement. Rachilde 
herself, through agreeing in principle with this judgement of Barrès, undermines 
Dada’s integrity by implying that having set a precedent as a group of jokers, an 
audience will never take them seriously: 
Jetez-leur [l’audience], une fois, des pois ou des haricots à la figure, ils seront indignés si vous 
vous contentez de leur faire une conférence plus ou moins intelligente sur un individu ou une 
œuvre. Alors ils jetteront, de leur côté, les haricots et les pois au visage nouveau que vous leur 
montrez. (AB: 51) 
It is notable that the Dadas (minus Breton) would have revelled in such a reaction, 
and thus we can to a certain extent attribute this new-found parody through 
seriousness and the illusion of conformity to an additional way of outraging the 
audience, who had no doubt become accustomed to the usual raucous provocation, 
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and furthermore a greater means to undermine a system.63 This attitude is evident in 
Meursault’s trial, which provoked outrage through crimes other than murder (and 
other than Meursault’s) in order to obtain the death sentence desired from the start. 
Given Pierre Drieu la Rochelle’s (later) alignment with Barrès’s nationalism, 
fascism and anti-Semitism (Rochelle is described by Soucy as a ‘self-proclaimed 
French Fascist’ (1972: 14)), the contemporary reader is inclined to view his testimony 
as holding the strongest or most serious link to Barrès himself. This testimony also 
gains the ability to leave a lasting impression through being the last. Rochelle claims 
that Barrès failed in his duty, rejecting his change of heart and yet maintaining a 
certain respect for the accused (perhaps because he would go on to do the same). 
Instructively, Breton criticises Rochelle’s mode of assessment: ‘Si bien que le 
jugement que vous rendez sur un homme dépend de ceux qui le jugent et de la 
manière dont ils le jugent, ce qui est une attitude purement aristocratique’ (AB: 60). 
Breton’s comment is notably hypocritical for one who chose the witnesses himself, 
and particularly for his ‘obscure reasons’ (cf. Sanouillet 2009: 188). Additionally, 
Breton’s provocation of the witnesses implies that he was trying to influence the 
direction that the judgement took, making him guilty of his own accusation. 
However, we may attribute this to a parody of the justice system whereby 
questioning is structured to obtain specific information, and which of course ‘dépend 
de ceux qui le jugent et de la manière dont ils le jugent’. We have seen that linguistic 
                                                 
63 The normalisation of deviance will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
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manipulation is normal in legal situations, as well as being an indication of skill in 
cases where success is deemed unlikely. 
Though Tzara’s testimony comes second among the witnesses, it is worth 
bringing it out to conclude our analysis of the Barrès trial, because not only is it the 
longest of the six by far, but it also goes the furthest to break down the event, erode 
any serious tone the trial may have been aiming for, and has the widest-ranging 
consequences for Dada. Tzara claims at first to know nothing about Barrès, but later 
declares three times to have met him, across Tzara’s literary, poetic, and ‘political’ 
career (Tzara would not express any real political interest until later in life). Most 
importantly, Tzara goes on to dismiss the idea of justice: ‘[j]e n’ai aucune confiance 
dans la justice, même si cette justice est faite par Dada’ (AB: 38). This statement alone 
successfully (and no doubt deliberately) takes away all credibility from his words, 
and rocks the foundations of the event, which he did not feel to be in line with Dada. 
Instructively, Breton later commented on the Barrès trial that ‘[t]he issues raised, 
which were of an ethical nature, might have interested several others among us, 
taken individually; but Dada, because of its conscious bias toward indifference, had 
absolutely nothing to do with them’ (1993: 53). While I agree with Breton’s first point, 
I disagree on the matter of Dada’s indifference. Instead I believe that Dada feigned a 
studied indifference while expressing strong concerns about several issues within its 
activities. 
Breton detailed that Tzara ‘contented himself with farcical statements and, to 
top it off, broke into an inept song’ (ibid.), something that we might argue to be not 
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entirely unprovoked or uninvited, given that the witness bar was a music stand. 
Tzara furthermore incited Breton to ask if he was in fact a witness for the defence, 
through his claim that he had nothing against the accused. Are we to consider 
Tzara’s testimony less reliable for its inherent contradiction? What about L’Étranger’s 
Marie, who cries and changes her statement, based on perceived consequences? 
Tzara’s belligerent refusal to comply with Breton’s questioning invited accusations 
that Tzara harboured a desire to commit an ‘attentat à la sûreté de l’esprit’ himself. In 
hindsight we might interpret this as either Breton’s way of fending off intellectual 
threat, or simply an excuse to threaten Tzara. From this personal jibing we may posit 
that the trial was more successful in highlighting the cracks in the moribund Dada 
movement64 than in revealing the flaws of the accused. Meursault’s case and the 
Barrès trial bring out the inauthenticity of both the in-world society and the external 
social environment.  
Like the Barrès testimonies, the witnesses in the Meursault trial are sped 
through, not gleaning much information from any given individual. A heavy 
weighting is put on the staff of Mme Meursault’s home, social authority figures who 
nevertheless know very little about Meursault. The manager of the home highlights 
Meursault as an absent carer, additionally expressing surprise at Meursault’s ‘calm’ 
at his mother’s funeral (E: 90). The manager does not consider that Meursault’s 
indifference could have been any combination of symptoms of grief, including shock 
                                                 
64 And indeed the personal worries of the Dadas themselves. As Tzara states, ‘je tiens à me faire passer 
pour un parfait imbécile, mais je ne cherche pas à m’échapper de l’asile dans lequel je passe ma vie’ 
(AB: 42). 
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and denial, which can lead to out-of-the-‘ordinary’ behaviour. The centrality of 
Meursault’s mother from the beginning of the questioning of the witnesses is 
indicative that the murder is not the real issue at stake. This devolution also occurs in 
the Barrès trial, which lost its thread almost immediately and instead provoked a 
number of other issues to come to a head. In both cases an element of sensationalism 
is created not from the opening aim or crime, but from the surrounding or 
underlying concerns, such as the case of Benjamin Péret’s manifestation of the 
Unknown Soldier, whose sole purpose seemed to be to cause outrage.65 The case 
against Meursault is built upon perceived social ineptitude, something that makes 
the members of the courthouse uneasy and/or threatened in their normalcy. 
Further references to normalcy and social convention are brought up by the 
concierge of Mme Meursault’s home, who relates Meursault’s demonstrably 
unaffected behaviour around his mother’s dead body. In this respect society is 
already condemning Meursault for not fitting in, but now also for exhibiting regular 
daily behaviour (sleeping, drinking coffee), demonstrating that full conformity to a 
predetermined set of behavioural principles is the only acceptable option. This is 
particularly questionable when it is deemed abnormal that Meursault does not wish 
to view his mother’s body. We might interrogate this condemnation of not wishing to 
                                                 
65 It succeeded, including scathing review in the press (AB: 91-92). For example Comœdia reported that 
‘[c]e fut une manifestation piteuse, grotesque, odieuse même par l’introduction dans cette mascarade 
sans gaieté, du symbole que le Soldat inconnu représente pour l’immense majorité des Français’ (ibid.: 
91). Sanouillet writes that ‘[a] wave of anti-Dadaist diatribes arose over the following days in the 
press, a wave that would erupt all the way onto the benches of the Chamber of Deputies’ (2009: 190). 
This raises further issues of the press as body of judgement, something that is parodied in Meursault’s 
trial through a journalist’s explanation of the large press presence: ‘Vous savez, nous avons monté un 
peu votre affaire. L’été, c’est la saison creuse pour les journaux.’ (E: 85). 
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see a loved one after their death, and consider that Meursault found it preferable to 
preserve a living memory.  
This stands in stark contrast with Meursault’s relationship with his crime. The 
pause between his gunshots provides an indeterminate space for reflection, 
highlighting his ambivalence toward the four final shots. This is particularly 
instructive when we consider the levity of Meursault’s case before the changed 
sentence: it is apparently acceptable to kill a person in cold blood, but not to show an 
aversion to interacting with the corpse of a relative. This can be notably compared to 
the unacceptability of the concierge’s offering of coffee, which is written off as polite 
convention, shifting the blame to Meursault’s acceptance. This manipulation of 
events demonstrates that Meursault’s guilt is already sealed, confirmed by the 
resignation of Meursault’s lawyer following his initial confidence of success: ‘Mon 
avocat a haussé les épaules et essuyé la sueur qui couvrait son front. Mais lui-même 
paraissait ébranlé et j’ai compris que les choses n’allaient pas bien pour moi’ (E: 97). 
We can compare this to Aragon’s behaviour in the Barrès trial, where he ‘acted as 
counsel for the defense and asked for the death of his client’ (Kirby 1972: 107). Is this 
any worse than a lawyer who will argue semantics to win an ostensibly hopeless 
case, despite obvious indications of guilt? At this point a trial becomes less about 
crimes and more about (linguistic) interpretations of banalities. 
This emphasis on the tenuous personal nature of Meursault’s trial is heightened 
through the ambiguous testimony of Mme Meursault’s ‘fiancé’, Thomas Perez. The 
use of his statement relies on a double negative: he did not see Meursault crying at 
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the funeral, but neither did he see him not crying. The conflicting and subjective 
nature of events is raised at this point: ‘“Voilà l’image de ce procès. Tout est vrai et 
rien n’est vrai!”’ (E: 92), rendering Meursault’s trial as absurd as the contradictions of 
the Barrès trial. Neither trial takes into account the little-informed situation of some 
of the witnesses, and both appear to put significant weight on the testimonies of the 
witnesses with the weakest connection to the accused. 
The testimonies of the two individuals who did have personal relationships 
with Meursault (his girlfriend Marie, and his friend Raymond Sintès) are varyingly 
dismissed and manipulated. During Marie’s testimony the judge fixates on the 
negative implications of Meursault’s unacceptable activities the day after his 
mother’s death, ignoring Marie’s own opinion of Meursault’s personal traits. This is 
ironic given the intrusive comments made on Meursault’s character by those who are 
demonstrably not familiar with it. Moreover, might we not consider that Meursault’s 
sudden, whirlwind romance may be a result of grief or of displaced affection? 
Although Meursault lives alone with no great trouble, he closes in on himself within 
his apartment after his mother leaving, abandoning the rest of the flat to live in one 
room. We may then attribute his engagement with (and later to) Marie to the trigger 
of his mother’s death, a cry for comfort and intimacy long lost, yet suddenly 
highlighted. Furthermore, Meursault’s apparent indifference can be challenged with 
his vocabulary of affection. As Sartre states, Meursault ‘désigne toujours sa mère du 
mot tendre et enfantin de “maman” et il ne manque pas une occasion de la 
comprendre et de s’identifier à elle’ (1947a: 108). The inhabitual method of grieving is 
170 
 
displaced by an underlying connection that the members of the court (choose to) 
ignore. 
The rejection of Raymond’s personal assessment of Meursault’s character 
compounds our sense that ‘[e]very detail of the trial adds up to the conclusion that 
the judges resent the murderer not for what he did but for what he is’ (Girard 1964: 
521). It is instructive that Raymond’s own self-confessed involvement in Meursault’s 
crime is not deemed important enough to make him an accomplice. Is this because 
Raymond’s lifestyle is quite open in its immorality (he is mocked but not persecuted 
for this), and thus he is deemed not a threat to society? Raymond’s behaviour can be 
compared to Meursault’s in that the former is deemed immoral and the latter amoral, 
the former breaks with convention (unconventional) but the latter is outside of it 
(aconventional). Through this it would be considered possible to ‘correct’ Raymond; 
Meursault is beyond correction, necessitating his further removal.  
This is particularly strongly presented by the prosecutor’s accusations that 
Meursault has no soul: 
Il disait qu’il s’était penché sur [mon âme] et qu’il n’avait rien trouvé, messieurs les jurés. Il 
disait qu’à la vérité, je n’en avais point, d’âme, et que rien d’humain, et pas un des principes 
moraux qui gardent le cœur des hommes ne m’était accessible. “Sans doute, ajoutait-il, nous ne 
saurions le lui reprocher. Ce qu’il ne saurait acquérir, nous ne pouvons nous plaindre qu’il en 
manque. Mais quand il s’agit de cette cour, la vertu toute négative de la tolérance doit se muer 
en celle, moins facile, mais plus élevée, de la justice. Surtout lorsque le vide du cœur tel qu’on le 
découvre chez cet homme devient un gouffre où la société peut succomber.” (E: 100-01) 
The prosecutor not only crosses into religious terminology, pre-empting the chaplain, 
but he also introduces a paradox in the judicial system. Meursault is pitied for not 
having a soul, even rendered blameless (‘nous ne saurions le lui reprocher’), yet is 
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deemed unsaveable and prosecuted on this very basis. This foregrounds the real 
nature of the judiciary system as a way of removing threats to mass morality. 
Furthermore, Meursault raises a crucial issue through his rejection of easy justice: 
justice should be difficult, because a system must be able to commit to serious 
decisions that are life-changing (or -ending) for the accused. From the point of view 
of individual or inner justice, it remains important to thoroughly consider one’s 
personal ethics, where ease could be equated with flippancy or, in extension, 
inauthenticity. While it can be argued that ‘natural’ justice is innate, reflection is 
required for a functional relationship with others. 
Systematic Societies and Individual Ethics 
These two examples of Dada and Existentialist trials interrogate the usefulness 
of a system of justice. The trials of Meursault and Barrès engage in an effort to attack 
the authenticity (in terms of justifiability) of judgement, parodying the acquired 
human need for a system of judging and sorting people, according to the 
‘appropriate’ guilt assigned to their actions. Both trials show the limits of justice as an 
extension of objective morality: as long as trials are based on precedent,66 individuals 
and their cases will never be fully gauged on their own attributes. Meursault’s trial is 
based on forward-thinking precedent: he is blamed for the crime that is next on the 
agenda, as if it is proof of his guilt. Additionally, Meursault’s failure to react to the 
charges against him makes the system nervous in its failed attempts to provoke him, 
                                                 
66 This is certainly true of British law, and other countries practising common law. However, while the 
Francophone system of civil law is centred on a case-by-case construct, basing its decisions on general 
principles and abstractions rather than case precedent, in practice any system based on a codified law 
is broadly working on a premise of precedent. 
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which produces the need to punish him for a new reason: lack of remorse. In 
addition to putting various systems and ideologies on trial, Dada was putting itself 
on trial. By falling into the attitudes of judgement that it resented, it judged itself 
(and, as we have seen through its demise, appeared to find itself guilty). 
Both trials enact an absurd parody bordering on madness to highlight the flaws 
in their respective systems. In relation to L’Étranger, René Girard states that ‘[t]he 
presentation of the trial as a parody of justice contains at least an implicit indictment 
of the judges’ (1964: 519). This indictment is quite explicit in Dada’s trial of Barrès, 
which ‘appl[ied] Dada’s ironic posture to the more serious moral issue of preserving 
commitment to one’s beliefs’, and ‘offered a clear (though still hilarious) replacement 
for Dada chaos by aping the solemnity and pompousness of traditional judicial 
procedure’ (Papanikolas in Spiteri ed. 2003: 44). Through analysing these parodies of 
the judicial system, we are led to wonder if justice is a concept that can be 
systematised, or if indeed it should. What is the purpose of systematising human 
behaviour? Does its organisation assist its comprehension? Or does it simply set up a 
rigid system that is doomed to fail, through the relative ease of its abuse? 
Furthermore, these cases highlight a weakness in systematised justice, in that any 
system left unquestioned can be manipulated for wrongdoing, as evidenced by 
Dada’s foregrounding of narratives such as nationalism and religion as causes of the 
systematised destruction and debasement of humanity during the First World War. 
Within each of our cases, the characters engage as individuals on different 
levels with both society and the systems of justice and, through this, with the 
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concepts of truth, reality and authenticity. The reality of the court’s qualification to 
judge in L’Étranger is undermined by their fictional existence. Conversely the real 
existence of Barrès’s ‘judges’ is undone by their lack of legal qualifications. Equally 
Barrès was not present for his trial, played instead by a (mute) mannequin. 
Meursault on the other hand attends his trial, but his accusers and even his lawyer 
act as if he is not there, and though he is not mute, his voice is lost in the courtroom’s 
apparent lack of attention to his words. Is justice always decided in the absence of the 
accused? The law is outside of the individual, and the verdict is to some extent out of 
his or her control (through the finality of the decision, or in cases of wrong 
accusation). Furthermore, traditional law is structured on a rigid dependence on 
moral and judicial precedent. While this may give the appearance of consistency, is it 
not an expression of inauthenticity in that it will almost always bend to the pressures 
of the times? Moreover, as Thomas Hanna points out, ‘any life, placed under the 
judgement of absolute moral standards, is guilty and monstrous’ (1958: 56). 
Ribemont-Dessaignes and Tzara share this distaste at the ‘objective’ judgement 
of others. The former states in his closing speech that ‘Dada ne pense pas. Dada ne 
pense rien. Il sait cependant ce qu’il ne pense pas: c’est-à-dire tout’ (AB: 66). Tzara 
had already testified that ‘[j]e ne juge pas. Je ne juge rien. Je me juge tout le temps et 
je me trouve un petit et dégoûtant individu […] Tout ceci est relatif’ (AB: 45). 
Soupault further rejects Dada judgement in his ‘plea’, and additionally implies that 
the crime of which Barrès is accused is an impossible feat:  
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Un acte, une pensée, l’acte ou la pensée contraires [sic] ne peuvent compromettre l’esprit ni chez 
celui qui le commet ou la conçoit, ni l’esprit en général, ni celui d’individus susceptibles d’en 
subir l’influence. (AB: 82) 
We can compare this rejection of concern to Meursault’s court, which was threatened 
not by his acts but by his mentality.  
The ridiculous nature of both trials serves to imply that the accusers are at fault 
for feeling intellectually threatened. In one last effort to highlight the futile nature of 
the trial, Soupault ends by insulting members of the court, calling Tzara ‘sénile et 
délirant’, Drieu la Rochelle ‘[un] abruti’, and Rachilde ‘folle’ (AB: 83), essentially 
carrying through Tzara’s earlier mockeries, including calling himself and all of his 
co-Dadas (among others) ‘cochons’ and ‘salauds’ (AB: 38-41). In a similar alignment 
with Dada’s réquisitoire and plaidoyer for Barrès, Meursault comments that he feels 
that the statements of the judge and of his lawyer are not so different after all (E: 98). 
The fact that this also continues his thought that there is not much difference 
between absurdities and crime highlights a (perhaps unconscious) criticism of 
judgement and the law: if the line of guilt is blurred and/or subjective, it can be 
twisted to assure a continuation of an ‘acceptable’ society. 
It took the trial of Barrès for it to become clear that Dada was not suited to a 
judgemental position. As Ribemont-Dessaignes expressed, ‘[c]e simulacre de justice, 
accompli sérieusement, se situait hors de Dada’ (1958: 139).67 Perhaps this is the 
foremost reason for it causing the rift between the Breton- and Tzara-camps: ‘[t]he 
débâcle surrounding the ‘trial’ of Maurice Barrès […] confirms the status of 
                                                 
67 It is instructive that Barrès does not fit with our ‘hors de’ paradigm: according to Jacques Madaule, 
‘Barrès’s great weakness, truly, was not to have known how to get outside himself’ (in Soucy 1972: 90). 
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judgement as intrinsic to surrealist attempts at self-definition’ (Baker 2007: 129; my 
emphasis). On the other hand it took the trial of Meursault for the novel’s society to 
realise it did want to persecute him. Initially the murder charges would not have 
entailed any great punishment because of a colonial indifference, but the trial caused 
a highlighting of undesirable character traits on the part of the accused, who then 
‘needed’ to be executed for his crime. Murder does not entail execution, but the 
wrong mindset is considered beyond correction.  
How does this reflect on society and its compulsion to correct and punish? Both 
Existentialism’s and Dada’s attachment to the systems that they hope to destroy 
gives them the upper hand in destroying systems (art, justice) from within. Although 
both trials examined here exhibit certain signs of failure – in Meursault’s case to try 
him for the crime he committed; in Barrès’s to try him at all – they both effectively 
highlight fundamental societal flaws. Both trials demonstrate the difficulties raised 
by engaging in a judgement of a subjective individual through an ‘objective’ moral 
system. This is expressed elsewhere in the use of declarations of insanity to override 
or influence a guilty verdict. Furthermore, the continued dependence on establishing 
a criminal as detached from normalcy maintains the status of the outsider that 
justifies the law, convincing the majority of society that the system works for them.  
Conclusion 
Both the Barrès trial and that of L’Étranger’s Meursault highlight the 
fundamental injustice of a society whose rules are more important than the 
individual (though it is of course more difficult to find evidence that Dada actually 
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wished to right the wrongs of the world beyond pointing them out). We saw that in 
Meursault’s trial, he suffered greatly from the heat and was unable to comprehend a 
significant part of his trial. Is this any better treatment of an individual than Barrès’s 
trial, at which he was not present (but to which he apparently was invited)? In an 
instructive parallel, the Dreyfus Affair is said to have (figuratively) taken place in his 
absence (see Thomas 1961), as his case took a secondary role to the divisive issues it 
produced. As Léon Blum summarised, ‘on se battait pour ou contre la République’ 
(in Royer et al 1995: 760). Through the link of Barrès, this is evident in Dada’s trial, 
and its many thinly veiled indictments of institutions and ideologies. 
The trials explored in this chapter raise questions of authenticity of the accused 
individuals, but also in terms of the implications for the society which is accusing 
them. Dada’s accusation that Maurice Barrès betrayed his own personal values in 
favour of conforming to reigning narratives might be interpreted as an Existentialist 
interrogation of Barrès as an example of an inauthentic individual. However, the 
event and its literary counterpart served to highlight inconsistencies in the 
movement itself, including the realisation that Dada had assumed the very 
judgemental position that it so detested in society. The self-destruction of the 
movement arguably allows Dada to regain a level of authenticity, through 
countering its own flaws. Conversely, Meursault is tried for not fitting in to society. 
As readers, we know that Meursault is guilty of murder, despite his lack of 
premeditation. And yet we are compelled to sympathise with this individual, feeling 
that his fate is unjust. Does this make us complicit in his criminality? Or do we see 
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the justice system as having inauthentically processed the accused? Do we feel 
personally wronged that the court sentences Meursault to death for his ‘criminal 
heart’, his indifference to society, and the resulting blame not only for his own 
murderous act but also for the parricide which is next on the judicial agenda?  
Both cases can be used to highlight a difference between authenticity in terms of 
the ‘real’, the ‘genuine’, conforming to certain standards, and the Existentialist sense 
of the term. In the case of Meursault, his breaking with societal norms would perhaps 
make him or his behaviour inauthentic in terms of traditional standards. However, 
within an Existentialist definition, his refusal to fit with established normalcy, even 
when doing so could save his life, is demonstrative of authentic behaviour.68 Both 
trials encourage the reader to challenge the ‘natural’ authenticity of social constructs 
and narratives. Through this we may wonder whether it is ever possible for a system 
of justice to ever engage with anything more than a standard definition of 
authenticity. A system is faithful to itself, but has no element of conscious decision, 
as it will always bow to external pressures, a characteristic of Existentialist 
inauthenticity. As a consequence, we may conclude that it is necessary to rebel 
against oppressive systematisation to gain individual authenticity. 
Both trials highlight the problematic nature of a black-and-white moral 
judgement of an individual when truth itself is subjective and situational. Through 
an analysis of these two trials, we can conclude that not only are the ideas of justice 
                                                 
68 One notable point of tension against an Existentialist perspective is the assumption that because 
Camus raises Meursault up as a model, he is therefore a model to be followed: something that Camus 
never sought to do. 
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and morality flexible and idiosyncratic, but that literature’s relationship with these 
aspects of society draws upon different degrees of authenticity, through its 
fluctuating relationship with reality, truth, deception and façade. The texts show that 
the line of ‘fiction’ is blurry, reflecting invented situations but also faithfully 
reproducing real, yet farcical, events. In a certain respect, we must consider 
Meursault’s trial to be no more fictional than Barrès’s, since it represents a comment 
on humanity, and is certainly not detached from the social and political concerns of 
its time. In this way, Dada’s indictment of Barrès is no less authentic for taking place 
in the absence of the accused. Existentialist and Dada provocations to question the 
validity of any text forces the reader to be aware of the perpetual necessity for 
authentic choices in their own life. Perhaps the highest degree of authenticity in 
literature is inversely proportional to truth, in that its negative link to society 
provides genuine critique, inviting the reader to become not only aware of the 
subjectivity of the world, but also to become the creative source of their own 
authenticity. 
This third chapter has delved into a side-by-side textual analysis of two literary 
examples of Dada and Existentialist expressions of justice and responsibility. We 
may draw these two themes together to answer our question regarding Meursault: 
why, if we know that he is guilty, are we yet affected by his fate? Because we feel 
responsible, not only for being complicit in the sentencing to death of a fellow human 
being, but for his inconsistent treatment through his changing judgement based 
progressively less on his crime. In this respect the Barrès trial took the notion of 
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subjective judgement to its logical extremity: through parodying unrelated and 
wildly varying aspects of the accused’s personality, Dada was provoked into a self-
reassessment. The implications for authenticity are instructive in relation to Sartre’s 
statement that ‘nous rappelons à l’homme qu’il n’y a d’autre législateur que lui-
même’ (EH: 76), an emphasis on the necessity for an individual ethics that 
nonetheless is universally applicable. Through these Dada and Existentialist attacks 
on objectivity, we can posit the importance of a case-by-case approach, as advocated 
by Beauvoir in her theories of ambiguity and through subjectivity, rather than a 
dependence on universalising morals and judicial precedent. 
Chapter Three began to address the ways in which Dada and Existentialist 
individuals can be viewed as outsiders to society, tradition and notions of normalcy. 
In the case of Dada we saw the extent of its rebellion leading to the movement’s self-
destruction. Chapter Four will develop this notion of deviance in relation to 
censorship and freedom, returning to Dada’s early days of the readymade but also 
exploring the repercussions of post-Dada ripplings, including neo-Dada and pop art. 
Where Chapter Three highlighted society’s need to isolate and alienate the threat of 
the different, Chapter Four will scrutinise the inevitable integration of such deviance 
through the normalisation of shock. Later, Chapter Five will pick up the thread 
briefly explored here of the notions of truth in relation to fiction and multiple 
interpretations of events. We have seen in this chapter how different relationships 
and renderings of events can affect the future of both individuals and movements 
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within their context. Chapter Five will further dissect this effect and its continuing 
importance across art and academia. 
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- CHAPTER FOUR - 
CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM: ‘COMMENT JE SUIS DEVENU 
CHARMANT, SYMPATHIQUE ET DELICIEUX’69 
Le seul plan sur lequel nous pouvons situer le refus du sujet, c’est celui de la censure. 
(EN: 87)  
Liberté: DADA DADA DADA, hurlement des couleurs crispées, entrelacement des contraires et de 
toutes les contradictions, des grotesques, des inconséquences: LA VIE. 
(Tzara in D3:3) 
When Dada exploded into the world in 1916, it was met with disapproval by the 
good people of Zurich. Simultaneously in New York, Duchamp’s urinal was rejected 
as degenerate. In Paris, Dada events often ended in violence (against and within the 
group of performers) and occasionally with the police being called. Dada spread 
mischief in every city that it called home, seeking to shake society into readdressing 
its role within the madness of wartime ‘civilisation’. Deviance was Dada’s status quo 
and scandal was its modus operandi. Yet within a few short years, Dada declared 
itself dead; the avant-garde’s most notorious group of misfits disbanded and moved 
on, several members denying any continuing association. A notable example is 
Breton, who tried to reappropriate Dada in his own recollections as simply a 
stepping stone toward his own Surrealism. Almost a century later, Dada has been 
incorporated into galleries and academic research; anti-art has become viewed as art. 
In short, the Dada that was once pelted with rotten vegetables has become 
acceptable, desired, and commodified. Previously censored words, acts and artworks 
are now celebrated – including through their hefty price tags – instead of reviled. 
Has the designation of respectability become a form of censorship in its own right?  
                                                 
69 Title of a 1920 manifesto by Tzara (in Tzara 1996: 236-37) 
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This chapter will scrutinise manifestations of Dada provocation, as well as 
examples from their Neo-Dada and postmodern counterparts, in order to answer the 
following questions. How, why, and at what point does the censored become 
acceptable? How can we explain the temporal normalisation of deviance? Is shock 
simply unrepeatable, or has the contemporary spectator become unshockable? When 
shock is gone, what is left? The chapter will assess the possibility of a ‘zero point’ in 
shock value in the artistic world. Richter uses the term ‘zero point’ as a title for a 
section on Dada and Neo-Dada (AA: 208-09), referring to the way in which Roger 
Shattuck describes artworks such as Duchamp’s bicycle wheel on second viewing: 
‘the (anti-)artistic value they used to possess has gone back to zero’ (ibid.: 208). 
Richter does not explicitly define his term ‘zero-point’ and it is for this reason that I 
will be investigating its potential for application here. This will be done in relation to 
works such as the Dada readymades, examples of Dada altercations with authority, 
and its complex relationship with Neo-Dada. The development of both external and 
internal censorship (the latter within the movement and in the case of individual 
Dada members) will be traced geographically, linguistically, and temporally: 
geographically, through the differing effects of censorship in Dada’s various 
hometowns; linguistically, through the specifics of language use and both internal 
and external rejection; temporally, over the course of the movement and its legacy.  
This analysis will be undertaken in relation to Existentialist ideas of censorship 
and freedom, especially through the increasing levels and varying types of 
censorship in Camus’s depictions of a plague-infested society in his novel La Peste 
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(1947): the rats, the early cases of plague, quarantine, responses to the plague. The 
rats will be read in relation to the phenomenon of the readymades, particularly those 
of Duchamp, alongside the found art of Schwitters. The use of and reactions to 
quarantine will be interpreted with reference to Dada events which involved the 
intervention of the authorities. Finally, the return of the rats and recuperation from 
the plague will be explored in relation to the emergence of Neo-Dada, its relationship 
with Dada, and its on-going and combined legacy. Colin Davis writes that La Peste 
‘can be read as an act of containment, in which what is at stake is how to eradicate 
the threat of the unwanted other’ (2007: 1008). This chapter seeks to reveal the ways 
in which Dada responded to its adversaries with confrontation, rejection and/or 
integration of the ‘unwanted other’. Additionally, it will consider Dada itself as 
unwanted other, from both without and within the movement. While La Peste is 
traditionally read as an allegory of the German Occupation of France during the 
Second World War, here it will be analysed instead on several different levels in 
regard to censorship, freedom, and rebellion. 
Freedom and Exile 
La liberté est la source d’où surgissent toutes les significations et toutes les valeurs; elle est la 
condition originelle de toute justification de l’existence 
(MA: 31-32) 
Ils éprouvaient ainsi la souffrance de tous les prisonniers et de tous les exilés, qui est de vivre avec une 
mémoire qui ne sert à rien 
(P: 81) 
An important concept to Existentialist writers and theory in general, freedom is 
a particularly central aspect for Sartre in L’Être et le néant. What is specifically useful 
to this chapter is his close linking of freedom with a lack thereof, that is, limits or 
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restraints, or for our purposes censorship. Because of Beauvoir’s aim of producing an 
Existentialist ethics (and in this respect often providing a practical synthesis of 
Sartrean thought), her writing on freedom (as exemplified in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté) will also be used to draw conclusions from our analysis. We have already 
seen that to be free is to be ‘condemned to be free’ but, despite this, Sartre states that 
La liberté est totale et infinie, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu’elle n’ait pas de limites mais qu’elle ne 
les rencontre jamais. Les seules limites que la liberté heurte à chaque instant, ce sont celles qu’elle 
s’impose à elle-même (EN: 576; original emphasis) 
Furthermore, Sartrean freedom does not depend on temporal circumstance, rather, 
‘être libre n’est pas choisir le monde historique où l’on surgit – ce qui n’aurait point 
de sens – mais se choisir dans le monde, quel qu’il soit’ (EN: 566).70 Through this an 
individual must be able to differentiate between political and social freedoms, and 
psychological freedom: ‘même les tenailles du bourreau ne nous dispensent pas 
d’être libres’ (EN: 551). It is the individual’s responsibility to assume their own 
freedom, creating their own values in order to live an authentic existence: ‘on ne 
pourra jamais expliquer par référence à une nature humaine donnée et figée; 
autrement dit, il n’y a pas de déterminisme, l’homme est libre, l’homme est liberté’ (EH: 
39; my emphasis).  
The first level on which we can perceive censorship in relation to Dada is its 
very beginnings in Zurich. It is well known that most Dada adherents were present 
in Switzerland at this time because of pressures of nationalism and conscription in 
their belligerent home nations. In this sense they flee a ‘mémoire qui ne sert à rien’ 
                                                 
70 We saw a notable example of this through Taeuber’s fragmented hybrid creations, which reflect 
upon and creatively incorporate, but are not defined by, influence of their context.  
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(cf. P: 81), seeking to cut themselves off from their national past. Even their methods 
of avoidance of fighting stem from a sense of self-censorship, with adherents such as 
Arp feigning mental instability in order to be excluded from conscription. 
Huelsenbeck writes of his interaction with the German authorities to obtain 
permission to escape to Switzerland: ‘I had already made up my mind never to 
return. Three months or six or twenty meant nothing to me. I had to get out forever, 
come what might’ (1974: 7). Tzara’s memory of leaving his native Romania for Zurich 
expresses a similar desire for escape, if only from the mundane or habitual nature of 
his former existence: ‘L’inconnu aurifère éblouissait déjà l’incandescence d’un rêve 
écervelé’ (in Buot 2002: 31). Tzara’s statement furthers the aforementioned mental 
escape, ironically replacing a mind-numbing provincial life with a self-censoring 
‘rêve écervelé’, to be further replaced with the unknown. This constant sense of 
removal from self suggests a fundamental need to be ‘hors de soi’ that we have seen 
consistently in Dada and Existentialist works over the course of the thesis.  
In line with this self-censoring flight from self, outside of Switzerland, there is 
the externally imposed exile of Schwitters from Germany to Norway, and later 
Norway to England, which furthermore led him to fully abandon his native language 
of German, because despite speaking ‘comic English’ (AA: 154), he felt the need to 
purge himself of this national marker. Huelsenbeck remarks on Germanic exile that 
even after Dada the movement’s adherents continued to be persecuted: 
Hitler, in his psychotic writings, in Mein Kampf, had said that dada was one of the most anti-
German, destructive and unpatriotic movements. (He was right.) What this meant practically, 
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though, was that any person who had been active in dada could expect to be destroyed in a 
concentration camp, scientifically – smoothly, so to speak, not brutally. (1974: 185)71 
How are we to interpret the rejection of nationality within Dada? Was Dada 
international, or a-national? The embracing of multiple languages in Zurich implies 
not only a desire to break down boundaries between languages, but also to create 
from this chaos a hybridised language, drawing from many to reject a singular 
nationality.  
Sartre states that ‘faute de savoir ce que j’exprime en fait, pour autrui, je 
constitue mon langage comme un phénomène incomplet de fuite hors de moi’ (EN: 
413-14). How does this relate not only to the other but also to the sustained use of a 
foreign/second language? We are always already tainted with language, in that our 
environment precedes us, and yet it does not have to define us. If the inability to be 
born languageless is inevitable facticity, we may consider the choice of a single or 
multiple foreign language(s) to be an assertion of freedom, especially in the case of 
Dada’s hybridisation of languages in their works,72 as well as a flight out of self 
towards a more complete linguistic being. As we saw through Demos in Chapter 
One, ‘belonging and foreignness become identical’ (cf. in Dickerman and Witkowsky 
eds 2005: 12). 
                                                 
71 This reference to the scientific hygiene of killing is also present in L’Étranger, when Meursault claims 
that ‘on était tué discrètement, avec un peu de honte et beaucoup de précision’ (E: 111). Furthering 
Huelsenbeck’s depiction of ‘smooth’ destruction, Meursault brings out an element of ‘quiet’ removal, 
not only through the use of ‘discrètement’ but also the more subtle play on the phonetic crossover of 
the past participles of taire and tuer: tu(é). 
72 It is notable that Neo-Dada had a significant Anglophone dominance, especially since Dada was 
ostensibly multilingual. We might posit this as a further diluting of Dada’s deviance as Neo-Dada 
became Dada’s more easily digestible next course. 
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Sartre writes that ‘[l]a liberté se donne les choses comme adverses, c’est-à-dire 
leur confère une signification qui les fait choses;73 mais c’est en assumant le donné 
même qu’il sera signifiant, c’est-à-dire en assumant pour le dépasser son exil au milieu 
d’un en-soi indifférent’ (EN: 553; my emphasis). Can we consider Switzerland 
representative of the indifferent in-itself? This allows us to assess the fundamental 
links but also the differences between neutrality and indifference. The former term is 
generally perceived in a positive way, and the latter acquires a negative tone. 
However, both have a pointed ideologically grounded concern. Additionally, it will 
be necessary to contrast this semi-self-imposed ideological exile with the externally 
imposed quarantine of La Peste’s town of Oran.  
This indifference of Zurich and external indifference towards Oran can be 
summarised through Sartre’s statement that ‘la liberté implique donc l’existence des 
entours à changer: obstacles à franchir, outils à utiliser. Certes, c’est elle qui les révèle 
comme obstacles, mais elle ne peut qu’interpréter par son libre choix le sens de leur 
être’ (EN: 551; original emphasis). Freedom reveals the environment’s obstacles, but 
also enables the assignment of meaning to them. Furthermore, Sartre implies that the 
‘project of freedom’ in some ways requires the presence of obstacles, of resistance to 
overcome: 
le projet même d’une liberté en général est un choix qui implique la prévision et l’acceptation de 
résistances par ailleurs quelconques. Non seulement c’est la liberté qui constitue le cadre où des 
                                                 
73 Dada also exhibits this tendency to make ‘things’, notably words, sonically through the performance 
of the simultaneous poem and visually in poetry in its written form. We have seen links between Man 
Ray and influences from Mallarmé and visual poetics: ‘one possible direction implied by “Un coup de 
dés” was the so-called chosiste or “concrete poetry” of later modernism. Here words tended to be 
reduced to nothing but their material thingness on the page, virtually without any communicative, 
representational, or even aural potential (they were impossible to read aloud)’ (Jay 1993: 179). 
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en-soi par ailleurs indifférents se révéleront comme des résistances, mais encore son projet 
même, en général, est projet de faire dans un monde résistant, par victoire sur ses résistances. 
(EN: 552; original emphasis) 
Freedom comes about through resistance, not only through victory over it, but also 
through the process of opposition itself. We will see, through our analysis of Dada 
texts and events in relation to the events of La Peste, how these obstacles and 
resistances are met in each case, and the consequences this has for the concept of 
freedom. 
(Always al)Readymades and Objets (re)trouvés 
In one sense, the readymade becomes the perfect vehicle of a pure idea 
(Goldsmith 1983: 201) 
The readymade prescribes amnesia.74 […] The readymade eviscerates the eye’s power of assimilation 
(Luisetti and Sharp 2008: 84) 
The readymade is a self-evident example of censorship, in the negative 
reception of its attempt to engage with artistic authority.75 We know that Duchamp 
submitted Fountain (1917, Fig. 21) to the Salon des Indépendants only to have it 
rejected, despite the Society’s own aim to exhibit any work providing an entry fee 
had been paid. But beyond this obvious example of Fountain’s rebuff from the art 
establishment, how do the readymades respond to (or provoke) censorship, and to 
what extent do they really break down the strictures of the art world? What issues or 
questions do they raise about respectability of the artist and the art work? Do the 
readymades represent a failure to infiltrate the artistic elite, or is their subversion 
                                                 
74 It is instructive that the readymades should be linked to amnesia. The development of the thesis has 
shown, particularly through feelings of aphasia in Chapter Two, that loss in the form of debilitating 
mental states forms a fundamental part of Dada work. This loss acts as a form of censorship in its own 
right. 
75 Also through its rejection of meaning: ‘The ready-made was the logical consequence of Duchamp’s 
rejection of art and of his suspicion that life was without a meaning’ (AA: 88). 
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indicative of a stronger engagement than one might initially assume?76 Thierry de 
Duve infers that the readymade is an inevitable product of its time, in that ‘[i]t is a 
rule of modernism that a convention of art practice be tested by being tampered 
with, subverted, or even jettisoned’ (1994: 71).  
What are the underlying ideological aims and results of this game that 
Duchamp played with authority? Several critics have claimed that the readymade as 
exemplified by Duchamp does not succeed in breaking down tradition. As Steven 
Goldsmith states, the readymades 
can become the vehicles of either aesthetic egalitarianism or elitism, depending mainly on 
whether they are perceived formally or conceptually […]. As an intriguing physical presence, 
the readymade destroys the framework of art. […] As a vehicle for the communication of ideas, 
however, the readymade reaffirms the traditional art world. (1983: 198) 
It is instructive that the readymades should foreground this tension or balance 
between egalitarianism and elitism, and destruction and affirmation, because of their 
significant play on contradiction and the resulting dependence on ambiguity. We 
will later measure how this ambiguity was important for Dada’s continuing impact 
on the art world. 
The readymades interact with the art world in a comparable way to the first 
sign of the plague in La Peste: the sudden appearance of dead rats in public places. 
From a sanitary point of view, both Fountain and the rats are linked to the 
undesirable locus of the sewer, despite both being physically removed from it. The 
urinal is removed from its function and as a newly manufactured object, was never 
                                                 
76 We saw another example of this in Dada film’s lingering relationship with narrative. 
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connected, and the rats, although once connected to the sewers, are now ‘out of 
place’ (see P: 16 quotation below). The rats’ status as first sign of plague aligns with 
the readymades as one of the earliest forms of Dada art: in this respect they both 
represent a brewing potential for infection.77 This is instructive in relation to Dada as 
many intellectuals were wary of being involved or associated with the movement 
due to its disruptive and destructive reputation, or because of its crossing of 
international boundaries that could entail problematic consequences in a wartime 
context. A notable Dada avoider was Apollinaire, who declined invitations to publish 
in Dada, ‘a journal that, however good its character, has Germans among its 
contributors, however Allied-friendly they may be’ (in Dickerman and Witkovsky 
eds 2005: 293n). We have seen that Taeuber’s involvement with Dada was externally 
frowned upon. A further example is Satie, whose involvement with Relâche was 
labelled ‘artistic suicide’ (see Orledge 1990: 178). 
A productive focal point for our analysis of the rats and the readymades is the 
opening paragraph of the novel proper:78 
Le matin du 16 avril, le docteur Bernard Rieux sortit de son cabinet et buta sur un rat mort, au 
milieu du palier. Sur le moment, il écarta la bête sans y prendre garde et descendit l’escalier. 
Mais, arrivé dans la rue, la pensée lui vint que ce rat n’était pas à sa place et il retourna sur ses 
pas pour avertir le concierge. Devant la réaction du vieux M. Michel, il sentit mieux ce que sa 
découverte avait d’insolite. La présence de ce rat mort lui avait paru seulement bizarre tandis 
que, pour le concierge, elle constituait un scandale. La position de ce dernier était d’ailleurs 
catégorique: il n’y avait pas de rats dans la maison. Le docteur eut beau l’assurer qu’il y en avait 
un sur le palier du premier étage, et probablement mort, la conviction de M. Michel restait 
entière. Il n’y avait pas de rats dans la maison, il fallait donc qu’on eût apporté celui-ci du 
dehors. Bref, il s’agissait d’une farce. (P: 16) 
                                                 
77 The language of infection is carried into Paris Dada by Richter, who states that ‘by the second issue, 
Littérature had been infected with Dada by way of Zurich’ (AA: 167). 
78 The novel begins with a note from the as yet unidentified narrator: the novel proper begins with the 
opening of the events in Oran (P: 16). 
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Davis highlights three defences given for the presence of dead rats, which he classes 
a ‘raisonnement de chaudron’, in which several defences are given to counter an 
accusation, all of which alone are legitimate, but together contradict each other: that 
is, the combination ‘La présence de ce rat…constituait un scandale’ – ‘il n’y avait pas 
de rats dans la maison’ – ‘il s’agissait d’une farce’. This can directly be compared to 
the rejection of Duchamp’s urinal in that its submission to the Salon des 
Indépendants consituait un scandale, precisely because il n’y avait pas [ce type d’objet] 
dans la maison, and that in the eyes of the Society, it s’agissait [peut-être] d’une farce. In 
any case it can be argued that conceptually speaking it was a joke, if the Society 
would believe that no artist in their right mind would enter such an object. We might 
additionally consider the rebuff of Duchamp’s urinal as like that of the pushing aside 
of the rat, ‘sans y prendre garde’. The urinal came back (metaphorically and 
physically, in multiple editions) to haunt the same world that ignored it, just like the 
plague in Oran. 
As Davis remarks, ‘[t]he point is not the truth or falsehood of any of these 
claims; rather, each of them serves the same purpose, which is to deny that the 
concierge could have any responsibility for the rodent’s presence’ (2007: 1013). This 
same shirking of responsibility is active in the Society’s rejection of an object which 
would later be acknowledged by the very same art world. Furthermore, Davis writes 
that there is a ‘persistent implication in the text that some sort of elemental or even 
moral significance lies behind their appearance’ (ibid.: 1014). What is the elemental or 
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moral significance of the readymade? We may consider it a point of no return, in that 
after the readymade art was no longer contemplated in the same way.  
We can regard the success of the readymade in relation to both the proliferation 
of the dead rats in Oran and the authorities’ initial reluctance to get rid of them. 
Fountain may have been removed from entry into the Salon, but it was not possible to 
remove its effect: ‘Perhaps, if the mess is removed too quickly, something is lost 
which might have been worth preserving’ (Davis 2007: 1009). As Richter states, 
‘[a]fter the Fountain and Duchamp’s break with the New York Salon des Indépendants, 
there appeared a whole series of puzzling objects’ (AA: 90). And as the narrator of La 
Peste relates, ‘partout où nos concitoyens rassemblaient, les rats attendaient en tas 
[…] [n]os concitoyens stupéfaits les découvraient aux endroits plus fréquentés de la 
ville’ (P: 23-24).  
After this initial flurry in both cases, the proliferation loses its effect (in the case 
of the rats, they disappear almost entirely). However, Davis writes that ‘[i]f the rats 
disappear from the novel after its early stages, it is not because the challenge to 
security and authority has been overcome, but because it is now all-pervasive. The 
rats’ thematic presence is no longer necessary’ (2007: 1014). The readymades, as both 
an early stage in, and as particularly symbolic of, the Dada revolt, are no longer quite 
as necessary beyond their initial effect. The metaphorical floodgate had been opened, 
and the idea of the readymade was all-pervasive. Perhaps this is why their shock 
factor is distinctly diminished after their original viewing, too. As Richter comments 
on the waning meaning of the readymade over its lifespan: 
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The second time one sees them, the coal shovel, the wheel, etc., are simple articles of use with 
no implications, whether they stand in their appointed place in one’s house or whether they 
make a pretentious appearance at an exhibition. They no longer have any anti-aesthetic or anti-
artistic function whatever, only a practical function. Their artistic or anti-artistic content is 
reduced to nothing after the first shock effect. At this point they could be thrown away, put in 
some store or returned to their normal functions. (AA: 208) 
Is this new anti-value actually what Duchamp was aiming for? The objects no longer 
shock, but also invite problematic contemplation, if they can be said to have no value 
other than their practical use. 
How are we to compare this depiction of a ‘return to purpose’ to the altered 
readymades?79 Duchamp’s urinal may be relegated to the bathroom, but others can 
no longer fulfil their original function as ordinary objects. For example, Man Ray’s 
Cadeau (1921, Fig. 22) was initially a simple flat-iron and, if presented as such, could 
be used again after being contextualised as art. However, the artist glued a line of 
tacks along the centre of its flat side, the very part that provides its function. Thus not 
only does the work as readymade feed into Richter’s statements on loss of shock 
value, but the decontextualisation of the work through being reassigned to its 
traditional function is no longer possible. An instructive point of tension with 
Duchamp’s urinal is the 1993 act of Pierre Pinoncelli, who ‘used’ one of its replicas in 
the gallery setting and was consequently arrested for vandalism (Cabinet Magazine 
2007b). What is striking here is that the lost shock value is regained precisely by the 
normalisation of the deviance of the original urinal: the item is at once de- and re-
contextualised. Furthermore, Pinoncelli continues Duchamp’s prank through a play 
on the notion of ‘taking the piss’ with this act and work of art, an extension of Arturo 
                                                 
79 A linguistic comparison can be made here between a return to purpose and Le Retour à la raison, 
which uses objects as readymade filmic subjects. 
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Schwarz’s definition of the readymade as ‘the three-dimensional projection of a pun’ 
(in Mundy ed. 2008: 127). 
Referring back to La Peste’s rats, the iron is not only ‘out of place’ as a work for 
exhibition, as the rats were in their state of being out in the open and in buildings, 
but in its customised state it is also rendered as disturbing as the rats in their trifold 
divergence from normalcy: they are visible, dead, and have bloody snouts. Davis 
states that ‘the rats are not just rats; they are bearers of meaning, though no one can 
quite settle what the meaning might be’ (2007: 1014). We can effect a simple 
substitution here of ‘rats’ to ‘the readymades are not just objects […]’, and our 
analogy of confusion is complete. This is particularly relevant in the case of Cadeau, 
which retains its mysterious semantic residue, without maintaining its shock value. 
We might argue through the analogy of residue that Cadeau maintains a stronger 
status as anti-art than Fountain, despite the latter’s relative ubiquity compared to the 
former.  
We might further suggest the conceptual creation of a compound readymade if 
we bear in mind Duchamp’s idea of the reciprocal readymade: ‘use a Rembrandt as 
an ironing board’ (in Sanouillet and Peterson 1973: 32).80 Does Cadeau – alterations 
and all – invite its reuse in its original function? In which case, it would seem 
appropriate that this particular iron require a special ironing board. Furthermore, 
would this represent the total destruction of the work of art? Or does it offer the 
capacity for creating a new one? A work that responds to both of these questions is 
                                                 
80 Cadeau is also already a double-artist work, through the input of Satie in the creative process. By this 
extension it would become a meta-compound readymade. 
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Indestructible Object (or Object to be Destroyed) (Man Ray, 1923, Fig. 23), since it 
presents itself as simultaneously self-destructive and eternal. The fact that the object 
is constructed from a metronome reinforces this reference to the indestructible 
passage of time, as well as the inevitable decomposition of all things. Additionally, if 
we read ‘object’ in its parenthesised title as a verb instead of a noun, we can consider 
the work an extra layer of declamation of censorship (as in, ‘object, [if you want] to 
be destroyed’). 
Despite Fountain’s initial shock value, the readymade was quickly incorporated 
into the traditional art world. Since this anti-exhibition, 
Fountain has been the centre-piece of countless exhibitions. At the Dada exhibition held at the 
Sidney Janis gallery in the late ‘fifties, it hung over the main entrance, where everyone had to 
pass under it…It was filled with geraniums. No trace of the initial shock remained. (AA: 89) 
Perhaps this is because Duchamp tried to focus on an object centred on a 
disconnected present, breaking from all tradition. Not only did the readymade’s 
audience play exactly into the reaction Duchamp anticipated – and after all, shock is 
still an aesthetic reaction, albeit negative – but it left an unexpected trace on the art 
world for years to come. We saw in Chapter Two that perception is always grounded 
in experience. Does this mean that a work of art, too, is always already tainted by the 
past? The objects that make up Cadeau certainly imply meaning if only by the 
deliberate distortion of functionality. Yet this is not to infer that the readymades are 
unoriginal, through their perception as a simple elevation of the mundane.  
Schwarz states that ‘the readymade, far from being an iconoclastic operation – 
as, so often, it is superficially defined – is a highly sophisticated philosophical 
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performance springing from a very special brand of humour’ (in Mundy ed. 2008: 
128). While Schwarz rightly highlights the risk of superficiality of such a definition, 
we might instead say that the readymade is much more than an iconoclastic 
operation. The iconoclastic quality of the readymades – particularly Fountain – is 
evidenced by its relationship with both censorship and the art world more broadly. 
Additionally, there is no reason why the readymade cannot be both iconoclastic and 
a ‘sophisticated philosophical performance’. Referring back to our rats, Davis 
suggests that they ‘represent a residue or semantic excess through which the 
questions of ethical choice and action are posed’ (2007: 1008). In a similar way, the 
readymades, compromised by residue, create both a visual and semantic excess 
primarily because of the plethora of questions of aesthetic choice and action that they 
provoke, and the answers that they refuse to provide.  
We may also consider the readymades to be always-already-made. Firstly 
because Duchamp, aware of the problematic relationship between the mass-made 
object and the artist, designated ‘rules’ for creating, or choosing, a readymade. 
Schwarz states that:  
the elevation of a common object to the level of a work of art did not consist in merely choosing 
and signing it. It implied following a set of four rules: de-contextualisation, titling, limiting the 
frequency of the act and, the most esoteric of all, the necessity of a ‘rendez-vous’ – the meeting 
of the artist and the object. (in Mundy ed. 2008: 127) 
So although the readymade appears to spring from a desire to reject aesthetic 
intentionality, Duchamp’s rules imply that ‘[t]he mass-produced repetition is not, 
bang-bang, mechanical: it contains longings for individual greatness, dreams of 
national prosperity, and fears of loss’ (Nesbit 1986: 53-54).  
197 
 
Secondly, and further to this ‘longing for individual greatness’, Ivars Peterson 
(2000) believes that the photographs of the readymades (all that remains in certain 
cases of the original art work) were manipulated by Duchamp: an extra layer of 
artistic interference that supports the idea that these objects are not simply plucked 
from a production line, ready-made, but have the potential for compound self-
referentiality, or a ‘multiple and deferred location’ (Luisetti and Sharp 2008: 79). For 
example, Duchamp’s own face can apparently be distinguished as having been 
superimposed over his moustachioed Mona Lisa, lending an additional personal 
quality (Peterson 2000: 10). We can compare and also contrast this superimposition 
with Duchamp’s alter-ego, Rrose Sélavy, which is achieved by layering make-up, 
clothes and other ‘feminine’ paraphernalia onto Duchamp himself. Both methods 
imply an idea of the layering of identity, an active hybridisation of characters. This 
hybridisation, layering and deferral contributes in advance to the work and the 
artist’s notoriety for years to come: 
[Duchamp] was a multidimensional individual who could function in the context of his own 
era, scandalizing society and exerting a powerful influence on the artistic community. Yet he 
could also look far deeper and farther, exploiting the acceptability of artistic idiosyncrasy to 
orchestrate an elaborate game of hide-and-seek with posterity. (ibid.) 
We might consider Duchamp’s relationship with temporality as an extension of the 
subjectivity of identity that we saw in Chapter One: by continuing to surprise for 
years to come, both the artist and his works refuse concrete external definition. 
The manipulation of object functionality as anti-art is labelled the ‘Uselessness 
Effect’ by Richter, who notes that ‘it was precisely because these things were useless 
that we found them moving and lyrical’ (AA: 96).  While Richter is primarily 
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discussing Picabia, Duchamp and Man Ray, the near-kleptomaniacal work of 
Schwitters engages in a similar relationship with objects. Like Duchamp and Man 
Ray, Schwitters had a penchant for incorporating the useless, or the mundane, into 
his work. We can also link Schwitters with the rats and readymades (cf. Fountain) via 
the initial emphasis on sewage. As a collection of waste, sewage is related to 
Schwitters’s collage style through the collection of discarded items, of rubbish and 
general disposal. However, we can consider Schwitters’s work as also clearing up this 
rubbish, and/or reducing its environmental impact, thus removing its negative 
aspect. We can also see this in Fountain, which is nonetheless a clean (unused, at time 
of creation) urinal.81  
Schwitters’s work, particularly that of his Merz series, collates and presents the 
often unwanted, as well as incorporating ‘residue and semantic excess’ through his 
use of items associated with consumer goods, such as tickets and food packaging. We 
may be inclined to call Merz art an assisted readymade: if objects such as train tickets 
are already readymades,82 the collaged nature of Schwitters’s work represents a 
compounding of this principle. As Dorothea Dietrich remarks, ‘in building with 
fragments, Schwitters attempts to conquer the very process of fragmentation’ (1991: 
91). Even the word Merz is a fragment or scrap (of ‘Kommerz und Privatbank’), and 
in keeping with our analogies of waste and sewage, also draws phonetically near to 
the French ‘merde’. 
                                                 
81 For more on Duchamp and ecological theory, see Patrick Suter in Adamowicz and Robertson eds 
2012. 
82 However, Schwitters notes that ‘[a] bus ticket has been printed for controlling the passenger, the 
MERZ picture uses it only as colour’ (in Chambers and Orchard eds 2013: 60) – does this represent a 
‘freeing’ of the passenger/spectator from this control? 
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Schwitters elevated his concept of Merz into a way of life, as well as a 
distinctive period in his own artistic career, raising the art form to a mode of 
existence: 
Merz stands for freedom from all fetters, for the sake of artistic creation. Freedom is not lack of 
restraint, but the product of strict artistic discipline. Merz also means tolerance towards any 
artistically motivated limitation. Every artist must be allowed to mold a picture out of nothing 
but blotting paper for example, provided he is capable of molding a picture. (Schwitters in 
Lippard 1971: 102) 
It is instructive that Schwitters foregrounds freedom as a central aspect of Merz. 
Furthermore, the desire to be free ‘from all fetters’ is something that we could 
translate into Existentialist terms as the desire to act based upon no pre-ordained 
system. Additionally, like Sartre he denies the conclusion that this would lead to 
anarchic tendencies, instead claiming it as a ‘product of strict artistic discipline’. This 
fulfils the Existentialist notion that choice should be a conscious, active process in the 
individual, as well as considering freedom as not primarily constrained by external 
factors (here through limitations being self-imposed, or ‘artistically motivated’). 
We can pick out a number of these elements in Schwitters’s Merz pictures. The 
1919 Merzbild 1A Der Irrenarzt [Merzpicture 1 A The Psychiatrist] (Fig. 24) features a 
multi-coloured head with wheel/cog items on top. We saw a comparable desire to 
build over things in Chapter Two in Man Ray’s building blocks sequence in Emak 
Bakia, as well as the use of mechanical additions to the human form in Hausmann’s 
Mechanischer Kopf in Chapter One. These artists foreground an apparent need to 
cover over human aspects of their works, leading us to wonder if this represents 
replacement, improvement, or dehumanisation (especially in the manner of many 
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Dada works that interrogate the brutal mechanisation of war). This is an additive 
process, but in the case of Schwitters’s Merzbild it is also revealing, if we consider 
these fragments the contents of one’s head and, by extension, the private workings of 
the mind. The relevance of the implicit authority of the title of this piece (‘The 
Psychiatrist’) takes on a disquieting quality in this respect.  
This strong externalisation of the personal and internal is expository but can 
also be considered a mark of honesty. Does this work (and its message) attain greater 
authenticity through its transparency (an expression of Dada’s common ‘what you 
see is what you get’ mode)? It certainly supports the necessity to be free ‘from all 
fetters’. The additive nature of much of Schwitters’s art evokes an insistence on the 
present that we saw in Fountain. Where Fountain does this by emphasising the 
moment, however, the Merzbilder achieve a similar effect by constantly building upon 
the same space: instead of expanding the edges of the canvas (a special construct 
with a temporal implication), Schwitters constantly alters the current, the ‘now’ 
point. In this way the Merz work is not only always already tainted with a residue of 
the past, but it insists on a hybridisation of this trace through combination of pasts. 
It is notable that the originals for many readymades, including Fountain and 
Cadeau, as well as Schwitters’s architectural Merz constructions, have been lost and, 
as such, only exist as memory or as a rippling of their effects. As Duve claims, 
201 
 
Fountain only exists as the lost referent of a series of ostensive statements […] that swear to the 
fact that it existed but that it no longer exists at the moment one learns of its existence, and 
that's why its whole public belongs to the progeny of The Blind Man. (1994: 89)83  
Similarly, beyond the initial disturbing appearance of the rats in Oran, the memory 
of their existence (until their reappearance) is only proven by their shared symptoms 
of plague in the community. Though they are frequently mentioned as a point of 
concern, no one will accept responsibility for them. Notably, the human victims 
suffer the same fate as their rat counterparts: post mortem, they are initially simply 
removed; later, when the number of corpses gets too high, both are incinerated 
without ceremony. However, despite the emphasis placed on the worthlessness of 
the Dada objects (with Duchamp originally not caring if they were lost or destroyed, 
sometimes inviting it), the artist would later commission copies to reinsert the work 
into the museum world. 
Museums today are keen to exhibit ‘genuine reproductions’ of Duchamp’s 
urinal, as notably seen at the Barbican’s retrospective (2013), thus continuing the 
artist’s game with posterity: the readymade has been elevated to the very status 
(‘art’) it claimed to destroy. With reference to Cabinet Magazine’s collection of 
information on the seventeen known reproductions of this work (2007a: n.p.), the 
Barbican’s copy appears to be the earliest reproduction (1950), as well as being the 
copy used at the Sidney Janis Gallery exhibition of 1953 to which Richter refers. Its 
relationship with the original is as follows: the urinal itself was not picked out (nor 
commissioned) by Duchamp, but was signed by the artist. This highlights the 
                                                 
83 The only remaining form of the ‘original’ Fountain is its photograph in this magazine. 
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varying relationship the copies have with the originals, as well as representing an 
everlasting interrogation of the notion of authenticity (in terms of ‘of the author’) in 
art. Additionally, these works maintain an ephemerality through their status as 
destroyed or lost, but also inherently reproducible, particularly in the case of 
Fountain and its multiple offspring, where ‘the problem of legitimacy remains 
relevant as unauthorised urinals have been discovered circulating in Italy’ (The 
Economist 2010: n.p).84 Schwitters’s Merz building work was destroyed in situations 
beyond his control, and thus their loss was not actively encouraged by the artist 
(Merzbau in particular was painstakingly recreated several times).  
How can we compare the recreation of lost objects between artists like Man Ray 
and Duchamp, who claimed not to care about their loss, and Schwitters, who would 
not have chosen to destroy his work? How does this relate to the re-commissioning 
of works, versus the careful reconstruction by the artist themselves? This draws upon 
a fundamental issue in artistic reproduction: recommissioning can simultaneously be 
considered a deliberate distancing between the artist and the work, and an 
inauthentic reproduction (arguably also deliberate). Careful reconstruction maintains 
the artist’s authentic personal touch (maintaining intention, if not necessarily 
original), yet becomes inauthentic in its desire to be the original in this bizarre non-
                                                 
84 This varying and disputed dispersion of Fountain plays with the notion of the ‘truth’ and ‘history’ of 
Dada, themes to be discussed in Chapter Five. The ‘false’ urinals also distort the notion of Dada 
deviance beyond the authorised multiple reproduction to the extent that censorship from the art 
world turns back on itself. 
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identicality.85 We will now evaluate how the game with posterity created by the 
above works interacts with the game with authority, as we explore a range of Dada 
events. 
(anti-)Altercations with Authority 
 C’était là une des façons qu’avait la maladie de détourner l’attention et de brouiller les cartes. 
(P: 83) 
Like the readymades, the various Dada exhibitions and events provoked a 
plethora of reactions in the public, as well as in the authorities. These reactions not 
only tested the (dis)tastes of the public, pointing out its limitations, but also served to 
highlight the presence of the very things the authorities were trying to censor. The 
Dada personality varied from place to place: two quite extreme examples are Zurich 
and Berlin. Zurich represented a neutral ground to which Dada artists had fled, and 
maintained ‘a sort of psychic equilibrium’ (AA: 122), whereas the political tension in 
wartime Berlin created an atmosphere of frustrated belligerence, and ‘encouraged 
rebels there to turn their rebelliousness even against each other’ (ibid.). This 
aggression led to a problematic post-war atmosphere, in that there was a ‘vacuum 
created by the sudden arrival of freedom’ (ibid.).86 We can analyse these reactions 
against the varying responses to the plague, from medical resistance to the illness to 
escape attempts, as well as authorities’ reactions to reactions to the plague, from 
quarantine to the imposition of prison sentences. 
                                                 
85 This creates a hierarchy of identicality in contrasting these works with the photography discussed in 
Chapter One. Both types of work are not identical to their originals, but the photograph is 
demonstrably ‘more identical’ than the reproduction. 
86 Richter’s account is foregrounded here because of its two essential values: it productively centralises 
information on these centres, and is one of the most comprehensive primary Dada texts. 
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Responses to Dada events from both the public and the authorities proved 
wildly varying. The early Zurich exhibitions had a rather restrained reception, giving 
Dada, ‘for the first time, some slight appearance of seriousness in the eyes of the 
Zurich public’ (AA: 39).87 This did not prevent the works being labelled ‘frightful’ 
(ibid.), but it represents quite an unusual level of acceptance by the public. 
Furthermore, Richter writes that the events prepared the public ‘for Dada to be, if not 
loved or understood, at least tolerated with a sort of disapproving curiosity’, yet ‘[i]t 
was not always possible to avoid nasty scenes’, something that Richter puts down to 
‘envy’ and ‘vanity’ (ibid.: 40). We have seen that this provocation became Dada’s 
modus vivendi, with widely varying results. Notably Berlin Dada’s events incited 
decidedly more inflammatory reactions from the authorities than those in Zurich, no 
doubt influenced by their varying wartime political atmospheres. This was in no 
small part due to frequent misleading advertising on the part of the adherents 
themselves, who ‘often advertised harmless lectures which they had no intention of 
presenting’ (AA: 129). This has the effect not only of drawing a different, specific type 
of audience, but also lends a certain guarantee of outrage (especially as they were 
usually directly insulted by the performers). In Berlin the Dadas’ deliberate 
misleading led to frequent riots, and a consequent engagement with the public and 
altercations with the police. However, a welcome result of this tumultuous 
atmosphere was wide and varying coverage in the press.  
                                                 
87 This is something that we will see again with the advent of Neo-Dada. We might consider that the 
nature of exhibitions gave an opportunity for quiet contemplation, something which would not have 
been offered at the Dada performances. 
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This relationship of rebellion and revolt with the press can be compared to La 
Peste when the authorities begin to enforce quarantine measures, fearing rebellion 
from the plague-inflicted population. The narrator writes that ‘[l]es journaux 
publièrent des décrets qui renouvelaient l’interdiction de sortir et menaçaient de 
peines de prison les contrevenants’ (P: 119). As we have seen, in neither case did 
these interventions stop the proliferation of that which it sought to contain. We may 
even consider that Dada flourished under censorship (in varying ways in its varying 
centres), just as La Peste’s Cottard begins to profit from the plague’s proliferation, 
selling contraband goods and eventually dreading the end of quarantine. 
A particularly strong interaction with the authorities was the First International 
Dada Fair (Berlin, 1920), which was closed down by the German police.  Wieland 
Herzfelde and Brigit Doherty describe a dual relationship of the event with the world 
of art: 
the Dada Fair "maintained" the art trade to the extent that it put Dadaist products on the 
market; at the same time, and indeed thereby, the exhibition aimed to generate within the walls 
of a well-situated Berlin art gallery an affront to public taste that would "eradicate" the market 
into which its products were launched, as if, again thereby, to "elevate" the enterprise of dealing 
in works of art in the first place. (2003: 93) 
Herzfelde and Doherty go on to explain that the organisers were subject to fines of 
nine hundred marks ‘on charges of having slandered the German military by putting 
Gott mit uns on public view’ (2003: 94). The use of the phrase ‘Gott mit uns’ used in 
parody highlights the problematic relationship between higher being as protector 
and as justification for (sometimes questionable) actions. The Dada work 
foregrounds the dependence on context for interpretation of this phrase. To the 
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authorities of the time, it was clearly acceptable for German soldiers to wear such 
insignia, despite its use for destructive military means. Yet its parody is unacceptably 
slanderous, something that unwittingly played directly into Dada’s game of revelling 
in negative reception.  
The explicit reference to divine authority can be compared with the two notable 
sermons of La Peste’s Jesuit priest, Paneloux. Paneloux decrees the plague first a 
punishment, and later a test of faith for the citizens of Oran. The way in which the 
citizens of Oran react to these sermons can be compared to Dada’s parody of religion 
through Gott mit uns. The citizens, who have until the point of the plague been as a 
whole rather religiously indifferent, gain a sudden interest on being told that the 
disease is punishment for their sins. This misuse of religion is extended later not only 
when the public turns to superstition (‘Ils portaient plus volontiers des médailles 
protectrices […] qu’ils n’allaient à la messe’ (P: 224)), but also in Paneloux’s second 
sermon which is notably less well-attended than the first, because ‘ce genre de 
spectacle n’avait plus l’attrait de la nouveauté pour nos concitoyens’ (ibid.).88 This 
attitude is comparable to the dwindling interest in Dada in its later years: scandal 
loses impetus with repetition, just as newness and self-interest affected the church-
going desires of the people of Oran. 
The Berlin Dada Fair interacted with the authorities in a similar way as the 
readymades interacted with the authority of the institution of art. Both left a lasting 
mark, despite their rejection, and both simultaneously broke down and maintained 
                                                 
88 Instructively it is at this point that Paneloux ‘ne disait plus “vous”, mais “nous”’ (P: 225), an ironic 
sense of complicity that we saw in Gott mit uns. 
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the institution with which they engaged. As Goldsmith states in relation to the 
conservative nature of defining readymades: 
Conceptual definitions are necessarily exclusive; they focus on particular, selected 
characteristics at the expense of actual uniqueness or diversity. They allow us to order our 
experience by grouping certain things together and leaving others out. If Marcel Duchamp 
presents an object that radically questions the borders of any definition of art, an object that 
cannot be ignored because it has been accepted in practice as art, the conservative critic seeks to 
enlarge the borders of theory and thus absorb the rebellion. While the peculiar, irresolvable 
nature of the readymade threatens to undermine this endeavor with the assertion that 
everything (or, of course, nothing) is art, it also surprisingly helps to further the conventional 
cause. (1983: 197) 
Goldsmith’s statement can be used to link these two manifestations. Both the Dada 
Fair and the readymades broke with traditional definitions of art, yet both were 
eventually absorbed into them. These changing definitions match Zurich Dada’s 
interaction with the police: as Huelsenbeck mentioned in a 1970 lecture on Dada, 
‘ironically the police took an interest in our carrying-on while leaving completely 
undisturbed a politician who was preparing a great revolution. I am referring to 
Lenin, who was our neighbor at the Cabaret Voltaire’ (1974: xiv). Not only is 
authority developed and altered in order to incorporate specific breaches, but it can 
also be misled by explicit, loud rebellion and blind to implicit, quiet musings. Hence 
retrospectively we can either consider authority misguided, or simply as redefined. 
Just as the authorities in Oran were wrong to ignore the early cases of plague, for 
many the ignorance of the early signs of Leninist revolution would be retrospectively 
regretted. 
Herzfelde and Doherty write that ‘The Dada Fair also received dozens of 
published reviews, both in Germany and abroad. Most of those reviews were hostile, 
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a good number venomously so’ (2003: 94). However, we know that Dada thrived on 
hostility from its audience, and Marc Dachy writes that ‘[t]he press involuntarily 
proved to be one of the active promoters of Dada’ (1990: 137). This is carried through 
to Paris Dada, particularly in reference to the Festival Dada at the Salle Gaveau in 
1920. Richter writes that the event was 
an enormous succès de scandale, both with the audience, which immensely enjoyed its active 
participation, and with the press, which tore Dada to bits and spat out the pieces. […] Everyone 
was discussing Dada and reacting, whether positively or negatively, to its programme, which 
consisted of anti-authority, anti-conduct, anti-church, anti-art, anti-order, daemonic humour. 
(AA: 182) 
This relationship with the press can be compared to le Courrier de l’Épidémie, which is 
created in Oran ‘pour tâche d’”informer nos concitoyens, dans un souci de 
scrupuleuse objectivité, des progrès ou des reculs de la maladie; de leur fournir les 
témoignages les plus autorisés sur l’avenir de l’épidémie[“]’ (P: 125). While the press 
generally maintains the same claims of reporting ‘truth’, we have seen that Dada 
successfully distorted it on several occasions. And just as le Courrier de l’Épidémie 
‘s’est borné très rapidement à publier des annonces de nouveaux produits, infallibles 
pour prévenir la peste’ (P: 126), Dada used its own little press to (falsely) advertise 
products that neither worked nor existed, such as the perfume Belle Haleine or the 
hair product Haarstärkendes Kopfwasser. In this way the Dada press had the further 
effect of breaking down the relationship between advert and art, as well as the 
language and material of advertising and poetry. 
Richter writes of the Gaveau Festival Dada: ‘Tomatoes and eggs were thrown 
on stage. “In the interval, some [members of the audience] even went to a local 
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butcher’s shop and provided themselves with escalopes and beef-steaks”89 […] An 
appropriate accompaniment to the poems, manifestoes and sketches of Paul Dermée, 
Éluard, Tzara, Ribemont-Dessaignes and Breton!’ (AA: 181-82; my emphasis). There 
is an implicit note of flattery in this remark, as if the projectiles had been upgraded, 
as well as the additional effort on the part of the audience to obtain them. Dada 
delighted in being (quite literally) egged on, and the cultural and monetary 
implications of being showered with steaks are clear. The effort required to produce 
these projectiles implies that the audience was quite invested in the performance, 
despite apparently being insulted by – and perhaps in conjunction with – its choice of 
venue. Sanouillet writes that ‘the choice itself was an insult to the Saint-Honoré 
quarter’s good taste, and to the prestige of the theatre whose great organs and grand 
pianos were reserved for the lofty music of Bach or Mozart’ (2009: 125). Furthermore, 
a ‘sizeable crowd’ (ibid.: 126) of people came to the event (and paid entry), despite 
having been warned of its disturbing content. Additionally, it is said that this choice 
of venue turned out to be auspicious, since the spectators ‘enjoyed themselves 
immensely, perhaps because they had been given the chance, for once, to play an 
active role in this hall usually devoted to falling asleep to classical music’ (ibid.). This 
latter statement highlights the delicate relationship between rejection of the 
unwanted and delight in the disapproved-of, a not wanting to look while wanting to 
see. 
                                                 
89 It is unclear who Richter is citing at this point, due to his style of inserting uncredited quotations 
into the body of his text. We might suggest attributing it to a later mention of Ribemont-Dessaignes, 
since this is the closest mention of a voice other than Richter’s. 
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This tension between censorship and delight was reflected in the distorted press 
coverage of the event, which notably listed projectiles in great detail, but omitted the 
steaks, and reported that ‘we attended the funeral of Dada’ (in Sanouillet 2009: 126). 
Did this represent a waning interest in Dada, or an attempt at selective censorship? 
The perceived upgrade in projectiles was replaced by a declaration of the end of the 
movement, censoring both content and the life span of the movement itself. 
Furthermore, Hanne Bergius underlines that ‘Dada’s play with publicity carried with 
it the danger of being quietly integrated by those very media that Dada was using for 
its activities and anti-cultural propaganda’ (2003: 30): as we saw in the readymades, 
once zero-point shock has been reached, aestheticisation and acceptance are not far 
behind. In addition to external censorship, these events also show examples of 
Dada’s own self-censorship. At the Festival Dada, one of the Dadas (Soupault, 
according to Sanouillet) ‘allegedly called upon the police to throw out a 
troublemaker’ (ibid.: 128). Whether or not Soupault called the police, the allegation 
implies a level of self-censorship (the Dadas filtering their events’ audiences), while 
also being an attempt to both degrade and publicise Dada’s status.  
This self-censorship rests upon ‘le refus du sujet’ (cf. Sartre); a manifestation of 
the self as ‘unwanted other’. Dada evidently thrived on aggressive audience 
participation, as well as the audience enjoying, despite themselves, this increased 
interaction with the performance. We have seen through these examples of 
censorship that good or bad, this feedback contributed to an on-going and indelible 
presence of Dada. Tzara quotes the critic Jean Paulhan as having written about the 
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Festival: ‘If you must speak of Dada you must speak of Dada. If you must not speak 
of Dada, you must still speak of Dada’ (in Young 1981: 30). Bad press may represent 
a form of censorship, but in Dada’s case it allowed a continuation of its own anti-self. 
We will now assess just how successful these Chinese whispers were. 
What’s New About Neo-Dada? 
[I]ls pariaient en somme sur le hasard et le hasard n’est à personne 
(P: 198) 
After Dada proudly proclaimed itself dead, it seems odd that after a period of 
time a movement bearing its name should spring up anew. However, this oddness is 
lessened when we consider Daniel Spoerri’s suggestion that between Dada’s death 
and the end of the Second World War Dada documents were simply not available: 
‘many things were still hidden, not yet worked on or not yet accessible’ (in Kuenzli 
ed. 2006: 41). This is a level of censorship that would have significantly affected 
Dada’s legacy, but also performs a gap that allows us perspective on the relationship 
between the two movements. How does the Neo-Dada resurgence, which involved 
none of the original Dadas, relate to the original movement? Burton Wasserman tells 
us that ‘[a]s Dada grew out of what it was partly against (abstraction and 
Expressionism), so too, Pop [Art] is both a by-product of and a rebellion against 
Abstract Expressionism’ (1966: 13). Despite this initial oscillating pattern of 
influences and reactions, we might wonder in what ways Neo-Dada was an 
authentic or substantive continuation of Dada. An analysis of the reaction to and 
criticism of Neo-Dada by the Dadas themselves will allow us to draw out the positive 
aspects of this re-birth of the movement. It will be necessary to investigate the 
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reciprocity of Dada and Neo-Dada art. We will then go on to evaluate the state of 
Dada today, as illustrated by continued exhibitions dedicated to the movement, its 
adherents and its legacy.  
Since our analysis of Neo-Dada is to centre around the return of the rats and the 
recuperation of the population, let us briefly revisit the readymades. Goldsmith 
claims that ‘[r]ather than destroying institutional art, [the readymade] has fathered a 
long line of conceptual pieces that promote philosophical inquiry in the scholastic 
tradition – complex, self-explorative pieces that question the very nature of their own 
existence as art’ (1983: 200). We will examine this claim in relation to Neo-Dada art 
works, as well as the altered nature of Oran before and after the plague. The rats in 
Oran reappear in a way that could describe the birth of Neo-Dada: 
Ça y est, disait-il, ils sortent encore.| Qui?| Eh bien! Les rats!| Depuis le mois d’avril, aucun rat 
mort n’avait été découvert.| Est-ce que ça va recommencer? Dit Tarrou à Rieux. Le vieux se 
frottait les mains.| Il faut les voir courir! C’est un plaisir.| Il avait vu deux rats vivants entrer 
chez lui, par la porte de la rue. Des voisins lui avaient rapporté que, chez eux aussi, les bêtes 
avaient fait leur réapparition. Dans certaines charpentes, on entendait de nouveau le remue-
ménage oublié depuis des mois. Rieux attendit la publication des statistiques générales qui 
avaient lieu au début de chaque semaine. Elles révélaient un recul de la maladie. (P: 266-67) 
The similarities that Neo-Dada has with original Dada are evident not only through 
materials and style in their artworks, but also through a ‘Dada-like sense of paradox 
and ambiguity’ (MoCA 2010: n.p.). We will see that Neo-Dada represented a more 
aesthetically acceptable version of Dada, something that can be analogised through 
the return of the rats: originally (in their dead and bleeding form) objects of fear and 
repulsion, their reappearance was celebrated. This symmetry can be posited in 
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relation to Neo-Dada, which in its commercialised, museum-friendly form, 
represented this ‘recul de la maladie’ of Dada. 
Justin Wolf suggests that Neo-Dada’s primary material characteristics were a 
penchant for found objects and performance (2012: n.p.), which mimicks some of 
Dada’s favoured art forms. We could add numerous other forms, including Neo-
Dada’s ‘happenings’ (cf. the Dada ‘excursions’), the specific foregrounding within 
performance of dance, and an emphasis on chance which can be linked in both 
movements to non-Western thought and/or religion. Wolf further links the two 
movements by comparing their perceived ‘goals’: 
[Neo-Dada] artists reinterpreted the goals of the original movement in the context of mid-
twentieth-century America. […] the artists of the Neo-Dada movement viewed their varied 
methods and mediums as a way to expand the boundaries of fine art, while the original 
Dadaists sought to deconstruct modern society and culture through their art. (2012: n.p.) 
To what extent does it matter that Neo-Dada ‘reinterpreted the goals’ of Dada in its 
particular context? Are we to consider it inauthentic, not least unoriginal, if it is 
simply a repetition based on former and external values? Or can we view this in a 
positive light, because Dada thus appropriated can be therein used as a critical 
theory or approach to art, life and philosophy? Pastiche may be considered 
inauthentic in its unquestioning imitation of external tenets, yet it may also be said to 
remain authentic, since this imitation is still based in choice. It can initially be argued 
that Neo-Dada goes against Dada’s fundamental principles, in that the latter 
proposed itself as an ephemeral, unrepeatable phenomenon, against itself as much as 
it stood against others. However, certain occurrences may suggest not only that Dada 
was not as dead as it seemed (cf. the re-commissioning of lost art works), but also 
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that its principles were viewed as so continuingly influential as to be all-pervasive in 
the art world. 
One of the fundamental ways in which Neo-Dada contradicts Dada ideals is its 
mainstream aesthetic celebration of mundane objects as art. Richter states that ‘[t]he 
anti-aesthetic gesture of the ‘ready-made’, and the blasphemies of Picabia, now 
reappear in Neo-Dada in the guise of folk-art – as comic strips or as crushed 
automobile bodies. These are neither non-art nor anti-art but objects to be enjoyed’ 
(AA: 205). In addition to Richter’s consideration of the aestheticisation of non-art and 
anti-art, he questions Neo-Dada’s underlying theoretical concerns, somewhat 
biasedly claiming that ‘[u]ncompromising revolt has been replaced by unconditional 
adjustment’ (ibid.). Practically and theoretically, then, Neo-Dada does not maintain 
Dada’s desire to shock, to épater la bourgeoisie, despite its best intentions. Neo-Dada 
art was created in the knowledge that the museum context would welcome it. 
Francis Naumann writes that ‘[w]ith Pop art considered the most important 
artistic tendency of the 1960s, Duchamp – and by association, Dada – were suddenly 
resuscitated and elevated to the status of subjects worthy of serious discussion’ (1994: 
222). This goes against Dada’s fundamentally unserious intial gesture, and integrates 
the movement into a new respectability that is a form of censorship in its own right. 
Yet from an academic standpoint, it represents a productive instigation of the 
consideration of the deeper meaning of the ostensibly meaningless. Despite not being 
involved in Neo-Dada, former Dadas recognised the link between the movements, 
albeit in a somewhat negative sense. We can posit this as reciprocal censorship, in 
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response to Neo-Dada’s lessening of Dada’s destructive, and self-destructive, intent. 
Hausmann poetically writes that ‘Dada fell like a raindrop from Heaven. The Neo-
Dadaists have learnt to imitate the fall, but not the raindrop’ (in AA: 203). We will 
now look at two examples of Neo-Dada art alongside a comparable Dada 
companion, in order to scrutinise the differing ways in which they interact with the 
institution of art and the notion of censorship, as well as with each other. 
In 1953 Robert Rauschenberg created his Erased de Kooning Drawing (Fig. 25), a 
piece which was a deliberate provocation and interrogation of the nature of the work 
of art.90 Rauschenberg requested a drawing from Willem de Kooning, with the 
intention of erasing it as completely as possible, in order to create a new type of work 
(with the original work remaining unknown to its audience). As the San Francisco 
Museum of Modern Art advertises the piece, ‘Rauschenberg set out to discover 
whether an artwork could be produced entirely through erasure – the removal of 
marks from a sheet of paper rather than the addition of them to it’ (2013: n.p). 
Despite its seeming originality, however, we can propose a direct precedent in Dada 
happenings.  
Tzara describes an event (Dada Matinée, 23 January 1920, Palais des Fêtes, 
Paris) at which a similar work was produced: 
Picabia, who has undergone so many influences, particularly those of the clear and powerful 
mind of Marcel Duchamp, exhibited a number of pictures, one of which was a drawing done in 
                                                 
90 John Cage later cited 4’33” as having been influenced by Rauschenberg’s works in ‘blankness’ (Katz 
2006: n.p.). 4’33” occupies a unique position as an ‘empty’ piece despite being full of (ambient) sound. 
Furthermore it was constructed as such, rather than being an original piece that was erased. In this 
respect we can contrast Rauschenberg’s white canvasses (constructed) with ‘Erased de Kooning 
Drawing’ (deconstructed). 
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chalk on a blackboard and erased on the stage; that is to say, the picture was only valid for two 
hours. (in Young 1981: 28) 
How are we to compare these two pieces, in light of our conclusions on the 
authenticity of Neo-Dada? Is the Rauschenberg simply a rip-off of the Picabia, 
‘imitat[ing] the fall, but not the raindrop’? If we consider the fall to be the conceptual 
grounding of the pieces, we could designate the Rauschenberg an imitation of the 
Picabia. However, the end results – the raindrop as it were – show a number of 
divergences. The Dada drawing was defined by its performance, the original was 
seen, and the end result was not framed and kept. In a certain respect, the 
Rauschenberg ‘version’ destroys its own notion of erasure, since it is carefully 
preserved. However, does this represent the erasure of erasure and thus the creation 
of a compound version of itself, a self-censoring work while maintaining its place in 
the art world? Picabia’s piece, entering and leaving the world as event, maintains no 
place except for that of account. Additionally, Picabia’s piece is irreparably lost to 
history (books), whereas the Rauschenberg maintains a museum presence.  
So strong is academic/human curiosity (as well as commercial/institutional 
interest), that the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art undertook a project to 
recapture the original de Kooning image (results of which can be seen on the 
museum’s website). Instructively, the museum admits to the negative result of this 
curiosity: 
the sight of this approximation of de Kooning's drawing does not markedly transform our 
understanding of Rauschenberg's finished artwork. Ultimately the power of Erased de Kooning 
Drawing derives from the mystery of the unseen and from the perplexity of Rauschenberg's 
decision to erase a de Kooning. Was it an act of homage, provocation, humor, patricide, 
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destruction, or, as Rauschenberg once suggested, celebration? Erased de Kooning Drawing 
eludes easy answers and stands as a landmark of postwar art. (SFMoMA 2013: n.p) 
If the retrievable image does not add anything to the work, perhaps Picabia’s 
irretrievable work is more effective. However, the Rauschenberg maintains status as 
a ‘landmark of postwar art’; the Picabia, lost, is censored both by itself and 
inadvertently by the art world. Furthermore, we can only say of Picabia that his work 
was art. The Rauschenberg continues to exist as perhaps the definitive work of anti-
art, secure in its place in the gallery. It is only when we look at the process, and 
consider it the performance of anti-art, that we may choose Picabia’s as the ultimate in 
removal.  
The persistent inclusion of Rauschenberg’s ‘Erased de Kooning Drawing’ in the 
art world reminds us of Schwitters’s statement that ‘[e]very artist must be allowed to 
mold a picture out of nothing but blotting paper for example, provided he is capable 
of molding a picture’ (cf. Schwitters in Lippard 1971: 102): in this respect not only are 
we inclined to believe that this work must be considered an authentic example of art, 
but also that it may be considered an example of Merz art. Additionally, the 
resistance of Rauschenberg’s work against attempts to ‘solve’ it remind us of Sartre’s 
theories on censorship and freedom in that ‘la liberté […] est projet de faire dans un 
monde résistant, par victoire sur ses résistances’ (EN: 552; emphasis removed). The 
art world rails against the invisible drawing, and even when revealed, the drawing 
resists closure. Picabia’s drawing furthers this, through resisting being seen in a more 
permanent way. 
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Another example that can be compared to a Dada’s ‘original’ is Roy 
Lichtenstein’s I Can See the Whole Room…and There’s Nobody in It! (1961, Fig. 26). The 
work is a graphite and oil rendition of a Steve Roper cartoon, reproducing it almost 
exactly but incorporating colour through the use of Ben-Day dots.  The painting, in 
which a man peers into a dark room through a peephole, has an affinity with 
Duchamp’s Étant donnés (1946-1966, Fig. 27), in which a construction is viewed 
through two peepholes in a door set a certain distance before it. What these two 
pieces immediately have in common is their interrogation of the gaze, building on 
the sense of alienation that we explored in Chaper Two. Duchamp’s piece allows (or 
rather forces) the viewer to be a (somewhat self-conscious) voyeur.  
As Martin Jay writes on Étant donnés, 
Rather than the picture returning the gaze of the beholder in the manner of, say, Manet’s 
Olympia, which suggests the possibility of reciprocity, the viewer becomes the uneasy object of a 
gaze from behind – that of those waiting to stare at the peep show. (1993: 170) 
Lichtenstein’s work interacts with the gaze in a similar way to Jay’s depiction of that 
of Olympia, turning the direction of viewing around and implying a certain 
reciprocity. However, as the character does not look directly at the viewer, we are 
both indirectly subject to the character’s gaze and speech bubble comment, and 
negated by his claim that there is ‘nobody there’.91 It is notable that Lichtenstein’s is a 
flattened version of this viewing scene, which not only emphasises monocular vision 
(hence implicit flattened perspective), but it also has nothing ‘behind’ it (unless we 
                                                 
91 We can compare this to the rayographs in Chapter Two, in which we perceived images even though 
there was ‘nothing there’: here the claim that there is ‘nobody there’ plays with the notion of the 
relevance of the viewer. 
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count the changing viewer). Duchamp’s piece has two eye holes, and looks onto a 3D 
installation through a further hole in a brick wall, pulling the viewer into a strong 
focus on the subject of the installation: a naked woman splayed out on a patch of 
grass.92  
Peterson’s claim that Duchamp plays a game of ‘hide and seek with posterity’ 
(cf. Peterson 2000: 10) is particularly applicable through the artist’s use of eye holes 
on the doors which (in a museum context) form part of the work. This means that the 
contemporary viewer’s voyeuristic stance is extended into a necessary tactile 
interaction with the work, as opposed to the Lichtenstein which can be mounted on a 
wall, and kept at a distance from its audience. We have seen that Dada artefacts such 
as the readymades are often removed from the viewer’s touch: Étant donnés makes it 
impossible for the art institution to impose this removal, while maintaining its own 
internal distance through its construction as a box. Notably, the ‘floor’ of the 
installation is coloured like a chess board. It is as if Duchamp is knowingly playing 
games with the art world, especially since during the period when Étant donnés was 
being created it was believed that he had given up art (removed himself) for good 
[for chess]. 
We might initially consider these examples as highlighting a fundamental 
difference between Dada and Neo-Dada, that of destruction of the art world in the 
former, and expansion of its boundaries in the latter (cf. Wolf 2012). However, we 
might posit a less divisive stance through a shared characteristic of expansion of 
                                                 
92 For further analysis of the construction and history of the piece, see Høy (2000: n.p.). 
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artistic boundaries in both Dada and Neo-Dada, as well as an expansion through 
destruction highlighted throughout this thesis. An additional counter to the division 
of these movements is the fact that Duchamp’s secret work unknowingly crosses the 
temporal divide between movements, while not claiming to belong to either. 
Duchamp expands on his desire to offend that we saw in the readymades, 
positioning the viewer as voyeur, as well as making them physically interact with the 
work. This continues to undermine art as an object of placid aesthetic contemplation. 
Lichtenstein’s work does not require (or allow) this kind of shocked reaction, but 
allows for the art work to look not at or away from, but behind or beyond, the 
viewer. In this way we might say that Duchamp’s work has a more productive 
relationship with boundaries and limitations than Lichtenstein’s, because the former 
constantly challenges the art institution’s formalisation of such works through its 
playful relationship with exhibition(ism).93 
We might furthermore consider these comparisons with our aforementioned 
link with Paneloux’s sermons in La Peste. The contrasting of Dada works with Neo-
Dada examples shows two different, yet intrinsically linked, relationships with the 
art world, considered here as destruction or expansion of artistic boundaries. We can 
compare Dada to Paneloux’s original diagnosis of the plague (a punishment for the 
citizens’ sins): as a punishment through reaction against both a stagnating art world 
and the rotting morals of wartime European society. In expansion of this we can 
                                                 
93 This is an effect that is reproduced in Duchamp’s La Mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même (Le 
Grand Verre) (1915-1923), whose content varies according to both its location and that of the viewer, 
due to its transparency. Additionally it plays into this sense of exhibitionism through the enforced (if 
abstract) nudity of its subject. 
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designate Neo-Dada as Paneloux’s changed claim of the plague as test of faith: by 
constantly seeking to expand the boundaries of the art world, while maintaining a 
strong link to the museum context, Neo-Dada tests the limits of artistic acceptance. 
Jagger writes on La Peste that ‘[t]he scourge continues in ever increasing violence 
until all human values, all time values become meaningless, and man’s degradation 
is completed in the denial of the sacred burial rites which had given diginity to 
death’ (1948: 126). We can interpret the progression of Dada within itself, as well as 
its movement into and through Neo-Dada, as a ‘scourge’ in the art world, rendering 
traditional artistic values meaningless, completed in the denial of aesthetic opinion: if 
everything is art, nothing is. 
Conclusion 
La seule façon de mettre les gens ensemble, c’est encore de leur envoyer la peste. 
(P: 199) 
[T]out le monde, aujourd’hui, se trouve un peu pestiféré. 
(P: 255) 
We have seen, through these examples of Dada interaction with censorship, as 
well as its on-going legacy within the art world, that Dada’s deviance was not only 
successful – inviting appalled reactions from all directions – and on-going, but also 
may have not been as shocking as we initially might think, as well as having been 
very quickly and effectively institutionalised. While Dada may have wished to break 
with the past (and therefore been disappointed by its residue), we might justify it 
through Beauvoir’s suggestion that lingering reliance on posterity is not problematic: 
Ainsi se développe heureusement, sans jamais se figer en facticité injustifiée, une liberté 
créatrice. Le créateur s’appuie sur les créations antérieures pour créer la possibilité de créations 
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nouvelles; son projet présent embrasse le passé et fait à la liberté à venir une confiance qui n’est 
jamais démentie. À chaque instant, il dévoile l’être à fin d’un dévoilement ultérieur; à chaque 
instant sa liberté se confirme à travers la création tout entière. (MA: 36-37) 
As a result of this inevitability of always already bearing a trace of the past, we 
should not be surprised that the censored rapidly becomes acceptable, particularly 
today but even in the time of Dada, almost a century ago. By deliberately 
foregrounding the offensive we are not only forced to confront it, but also realise that 
it is not so offensive in the first place, if it always already carries a trace of our own 
experience. By being provoked, we are cathartically facing the undesirable and the 
shocking. As we have seen through Dada, sometimes we seek such experience for 
precisely this reason.  We saw that Richter considered that readymades could (and 
should) be returned to their original function once their shock value has been 
reduced to zero. However, more often than not, shocking art objects and works are 
not returned to their original purpose. They are left at this ‘zero point’. Yet they are 
not of zero value. While the contemporary viewer is inevitably born into Richter’s 
dubbed ‘unconditional adjustment’ (AA: 205), shock is not lost, and novelty can still 
be created. When shock is ‘gone’, we are left with contemplation. But more 
importantly, we are incited to question.  
We saw that Neo-Dada sought not only to resuscitate Dada but also to redefine 
its principles for its own purposes. Bürger indirectly summarises, through the 
indexing of his text, the neo-avant-garde as ‘institutionalized avant-garde as art’ and 
‘as manifestation void of sense’ (1984: 132). While we might argue that Neo-Dada 
presented a fully institutionalised (fully realised?) version of Dada, I fundamentally 
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disagree that the works are void of sense. It makes sense that Neo-Dada attempts to 
continue the tradition of Dada ‘can no longer attain the protest value of Dadaist 
manifestations, even though they are prepared and executed more perfectly than the 
former’ (ibid.: 57). Bürger explains that this is because ‘the neo-avant-garde 
institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely avant-gardiste 
intentions’ (ibid.: 58; original emphasis). Yet it might be considered that Bürger is 
fixated on an ideal of Dada that could never be achieved, a quasi-fetishisation of a 
‘pure’ Dada, and he moreover does not elucidate what he thought would constitute 
an authentic Dada.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that the later works have more deliberate sense, 
whereas Dada enthusiastically embraced the lack thereof. Dada works were 
knowingly senseless (and yet knowingly meaningful), and aimed at an unsuspecting 
audience who were not prepared to interpret them. By the time of Neo-Dada, not 
only was the audience aware of this type of work, but the creator also worked with 
this expectation. Meaning is always already present, not simply from the original 
purpose of a prefabricated object (as with Fountain), but from an established tradition 
of disruption. As Benjamin notes: ‘“A work of art,” said André Breton, “has value 
only in so far as it quivers with reflections of the future”’ (2008: 48n). Perhaps Neo-
Dada is evidence, then, of Dada’s success: a collection of reflections of this original 
quivering. Based on these quiverings, we might consider that Dada and Neo-Dada 
work together in posterity to fulfil Beauvoir’s statement that 
En vérité, pour que ma liberté ne risque pas de venir mourir contre l’obstacle qu’a suscité son 
engagement même, pour qu’elle puisse encore à travers l’échec poursuivre son mouvement, il 
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faut que, se donnant un contenu singulier, elle vise à travers lui une fin qui ne soit aucune 
chose, mais précisément le libre mouvement de l’existence. (MA: 38-39) 
Through the readymades and beyond Neo-Dada, the art world has succumbed to a 
dominance of the conceptual, a model of art as idea rather than aesthetic becoming 
largely the standard model. Conceptual art, ‘qui ne soit aucune chose’, can then be 
posited as ‘précisément le libre mouvement de l’existence’. 
This chapter has drawn upon themes explored in Chapters One and Two, those 
of choice and subjectivity, as well as the creative interpretation of reality, to posit the 
notion of alterity as a creative state of being. The chapter additionally developed the 
notion of attempts at normalisation of deviation from standard behavioural patterns 
initiated in Chapter Three. The exploration of the concepts of censorship and 
deviance in Chapter Four has shown that Dada and Existentialism both interrogated 
and worked within the margin of acceptability. The chapter showed that freedom is 
often found precisely through censorship, and indeed that the censored and the 
shocking are only temporarily so. We have problematized Dada’s (retrospective) 
relationship with Neo-Dada, expecting not to be convinced by the latter’s productive 
role in the art world. Yet in examining both movements alongside Existentialist 
notions of authenticity, Neo-Dada is brought into new light. This turns back round 
on censorship: while Neo-Dada may not shock, it still manages to subvert the art 
world by its very acceptance. Through this, we might argue that shock has become 
not non-shock, but anti-shock. Chapter Five will draw the thesis to a close by taking 
this notion of normalisation through integration into the notions of subjectivity of 
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truth and history, to posit that truth is individual in its subjectivity, and plural as a 
result. 
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Fig. 21: 
Fountain 
Marcel Duchamp, 1917 
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Fig. 22: 
Cadeau 
Man Ray, 1921 
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Fig. 23: 
Indestructible Object (or Object to be Destroyed) 
Man Ray, 1923 
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Fig. 24: 
Merzbild 1A Der Irrenarzt 
Kurt Schwitters, 1919 
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Fig. 25: 
Erased de Kooning Drawing 
Robert Rauschenberg, 1953 
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Fig. 26: 
I Can See the Whole Room…and there’s Nobody in It! 
Roy Lichtenstein, 1961 
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Fig. 27: 
Étant donnés (side/deconstructed view) 
Marcel Duchamp, 1946-1966 
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- CHAPTER FIVE - 
TRUTH AND TRAVESTIES: THE TELLING AND RETELLING OF 
DADA (HI)STORIES 
He knows a hundred different truths, and one is as true to him as another 
(FT: 7) 
[I]n a real sense, there are as many ‘Dadas’ as there are Dadaists 
(Last in Sheppard 2000: 172) 
Dada scholars are bombarded with varied and often contradictory primary accounts 
of a movement that refused concrete definition, and whose claims of rejecting all 
labels are widespread and well-known. Through the movement’s dis- and re-
assembling of art, language and life, a desire to re-write history becomes apparent. 
Accounts of the movement, especially those related by adherents themselves, are rife 
with ambiguity, fiction, and (varyingly absurd) claims to authority. In this respect it 
is also a parody of historiography, in medias res of the actual cultural phenomenon 
that is Dada. The name of the movement itself presents, beyond its initial appearance 
as an infantile repetition of a single syllable, a word whose polyvalent associations 
give us ‘hobbyhorse’ in French, ‘yes, yes’ in various Slavic languages, and in English 
a child’s early paternal moniker; yet together, these definitions only contribute to its 
linguistic inexactitude. Furthermore we know that despite all attempts to attach 
meaning to the word, Tzara famously claimed that that ‘Dada ne signifie rien’ (D3: 
1).94 Pegrum explains that ‘[t]he word Dada itself has an undermining, destabilising 
function’, and that Picabia ‘[found] that its importance lies in the fact that it ‘rest[e] le 
                                                 
94 It is instructive but not surprising that Da(da) is a word with functioning meaning (beyond its use as 
an infantile sound, or indeed as indicating the movement itself) in most common world languages, 
including ‘nothing’ in Irish, perhaps unknowingly proving Tzara’s claim that Dada means nothing. I 
use the word ‘most’ based on a sample of seventy languages, fifty-one of which present coherent 
meaning for ‘da’ or ‘dada’. 
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même dans toutes les langues, ne précisant rien, ne limitant rien’’ (2000: 173). From 
this we can posit that the word is both asemic and polysemic, providing a productive 
basis in ambiguity on which to build a movement that reveled in confusion. 
Further exploration of accounts of Dada by its adherents on the origin and 
choice of this name are yet more convoluted. Ball’s early diary entry claims ‘[m]y 
proposal to call it Dada is accepted’ (FT: 63). Ball’s statement relates to the 
eponymous review, rather than the movement, but the suggestion of ownership 
and/or invention of the name remains. While Huelsenbeck allows for Ball’s 
involvement, he does not give him sole ownership of the term, and writes that ‘[t]he 
word Dada was accidentally discovered by Ball and myself in a German-French 
dictionary when we were looking for a stage-name for Madame Le Roy, the singer in 
our cabaret’ (in AA: 32). Richter writes retrospectively that ‘I heard the two 
Rumanians Tzara and Janco punctuating their torrents of Rumanian talk with the 
affirmative ‘da, da’. I assumed […] that the name Dada, applied to our movement, 
had some connection with the joyous Slavonic affirmative ‘da, da’ – and to me this 
seemed wholly appropriate’ (AA: 31).  
Despite his historical status as ‘leader’ of Dada, an account from Tzara lays no 
claim to invention of the word, stating that ‘[a] word was born, no one knows how’ 
(in ibid.: 32). Tzara’s statement reflects the performative nature of his ‘characteristic’ 
immodesty,95 and is (part) denied by Arp’s claim that ‘I hereby declare that Tzara 
                                                 
95 Accounts reference in great detail Tzara’s impresario character and boisterous performances. 
However, his more fragile side is less often referenced, which gives a skewed impression wherein the 
self-assured and self-promoting person of the history books dominates. Buot relates, however, that on 
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invented the word Dada on 6th February 1916, at 6pm. I was there with my 12 
children when Tzara first uttered the word…it happened in the Café de la Terrasse in 
Zurich, and I was wearing a brioche in my left nostril’ (in ibid.).96 These varying 
accounts not only demonstrate the privileging of performative artistic identity, but 
also highlight the parodic nature of Dada’s relationship with (cultural) history, the 
reification of which will be brought out in this chapter. 
If, as Last claims, there are ‘as many ‘Dadas’ as there are Dadaists’, what are we 
to draw from the varying texts as scholars of the movement? Is it possible, or even 
advisable, to arrange these accounts in terms of a hierarchy of truthful content? 
Should we favour the account of Ball, arguably the first Dada, who established the 
movement’s birthplace, the Cabaret Voltaire, yet who was among the first to distance 
himself from it? That of Huelsenbeck, who wrote notoriously bitter accounts and 
vied for leadership with other members of the movement?97 Arp, long-time Dada 
adherent whose pseudo-formal account is sprinkled with perceivable absurdities, 
perhaps in a deliberate attempt to undermine its own credibility? Or Tzara, who is 
                                                                                                                                                        
the decline of the Cabaret Voltaire and the departure of Huelsenbeck and Ball, ‘[p]longé dans une 
forte dépression, Tzara a du mal à sortir de sa chambre’ (2002: 60). This reveals a dependence on both 
activity and the presence of others which somewhat undermines the notion of his indefatigable 
confidence. 
96 Travesties references a similar episode involving pastries and facial orifices, in which it is noted that 
‘Arp, as usual, was inserting a warm croissant into his nose’ (in T: 27). This reference has a comic 
counterpart in La Nausée when Roquentin, experiencing a bout of nausea in a café, suddenly becomes 
aware of the ‘enormous nostrils’ of the café’s patrons (N: 39). These two humorous episodes introduce 
an ‘inflation’ of the senses when falsehood or bad faith is created that is reminiscent of the classic tale 
of Pinocchio. Are our senses inflated as a visual representation of the commonly caricatured pricking 
up of ears as a heightening of the senses in order to perceive things more clearly? 
97 An example of this can be found in his obituary to Tzara, in which he actively disputes Tzara’s 
‘claim’ to having named the movement (Huelsenbeck 1974: 103). Moreover, Huelsenbeck claims that 
Tzara ‘permitted himself to live all his life off a fame for an arrogated founding of dada’ (ibid.). 
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historically accepted as the founder and/or leader of Dada and yet who denies 
ownership of the movement’s name?  
Moving from this series of questions emerging from the discussion of the 
invention of the word ‘Dada’, along with its associated meaning(s) as both a word in 
its own right and as the name of the movement, this chapter will examine a selection 
of the ‘stories’ and histories of Dada, alongside Existentialist notions of ‘truth’, as 
well as in contrast with its opposing concepts: lies, untruth, and doubt. Through its 
analysis of truth and travesties in a foregrounding of written texts from Dada and 
beyond, this chapter will explore the importance of writing as not only a 
documenting of, but also a (de)construction of, the self. As Chapter Four traced 
freedom through censorship, so Chapter Five will evaluate the possibility of new 
truth through lies. 
This investigation will be performed through three ‘non-fiction’ Dada methods 
– the memoir, the diary, and the manifesto – against three fictional texts. Firstly we 
will consider the memoirs of Richter (Dada: Art and Anti-art, 1965) and Huelsenbeck 
(Memoirs of a Dada Drummer, 1974). These will be analysed alongside two works of 
Tom Stoppard, a postmodernist writer whose works often involve significant 
references to Dada: Travesties (1975), a play that is designed as a feasible fake, filled 
with genuine anecdotes and sprinkled with historical accuracy, and Artist Descending 
a Staircase (1972), more evidently fictitious and yet which references a plethora of 
names, places and events, with a characteristic postmodern confusion. Both plays are 
constructed in such a way that they fold back on themselves and partially repeat in 
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an effort to destabilise the perception of a ‘correct’ storyline. Secondly we will assess 
the role of the journal as illustrated in Ball’s Flight out of Time: a Dada Diary (1974), 
and Tzara’s ‘Zurich Chronicle’ (1915-1919). These will be compared with Sartre’s La 
Nausée, a novel whose use of a protagonist in existential crisis promotes the 
importance of diary form as an Existentialist exploration and development of the self, 
as well as a constant re-writing of the truth. The manifestos will be analysed 
primarily in their own right, but with the view to bringing out Dada’s own 
philosophy (as well as its alignment with core Existentialist thought), through its 
most clearly proclaimed expression of identity. This is particularly applicable if we 
consider the etymology of ‘manifesto’, which comes from the Latin manifesta: clear, 
conspicuous (Latdict).  
The discussion of language and its relation with the Dada self will be central to 
this analysis, especially regarding Existentialist thought on the reciprocity of the 
creation and implementation of values. The memoirs will be analysed with a view to 
assessing the usefulness of different types of retrospective, as well as comparing the 
notions of ‘lasting impressions’ and ‘fading memories’, and furthermore the 
Stoppard as a text entirely constructed from false memory. The diaries will address 
the significance of the writing of the self at the time of happening, as well as its 
relationship with being seen and/or published, especially in regards to the process of 
editing. These texts will deliberately be analysed approximately in reverse 
chronological order. This is so as to begin from the most distant memory (as defined 
by inevitable loss through temporal distance), and progress toward the most 
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concentrated and ‘in the moment’ idea of Dada values. This also works toward the 
structure of the thesis as a whole: Chapter One started in Dada’s core, the three 
middle chapters moved steadily outwards geographically, philosophically and 
temporally, and this final chapter will hone in backwards on ‘original’ Dada from a 
contemporary perspective. As such it will perform a final test on the correlation 
between Dada and Existentialism before our concluding synthesis of the thesis itself. 
Truth and Lies, Faith and Disguise 
C’est que chacun, regardant dans le même miroir, voit les choses à sa façon. 
(Ribemont-Dessaignes 1958: 83) 
Let us rewrite life every day. 
(FT: 56) 
Before analysing our key texts, is useful to consider the etymology behind our 
terms ‘travesty’ and ‘truth’, in order to assess their relationship with the accounts 
and principles of Dada. The word ‘travesty’ is rooted in the French travesti, 
‘disguised’ (from Latin trans- + vestire (to clothe)). Conversely, ‘truth’ derives from 
the Old English trēowth, cognate of the Old Norse tryggth, ‘faith’ (All Dictionary.com). 
We saw in Chapter One that the ways in which disguise can be used to deceive are 
closely related to the ways in which truth (and, by extension, faith) can be 
manipulated, including deception by feigning to deceive. In Stoppard’s Travesties, the 
character Henry Carr98 states (on Tzara) that ‘[h]e is obviously trying to pass himself 
                                                 
98 Names of Stoppard’s characters will be placed in italics, as they are fictional by design and are not to 
be confused with the individuals outside of the play. 
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off as a spy’ (T: 12),99 and later, that ‘[t]o masquerade as a decadent nihilist – or at any 
rate to ruminate in different colours and display the results in the Bahnhofstrasse – 
would be hypocritical’ (ibid.: 47; original emphasis). This chapter will seek to 
evaluate the pertinent underlying similarities and differences between these two 
terms, both of which are fundamental to an understanding of Dada and its 
(hi)stories. Is disguise essentially deception, or rather a reimagining of the truth? Is a 
travesty always to be considered a disaster, or can the word be used in a positive, 
creative sense? 
Beyond these common definitions, it is also necessary to explore the 
Existentialist definitions of truth as expressed by Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-
Ponty. We have already seen that French Existentialist thought places the creation of 
values in the individual: we will assess how this relates to definitions and usage of 
‘truth’ and its associated terms including ‘lies’ and ‘doubt’. Existentialist writing 
foregrounds subjectivity, and this includes subjectivity (or even non-existence) of 
truth. Sartre states that ‘[l]a connaissance nous met en présence de l’absolu et il y a 
une vérité de la connaissance. Mais cette vérité, quoique ne nous livrant rien de plus 
et rien de moins que l’absolu, demeure strictement humaine’ (EN: 255; my emphasis). 
Merleau-Ponty continues this embracing of the subjectivity of truth, stating that 
‘toutes mes vérités ne sont après tout que des évidences pour moi et pour une pensée faite 
comme la mienne, elles sont solidaires de ma constitution psychophysiologique et 
                                                 
99 The link between spies and Zurich is not unfounded. Keith Jeffery states that around the time of 
Dada ‘[t]he Swiss resented the use of their country as a kind of intelligence ‘clearing-house’ where 
spies from every belligerent power engaged in an espionage free-for-all’ (2010: 90).  
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l’existence de ce monde-ci’ (PP: 458; my emphasis). Beauvoir relates truth to 
ambiguity and, through this, back to subjectivity: ‘pour atteindre sa vérité l’homme 
ne doit pas tenter de dissiper l’ambiguïté de son être, mais au contraire accepter de la 
réaliser’ (MA: 19). We have seen constantly throughout the thesis the apparent 
necessity to access a position ‘hors de soi’ in order to view one’s sense of self more 
clearly. Here we will explore its combination with ambiguity as a pathway to 
individual truth. 
Truth is productively connected to its opposite, the lie, or untruth, through 
Beauvoir, who posits ‘les vérités nécessairement partielles que dévoile tout engagement 
humain’ (MA: 87; my emphasis). The homonymically dual function of the English 
word ‘partial’ is instructive in relation to subjectivity of truth because ‘l’esprit 
indépendant, c’est encore un homme avec sa situation singulière dans le monde, et ce 
qu’il définit comme vérité objective, c’est l’objet de son propre choix’ (ibid.). 
Furthermore, Beauvoir elucidates that ‘le mot mensonge a un sens par opposition à la 
vérité établie par les hommes mêmes, mais l’Humanité ne saurait se mystifier tout 
entière puisque c’est précisément elle qui crée les critères du vrai ou du faux’ (MA: 195; my 
emphasis). We can extend this subjectivity while relating back to Chapter Two 
through Merleau-Ponty, who theorises that ‘la vérité ou la fausseté d’une expérience 
ne doivent pas consister dans son rapport à un réel extérieur’ (PP: 393).  
Fitting with our exploration of the many stories of Dada, in terms of being 
experienced and related as two very different things, Sartre states that ‘l’essence du 
mensonge implique, en effet, que le menteur soit complètement au fait de la vérité 
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qu’il déguise’ (EN: 82),100 and furthermore that ‘[i]l y a une vérité des conduites du 
trompeur: si le trompé pouvait les rattacher à la situation où se trouve le trompeur et 
à son projet de mensonge, elles deviendraient parties intégrantes de la vérité, à titre 
de conduites mensongères’ (EN: 84-85; original emphasis). In lying to the press, and 
to history more broadly, the Dadas were not only aware of the truth of their 
situation, but also were creating a plurality of truth through the lie. 
Connected tightly with the multiplicity of truth and the lie is doubt, which 
Sartre analyses in detail (cf. EN: 191-92). He instructively notes that ‘[l]e doute paraît 
sur le fond d’une compréhension préontologique du connaître et d’exigences 
concernant le vrai’ (ibid.: 191; original emphasis), foregrounding that the implicit 
way in which we relate to knowledge (a version of truth) and doubt are intrinsically 
linked. Sartre develops this notion of doubt in relation to temporality, stating that  
Se découvrir doutant, c’est déjà être en avant de soi-même dans le futur qui recèle le but, la 
cessation et la signification de ce doute, en arrière de soi dans le passé qui recèle les motivations 
constituantes du doute et ses phases, hors de soi dans le monde comme présence à l’objet dont 
on doute. (EN: 191-92) 
Sartre’s discussion of the importance of doubt is reminiscent of a frequently occuring 
(sarcastic) line in Travesties: ‘Intellectual curiosity is not so common that one can 
afford to discourage it’ (T: 47, among others). Stoppard’s comment on the state of 
affairs in early twentieth-century Europe, as well as the compulsion to create 
material with which the questioning intellectual can engage, can be filtered through a 
                                                 
100 We will see that this is particularly evident in Travesties, through the deliberate deception of 
characters pretending to be others. 
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point of view of Dada’s desire not only to épater la bourgeoisie, but also to introduce a 
provocation of intrigue in Dada scholars for years to come.  
Through the existence of Dada’s many tales the scholar is required to constantly 
research further, and will find not the truth, but a number of truths about the 
movement. Additionally, it might be said that this is part of Dada’s aim of 
provocation as a means to self-knowledge. Tzara claimed that ‘Dada doute de tout’, 
and warned ‘[m]éfiez-vous de Dada’ (1996: 227). Perhaps this is part of a wider 
incitement for the reader to question traditions and narratives. Furthermore, we will 
see how in weaving falsities into the recording of history, Dada activities forward 
Sartre’s notion of ‘se découvrir doutant’, as well as being ‘en avant de soi-même dans 
le futur’, ‘en arrière de soi dans le passé’, and ‘hors de soi dans le monde comme 
présence à l’objet dont on doute’. Dada created a relationship with itself that moved 
in and out of coincidence with reality, as well as a flexible approach to time that 
concealed the creation of false truths enough to introduce a lasting ambiguity. We 
saw in Chapter Two the desire to create this ambiguity through states of dreaming. 
Here we can link it to the truth through Tzara, who theorised that ‘[l]e sommeil est 
un jardin entouré de doutes. On ne distingue pas la vérité du mensonge’ (cited in 
Buot 2002: 22). 
Further to this, Merleau-Ponty suggests that every action or thought is a truth 
of some sort, stating that 
il n’est pas une de mes actions, pas une de mes pensées même erronées, du moment que j’y ai 
adhéré, qui n’ait visé une valeur ou une vérité et qui ne garde en consequence son actualité 
dans la suite de ma vie non seulement comme fait ineffaçable, mais encore comme étape 
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nécessaire vers les vérités ou les valeurs plus complètes que j’ai renconnues dans la suite. Mes 
vérités ont été construites avec ces erreurs et les entraînent dans leur éternité. (PP: 454) 
Not only does Merleau-Ponty’s statement on the omnipresence of truth have value in 
relation to Dada’s outlook on the multiplicity of truth, but his emphasis on the 
importance of error reminds us of Beauvoir’s theory of ‘sans échec, pas de morale’ 
(MA: 15). We may consider that this constant re-writing is not only a method of self-
exploration, but also a means to finding personal truth: ‘Tout serait vérité dans la 
conscience’ (PP: 437). This is not only instructive in the sense of the subjectivity of 
truth, but also if we consider that we are never really able to know that that which 
we perceive is reality: everything is reality as we know it. 
Memoirs of (a) Dada, or, the Importance of Being…Tzara 
Stoppard knows that audiences prefer entertainment to accuracy. 
(Nadel 2008: 488) 
Memory, my dear Cecily, is the diary that we all carry about with us […] Yes, but it usually 
chronicles the things that have never happened, and couldn’t possibly have happened. 
(Oscar Wilde)101 
Stoppard’s Travesties (1975) is a fictional account of the fictional meeting of 
Henry Carr with Tristan Tzara, James Joyce, and Lenin in wartime Zürich, all loosely 
based around the plot of Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest (1895). The 
play presents a collection of retellings by a rather senile Carr, giving the effect of 
Dada’s various reports and diaries. Travesties integrates a number of postmodern 
techniques which are shared with its Dada counterpart, including playfulness, 
                                                 
101 Cited in programme notes: interview with director Philip Wilson of 2011 performance run of 
Travesties. 
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intertextuality, and of course fabulation.102 Stoppard’s play was first performed in the 
same year that the English translations of Ball’s diaries and Huelsenbeck’s memoirs 
were published (1974), lending the movement and its fictional successor a notable 
temporal crossover.  
Stoppard based his historical references on Richter’s account, as well as 
Motherwell’s The Dada Painters and Poets (1989).103 Yet Travesties is a self-aware, self-
confessedly less-than-accurate account: is this more important than the inevitable 
bias the author risks portraying through his choice of source(s)? Ira Nadel claims that 
Stoppard would consider historical accuracy secondary to ‘the imaginative 
encounter, the possibility that these figures might have met and what they could 
have said’, and furthermore that ‘[t]ruth is not only imaginative but irregular’ (2008: 
482). Indeed such parallels are not unprecedented: not only was the real James Joyce 
acquainted with Dada, but he was also once believed to be the movement’s founder 
(ibid. 486); the varyingly hypothetical (yet highly possible) meeting of Lenin and 
Tzara is frequently posited, especially due to the apparent proximity of the Cabaret 
Voltaire to Lenin’s temporary living quarters on Spiegelgasse.104 
                                                 
102 For more specific work on Dada’s relationship with Postmodernism, see Pegrum (2000) and 
Sheppard (2000). 
103 Huelsenbeck details that even during the production of Motherwell’s anthology a dispute broke 
out between Tzara and himself, allegedly over content (Huelsenbeck 1974: 80-81), proving that 
perceptions of the movement and its historicisation differed, and that adherents never stopped vying 
for leadership. 
104 Accounts include Codrescu (2009), Harskamp and Dijstelberge (2012), and Pichon and Riha (eds 
1996). Richter supports the claim (in AA: 16), and perhaps most tellingly, Tzara claimed (in a BBC 
recording in 1959): ‘Je peux dire que j’ai connu personnellement Lénine à Zurich avec lequel je jouais 
aux échecs. Mais à ma grande honte, je dois avouer à ce moment-là, je ne savais pas que Lénine était 
Lénine. Je l’ai appris bien plus tard’ (in Buot 2002: 50-51). Whether this is true or part of a long-
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Travesties is constructed as two acts of Carr’s memories, that he recalls in a way 
that they become repeated and recycled. The predictable Chinese whispers effect 
created by this method is compounded by the second act’s inclusion of Wildean 
farce, centred on Carr’s deception of Cecily by pretending to be Tristan Tzara. 
Meanwhile the ‘real’ Tristan Tzara is revealed to be posing as his fictional brother 
named Jack (‘my name is Tristan in the Meierei Bar and Jack in the library’ (T: 27)). It 
is thus clear that ‘the merging or collapsing of identities and differences is the 
biographical fantasy at the center of the play’ (Nadel 2008: 483). The storyline of 
deception is based on The Importance of Being Earnest, a play in which the real Carr 
actually starred in Zurich in 1918 (T: ix).  
As a text that has little or no known connection to Dada or its adherents, and 
certainly no claim by its author, Travesties not only shows Dada’s continued use as a 
literary and artistic reference point throughout the twentieth century, but also raises 
questions about the nature of truth and telling. Travesties therefore might potentially 
be considered a Dada text in its own right, making us wonder whether Stoppard 
himself could be considered the (or a) ‘nouveau dada’ (cf. Huelsenbeck). 
Additionally, this fulfils Richter’s conditions of the Dada myth through his statement 
that: 
From the beginning, Dada was thus replaced by a thoroughly blurred image of itself. Since then 
even the mirror has broken. Anyone who finds a fragment of it can now read into it his own 
image of Dada, conditioned by his own aesthetic, national, historical or personal beliefs or 
preferences. Thus Dada has become a myth. (AA: 10) 
                                                                                                                                                        
standing Dada prank, the element of embarrassment is certainly indicative of a lack of awareness that 
allows for the meeting to be simultaneously ‘true’ and ‘false’. 
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It is instructive that Richter chooses to call Dada a ‘myth’, since the construction of 
myth is based in a delicate balance of truth and doubt, linking the two in the same 
way that we saw in Sartre. His description of Dada as fragments of a mirror also 
reiterates our findings in Chapter One on the subjectivity of selfhood. 
We have already considered much of the content of Richter’s Art and Anti-Art, 
but this chapter will focus on the way in which Richter collects together memories 
that are not always his, as well as analysing the choice of content for what is one of 
Dada’s definitive primary sources. Published for the first time in German in 1964, it 
was quickly followed by its English translation in 1965. Richter was not present or 
active in each individual Dada centre that he describes, and confesses in his account 
both to inevitable bias, and the reliance on the stories of others: 
I shall not be able to confine myself within the bounds of academic art-history. I shall depend 
above all on my own memories and those of my surviving friends. […] Having been involved 
in this revolt myself, I shall try to tell what I experienced, what I heard, and how I remember it. 
I hope to do justice to the age, to the history of art, and to my friends, dead and living. (AA: 7) 
From the outset it is clear that Richter’s account will unavoidably be affected by his 
personal relationships, as well as inferring an edge of ‘fond memory’ rather than an 
entirely objective outlook. We can instantly compare this to Stoppard’s Carr, who 
recounts his memories with fondness, as well as a slightly senile inaccuracy (within 
himself/the fictional world of Travesties as well as what we know of ‘non-fictional’ 
Dada itself). Carr gets around this by claiming that ‘No apologies required, constant 
digression being the saving grace of senile reminiscence’ (T: 6). 
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Continuing his discussion of the reliability of accounts in relation to actual 
events, Richter states that 
the image of Dada is still [i.e. in 1965] full of contradictions. This is not surprising. Dada invited, 
or rather defied, the world to misunderstand it, and fostered every kind of confusion. This was 
done from caprice and from a principle of contradiction. Dada has reaped the harvest of 
confusion that it sowed. (AA: 9)105 
Perhaps Dada, like Stoppard, knew its audience, and preferred to privilege the 
process of storytelling over the accuracy of its content, a fundamental part of 
mythmaking. Yet despite this portrayal of Dada as something as simultaneously 
undefinable and multiplicitously definable as its name, Richter still claims three 
categories for ‘proof’ that events happened (which he forwards as having been his 
criteria for inclusion of ‘facts’ and ‘events’ in his text): 
1. Dates and facts supported by published documents, diaries, etc., dating from the period itself. 
2. Dates and facts for which there is no documentary proof dating from the period, but for 
which there are at least two disinterested witnesses or testimonies. 
3. Dates and facts which can only be attested to by the author or one friend. (AA: 10) 
Was Richter genuinely trying to provide an accurate account of his former 
movement? Or is this yet another tongue-in-cheek refusal of the authority of the 
written text?  
Richter’s own text does not always clarify who is ‘talking’, nor does he 
reference consistently or clearly. This initially suggests the problematic notion of 
Richter’s account being interpreted as a desire for a single, homogenised viewpoint, 
reducing Dada’s wildly heterogeneous individuality. However, we might instead say 
                                                 
105 Richter’s statement is particularly relevant in relation to Chapter Four’s analysis of the destruction, 
recommission and reproduction of art works, highlighting a strong delight in contradiction and 
ambiguity. 
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that this text is a fond memory of a movement that refused definition, faithfully 
preserved in its ambiguity and productively incorporative of ‘errors’ (cf. Beauvoir 
(MA: 38-39); Merleau-Ponty (PP: 454)). Richter’s text instructively highlights an often 
overlooked crossover between primary text and post facto account, primarily 
because it straddles the divide between primary and secondary source itself, but also 
because it effectively calls into question the authority of both texts written by Dada 
adherents and secondary accounts. 
Both Richter’s account and Travesties foreground the the notion of playing a 
role, or playing an identity, whether this is constructing and projecting a self-created 
identity, or absorbing an externally conceived image of the self, inadvertently or 
deliberately perpetuating the character in the course and recording of history. We 
have seen this particularly strongly in the historicised ‘character’ of Tzara. I would 
argue that this began through the creation of the name: on taking on a multi-faceted 
moniker,106 the former Samuel Rosenstock initiated a play of not only words, but also 
identity. Disengagement with the past was a key Dada theme: here Tzara could be 
argued to be the most disengaged of all adherents, fully changing his name in 1915, 
just before embarking on Dada (so not changing it for Dada, nonetheless). Tzara was 
not the only Dada who changed his name around the time of or because of the 
movement. Others include: Hannah Höch (Schwitters added the ‘h’ to the end of 
Hannah to make it a palindrome), John Heartfield (b. Helmut Herzfeld), and George 
Grosz (b. Georg Ehrenfried Groß). The common theme of nationality is no 
                                                 
106 ‘Tristan Tzara’ has varyingly been assigned meanings in French, German and Romanian, and even 
attributed connections to Wagner (Tristan und Isolde) and Nietzsche (Also Sprach [T]Zarathustra). 
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coincidence: often German(ic) members changed their name to distance themselves 
from national or political association.  
Nadel’s suggestion that Travesties is a ‘merging or collapsing of identities’ is 
replicated in Richter’s account, which displays an occasional lack of differentiation 
between ‘characters’. However, through the constant need to reinvent that is brought 
out by the name-changing habits of the Dadas (including such grandiose epithets as 
Dadamax (Max Ernst) and Oberdada (Johannes Baader)), we can posit not a merging 
but a multiplicity of identities. This no doubt stems from the movement’s refusal of 
concrete definition, as the presentation of a perpetual non-coincidence with the self 
challenges the reader to question every account. Furthermore, breaking with while 
remaining in a creative relationship with the past links Dada and the individual 
Dadas with Beauvoir’s theory that ‘[o]n n’aime pas le passé dans sa vérité vivante si 
on s’obstine à en maintenir les formes figées et momifiées. Le passé est un appel, c’est 
un appel vers l’avenir qui parfois ne peut le sauver qu’en le détruisant’ (MA: 118). 
Through Dada accounts we can perceive a need to both consider the truth a living 
(and thus malleable) present entity, but also a desire to change the potential future(s), 
and moreover fundamentally more than the ‘willful negation’ that Papanikolas 
presents the movement as embodying (cf. 2010: 65). 
Brigitte Pichon states that ‘the writing of history is the writing – the 
construction – of stories’ (in Pichon and Riha eds 1996: 7). In order to illustrate the 
desire for ambiguity of cultural and historical memory construction through the 
distortion of ‘truth’ in Dada, we can look at an example of an event that was reported 
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in different ways: the mock duel between Tzara and Arp near Zurich. We have seen 
that one of Dada’s strongest tools in the construction of hybrid or ambiguous 
meaning was manipulation of the press. Because of its scandalous reputation as a 
movement, yet which nevertheless maintained a productive relationship with the 
European cultural scene, members were able to feed stories to the media, sowing 
confusion at the time, and weaving in a subtle manipulation of history for years to 
come. The announcement for the Rehalp duel was sent by the Dadas to around thirty 
Swiss and international newspapers: 
Sensational Duel. We have received this report from Zurich, dated 2nd July [1919]: A pistol duel 
occurred yesterday on the Rehalp near Zurich between Tristan Tzara, the renowned founder of 
Dadaism, and the Dadaistic painter Hans Arp. Four shots were fired. At the fourth exchange 
Arp received a slight graze to his left thigh, whereupon the two opponents left the scene 
unreconciled. […] We have learned that the Zurich prosecutor’s office has already opened up an 
investigation into all those involved. Its findings the [sic] will certainly interest the public 
greatly. (in ZC: 34) 
Tzara recorded the same event, in his ‘Zurich Chronicle’ (1915-1919) as ‘mock 
duel Arp + Tzara on the Rehalp with cannon but aimed in the same direction 
audience invited to celebrate a private bluish victory’ (ZC: 34). Does Tzara’s 
statement mean that the duel did not, as we suspect, happen at all, or does it simply 
imply that the event was staged? We are told by Richter that one of the cited 
‘witnesses’ of the event, the poet Jakob Heer, sent in a disclaimer to the press, only to 
be countered by a Dada response from two (Dada) witnesses, confirming Heer’s 
presence.107 Huelsenbeck notes that the report was ‘a COMPLETE FABRICATION 
                                                 
107 Ball cites Heer as ‘one of our most regular customers’ at the Cabaret Voltaire, whose ‘voluminous 
cloak sweeps the glasses off the tables when he walks past’ (FT: 58). Is Heer’s denied presence another 
Dada-style prank on the part of the poet? It is arguably exactly this position at which the telling of 
multiple truths aims, a simultaneous presence and absence that we saw in Chapter Two. 
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from someone wishing us ill’ (in ibid.). We must bear in mind that according to 
Richter’s own rules both would be considered true accounts, owing to the presence 
of witnesses and documents to support each side. The event was reported, along 
with dates, in the Zurich press, as well as in Tzara’s diary (both dating from the 
period itself). Witnesses backed up these accounts: for Tzara, Walter Serner and 
Heer, and for Arp, Otto Kokoschka and Picabia (ibid.). Finally, Richter himself attests 
to the occurrence of the event. In this way, all three of Richter’s rules have been 
adhered to, giving the event a certain logical consistency, even if it is only in the 
context of the movement itself.108 
By infiltrating the press in this way, Dada erodes our foundations of truth in 
relation to authority. Sheppard explicates that the point of sending in false reports 
such as the duel was ‘to unmask the unreliability of the printed word and so generate 
an attitude of scepticism toward “authorities” in general and the authority of the 
press in particular’ (2000: 181). One may be naturally more inclined to believe or 
respect printed word, especially that of a newspaper, despite the fact that evidently 
neither being published, nor simply claiming something as fact, makes it true. But 
what are the consequences and effects on the reader? And how does it affect the 
creators of the fiction? The creator is allowed the possibility of freely interpreting 
truth and fiction, and the reader is obliged to interpret what they see, rather than 
blindly accepting it.  
                                                 
108 We have seen this technique used in Dada film (particularly Entr’acte) in Chapter Two. Here it is 
transferred to ‘real’ events. 
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Richter claims that ‘the public likes nothing better than to be made fun of, 
provoked and insulted’, because it is ‘the moment when the public finally begins to 
think’. So by lying to the readers in this way, ‘they all go home with a contented 
feeling that self-knowledge is the first step towards reforming oneself’ (AA: 66-67). 
This represents a useful provocation of personal truth and a consequent proposing of 
authenticity through choice, an incitement not to simply take on pre-packaged values 
as so flagrantly offered by traditional narratives. Additionally, while Sheppard 
highlights the undermining of authority as a purpose of this type of venture, we 
might suggest that beyond this Dada was asserting its own authority, by levelling 
notions of reliability in this way. As a self-reflexive product thereof, we may also 
consider this an effort to undermine authority, level authority, and undermine itself 
as authority: a compound and perpetually replicating process that we began to 
explore in Chapter Four’s concepts of authority and deviance. 
We have seen that the invention of the word Dada was openly ambiguous. 
However, Richter writes that ‘The word Dada first appeared in print at the Cabaret 
Voltaire on 15th June 1916; this is a fact’ (AA: 32; my emphasis). Richter’s use of the 
word ‘fact’ is instructive because of its reliance upon the authenticity lent to a 
statement through its occurrence in print or in the press. We also know that the word 
dada (in its general, lower case sense) did not literally appear in print for the first 
time under the circumstances that Richter presents, but it may have done in the 
specific context of the little magazine and/or the movement. If Dada deliberately 
undercuts the authority of the press, this statement about its own press cements the 
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movement’s parodic relationship with historicity. Additionally, the highlighting of 
their own press as ‘to be questioned’ underlines Dada’s desire to not be taken as an 
authority, especially as it was those in traditional positions of authority who 
(mis)used this power to wage war. We will discuss toward the end of this chapter 
how this mistrust of (self-) authority interacts with the creation of a ‘system’ of 
morality. 
Memoirs of a Dada Drummer is a collection of essays by Huelsenbeck, written 
after the Dada period. Huelsenbeck’s account presents an aggressive attempt to 
reassert his role in Dada, despite his denial of any affiliation when he moved to the 
United States. This latter was not necessarily through any malice on his part; rather, 
affiliation with Dada was varyingly persecutable, from threats against livelihood to 
threats against life. Unlike Tzara, who changed his name shortly before Dada and 
seemingly to embrace his new life in Zurich, Huelsenbeck changed his name, to 
Charles R. Hulbeck, on leaving Europe, ‘[m]otivated by a desire to relinquish Dada 
completely’ (Kleinschmidt in Huelsenbeck 1974: xxiii). However, he was one of the 
only Dadas to claim that Dada never died (‘it has never grown old and even today, 
after fifty years, it shows no symptoms of old age or senility’ (Huelsenbeck 1974: 
136)). It is (perhaps deliberately) difficult to know what Huelsenbeck means by this, 
and we may conclude that he simply implies that the spirit of Dada  never died, and 
never will. 
Huelsenbeck’s account differs from Richter’s in that although Richter’s is told 
from a single viewpoint (Richter being the sole author), Huelsenbeck’s account rarely 
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acknowledges the presence of other opinions. In this sense his account is a personal 
memoir, an autobiography, rather than a memoir or biography of Dada. Memoirs 
crosses several types of text through this style: like Richter, Huelsenbeck comments 
on the movement from outside of it (temporally speaking) but, like Ball, his is an 
account of personal experience of the events. A third element, present in differing 
levels across these three accounts, is the (arguably failed) effort towards a distanced 
analysis, as evident in Huelsenbeck’s essay ‘The Case of Dada’ and the presence of 
several accounts on Dada adherents including Tzara and Richter. 
The difference in ways in which Richter and Huelsenbeck tell the stories of 
Dada can be compared again to a Stoppard play: Artist Descending a Staircase (1972). 
The play describes the demise of an artist from the point of view of his various peers, 
and at whose hands he possibly came to his unfortunate end. Artist Descending, while 
not directly incorporating Dada or its adherents,109 alludes to Duchamp not only 
through the play’s title, but also through his characters Martello and Beauchamp, 
whose phonetic similarity cannot be accidental.110 Not only have Stoppard’s 
characters changed their names over time, but they also adapt their memory of 
events for their personal gain. Artist Descending is divided into eleven scenes, 
structured around dates and events to form a precise symmetry. The chronology 
                                                 
109 It might additionally be argued that Artist Descending hints at Neo-Dada through experimental 
(tape) music: over the course of the play, Beauchamp records, overwrites and interprets the sounds of 
the apartment, creating a creative multiple exposure in the style of both experimental music and 
Dada’s relationship with History. The product is distorted and multiple, simultaneously linear and 
circular, but all versions are still present. 
110 A perhaps unintended Dada parallel is also present as the plot centres around the death of Donner, 
who meets his demise falling down the stairs in an attempt to catch a fly. We saw in Chapter One that 
an important episode at the Cabaret Voltaire involved a dance named ‘Fliegenfangen’ [Flycatching]. 
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begins in 1972, moves through 1922 and 1920 to a centre of 1914, and then 
systematically reverses back to 1972. This structuring gives a feel of a deliberate 
manipulation of memory: as such, none of the four separate time periods is told with 
any greater clarity than others. The older times are not told as memories, either, but 
in situ. Though not as symmetrical, Huelsenbeck’s collection flits between times in a 
similar way as Artist Descending. Both texts present their ‘story’ (taking 
Huelsenbeck’s collection as a whole) in medias res, a method that we saw earlier as 
forming a fundamental part of Dada’s means of parodying history. Additionally 
these means of storytelling question the authenticity of reproduction in a similar way 
to that of Neo-Dada explored in Chapter Four. Both stories depend upon their 
originals in a way that suggests inauthentic reproduction, yet both produce 
something new and as such authentic as a product in its own right. 
Diaries and Journals: Documenting the Self 
Je pense que c’est le danger si l’on tient un journal: on s’exagère tout, on est aux aguets, on force 
continuellement la vérité. 
(N: 13) 
Moving on from Richter’s and Huelsenbeck’s texts as Dada ‘memoirs’, we 
might consider Ball’s Flight out of Time: a Dada Diary as a subtly different medium for 
the documenting of the self. Although all three texts (Ball’s, Richter’s and 
Huelsenbeck’s) were adapted for publication, only Ball’s was written at the time of 
Dada,111 in the form of a journal. We saw that Richter’s first ‘rule’ for the validity of 
accounts not only stressed the high status of published documents of the movement, 
                                                 
111 Ball completed the editing of his diary for publication shortly before his death in 1927 (the diary 
itself finishes in 1921). The work was first published in German in 1927, an edition was published in 
1947, and the English language edition was published in 1974. 
256 
 
but also included the diary as an important means of recording the period as it 
happened. In this respect it is worthwhile to consider the role of fiction that is written 
in this way. Sartre’s La Nausée is particularly instructive to analyse because the novel 
highlights the importance of diaries or accounts in a diary style,112 as well as the 
compound factor of the protagonist’s project of documenting a historical figure 
(something he gives up when his nausea reaches its peak).  
Cohn comments that La Nausée’s journal form is doubly significant: 
first, by eliminating connectives or "verbal" flow, Sartre obtains for his fragments a total 
simultaneity much like that of poetry since, say, Rimbaud.113 The flow, being displaced from 
"architectural verbs," now occurs through key images linked in a series which begins with the 
half-muddy, half-dry shingle and continues through the viscous oak tree and the seashore city's 
"gummy" Museum. Secondly, the journal-form allows for the interpenetration of past and 
present, of action and comment, such as we see in Proust. (1948: 63) 
Throughout the novel the protagonist, Antoine Roquentin, develops an increased 
awareness of himself through the flow of images created by the diary. The flow is 
neither linear nor truth-based, yet enables Roquentin to construct his world in 
fragments and through active interpretation. By constantly narrating the present he 
is able to decipher his nausea and come to terms with his experiences, in a way that 
we saw in Sartre’s ideas on temporality and the importance of doubt. This is similar 
to the way in which Ball wrote in order to make sense of his environment; doubt is 
found throughout the diary in his constant questioning of his activities (and 
                                                 
112 La Nausée is also useful in terms of philosophical content in a work of fiction: as such it provides a 
readily accessible summary of many of Sartre’s themes and concepts expressed considerably more 
verbosely in L’Être et le néant. 
113 To take this further than Rimbaud, we might compare Sartre’s flow of fragments to the Dada 
simultaneous poems, as we saw in Chapter One, whose lines intermingle to the extent that no single 
line takes precedence over others and we are forced to hear the mélange in its incomprehensible 
entirety. 
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including the fact that he ‘left’ and returned to Dada several times). It is clear that the 
diary form is valued in Dada as well as in Existentialism: Arp wrote of Ball’s diary 
that ‘in this book stand the most significant words that have thus far been written 
about Dada’ ([1949] in Motherwell ed. 1989: 293). 
The way in which both Ball and Roquentin narrate the events of Dada and the 
novel respectively (and fundamentally, their own lives) occasionally falls into the 
cyclical patterns presented by Carr’s narration in Travesties. This latter text becomes 
like a diary with the repetition of ‘Yes, sir. I have put the newspapers and telegrams 
on the sideboard, sir’, which becomes a common precursor to temporal slips and 
recaps.114 Though Carr’s stories are subject to his failing memory, they maintain their 
likeness with Roquentin’s through their aspect of correction through re-telling. On 
occasion Roquentin admits to having not told the truth – ‘du moins pas toute la 
vérité’ (N: 24; my emphasis). He appears fascinated by his ‘lie’ (omission) and 
wonders why he would deceive himself in this way. This self-deception is something 
that he revisits later, stating that ‘[j]e viens d’apprendre, brusquement, sans raison 
apparente, que je me suis menti pendant dix ans’ (N: 61).  
How can we interpret this in relation to the need to ‘force[r] continuellement la 
vérité’? We do not necessarily need to consider Roquentin’s worry about his self-
deception a time-span to be written off: rather, we can explicate it as a sudden 
                                                 
114 Ribemont-Dessaignes comments that ‘[s]i vous vous entêtez à simuler le voyage à l’envers comme 
si l’irréversibilité du temps n’était pas un principe inexorable, c’est-à-dire s’il vous plaît de faire votre 
œuvre d’historien, vous ne pouvez espérer obtenir qu’une suite de coupes de temps, semblables à des 
coupes histologiques pour examen microscopique’ (1958: 85). We saw a similar use of ‘coupes de 
temps’ in Chapter Two. 
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awareness of the perception of self and the authenticity of an engaged means of 
thought. As Ball writes, ‘I read Rimbaud differently today from a year ago’ (FT: 94): it 
is not surprising that our relation of self to world would be fluid and variable, not to 
mention subject to development. The diary form notably encourages this constant 
rethinking of the truth and its meaning, and the way it may change over time. How 
do remembering, forgetting, and documentation relate to our definitions of truth? 
Roquentin expresses the concern that he does not even exist, and this is because he 
has little relation to public record, and thus little impact on society. He writes, ‘Je 
n’étais pas un grand-père, ni un père, ni même un mari. Je ne votais pas, c’était à 
peine si je payais quelques impôts’ (N: 127). Perhaps it is his lack of influence on 
others that compels him to record himself for posterity. 
The way that Roquentin considers himself outside of time through his familial 
detachment can be compared and contrasted with Cohn’s comments on the 
‘interpenetration of past and present’, as well as Sartre’s thoughts on our relationship 
with the position of the self in time that we saw earlier in the chapter (cf. EN: 191-92). 
Roquentin sees himself as disconnected because of his lack of impact on his 
environment, but his severance also allows him to see more clearly his isolated self-
development. Valerie Raoul links the diary to a way in which to monitor and/or 
change the way time passes, in that  
the diary provides […] a trace, something that continues into the future. The role of the 
narrator-actor as potential reader is dependent on the survival of the written record. It is 
Roquentin's critical comments on rereading his entries […] that convey the sense of a changing 
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and unseizable existence, as much as his reflections on the difference between "then" and 
"now"’. (1983: 705)115 
A particularly poignant moment in relation to the inevitable passing of time is in 
Ball’s diary when he notes: ‘I scribble and look down at the carpenter who is busy 
making coffins in the yard’ (FT: 66). Ball’s comment manages to simultaneously 
remind the reader of the daily horror of mass slaughter and the existentially 
troubling notion of the unusually heightened awareness of one’s own mortality. 
Richter described Ball in terms of his philosophical position in a way that 
furthers this implication of an underlying Existentialist way of thinking: 
There can be no doubt of Ball’s unswerving search for a meaning which he could set up against 
the absurd meaninglessness of the age in which he lived. He was an idealist and a sceptic, 
whose belief in life had not been destroyed by the deep scepticism with which he regarded the 
world around him. (AA: 13; original emphasis) 
Richter’s elucidation of Ball’s world view presents an individual confronting the 
Absurd, yet maintaining an optimistic outlook despite professed scepticism. This is 
an attitude that Camus promotes through his rebel, recommending ‘le maintien de 
cette confrontation désespérée entre l’interrogation humaine et le silence du monde’ 
(HR: 18). 
The editing process of diaries, particularly in its additive form, performs a 
constant redefinition of truth, leading us to definitions of identity and role of the 
diary as something to be (re)read. Raoul considers this in relation to temporality, as 
well as the developing relationship between writer, journal and reader: 
                                                 
115 This ambiguous relationship with time and space is supported by Metz’s theory of the ‘here and 
then’ that we saw in Chapter Two. 
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The process that aims at defining the self as it recedes into the past paradoxically contributes to 
the emergence of a new present self-as-writer and posits the future role of the self-as-reader. 
The journal, meanwhile, acquires an autonomous existence as a written text. (1983: 706) 
This relationship is additionally highlighted by the Autodidact, who asks Roquentin 
at one point, ‘N’écrit-on pas toujours pour être lu?’ (N: 169). This question, along 
with Raoul’s discussion, moves the authority and ownership of words from the 
writer to the reader. We may wonder if the Autodidact’s question is still applicable if 
this reader is only the author, as the notion of re-reading will change the course of 
personal narrative. Elderfield writes that Ball edited his work and yet it still reads as 
a highly personal account: ‘Strangely, it does not read like a public document at all, 
despite Ball’s considerable revisions to make it so; it is more like a private confession 
intended to give meaning to his earlier periods of aesthetic and political rebellion’ (in 
FT: xiv).  
Tzara’s ‘Zurich Chronicle’ is much shorter and less detailed than Ball’s, was 
originally published in Huelsenbeck’s Dada Almanach and only later as an 
independent text, and seems to simply document events as they happened. This is 
demonstrated particularly strongly by Motherwell’s edition of the text, which cuts 
out almost all typographic and visual interest, showing not only the highly varying 
representation of Dada texts but also a normalisation of deviance as Dada becomes 
increasingly academicised. However, the version that appears in Huelsenbeck’s Dada 
Almanach conveys a sense of excitement through typography that is then 
complemented every so often by Tzara’s personal reactions to these happenings, and 
it is instructive to analyse both the content and the events to which they relate.  
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This varying detail is a characteristic of La Nausée, and is particularly noticeable 
when Roquentin begins his entry with ‘rien de nouveau’ (for example N: 20), yet goes 
on to describe his day in several pages’ worth of detail. While Tzara tends not to 
elaborate on the entries that imply such ‘rien de nouveau’ dates, certain small 
linguistic fragments are repeated in a relatively insistent manner: for instance, he 
maintains a striking obsession with red lamps across the chronicle. This suggests a 
sensitivity to and awareness of their effects and meaning. Richter describes the 
location of the Cabaret Voltaire (the Niederdorf district) as a ‘slightly disreputable 
quarter of the highly reputable town of Zurich’ (AA: 13). Niederdorf is a former 
Zurich red light district, something of which the Dadas would likely have been 
keenly aware, particularly with a heavy wartime police presence. An example of 
Tzara’s preoccupation is noted in the entry dated February 1916: ‘In the darkest of 
streets in the shadow of architectural ribs, where you will find discreet detectives 
amid red street lamps’ (ZC: 15). This must have given a particularly ominous feel in 
the Niederdorf quarter’s (location of the Cabaret Voltaire) narrow medieval streets 
lined with tall buildings. 
Tzara’s entry dated June 1916 contains a passage summarising the Cabaret: 
The Cabaret lasted 6 months, every night we thrust the triton of the grotesque of the god of the 
beautiful into each and every spectator, and the wind was not gentle – the consciousness of so 
many was shaken – tumult and solar avalanche – vitality and the silent corner close to wisdom 
or folly – who can define its frontiers? – the young girls slowly departed and bitterness laid its 
nest in the belly of the family-man. A word was born no one knows how DADADADA we 
took an oath of friendship on the new transmutation that signifies nothing, and was the most 
formidable protest, the most intense armed affirmation of salvation liberty blasphemy mass 
combat speed prayer tranquillity private guerrilla negation and chocolate of the desperate. (ZC: 
18; original formatting) 
262 
 
The ferocious energy with which this is described implies that this entry is 
significant, and aspects of its vocabulary can be found across the rest of the chronicle. 
There is a particularly strong focus on references to explosions and harsh weather, 
for example ‘the subtle invention of the explosive wind’ and ‘the explosions of 
elective imbecility’ (ZC: 24; 25). The June 1916 entry and its ripples across the diary 
are reminiscent of Roquentin’s bouts of nausea, and its effects on his daily existence. 
Roquentin experiences the waves of nausea as explosions of his senses, often 
combined with the humidity of Bouville and an unusual sensitivity to the weather. A 
heightened sensitivity to colour is integral to both accounts, perhaps unsurprising for 
the artist, who states in his May 1919 entry: ‘Inaugurate different colours for the joy 
of transchromatic disequilibrium and the portable circus velodrome of camouflaged 
sensations’ (ZC: 34). Unlike Tzara, however, who revels in this disruption of 
chromatic normalcy, Roquentin’s sensitivity to colour is disquieting when he does 
not yet understand his nausea. He reports an episode of discomfort that centres on 
the changing colour of a pair of purple braces: 
Les bretelles se voient à peine sur la chemise bleue, elles sont tout effacées, enfouies dans le 
bleu, mais c’est dans la fausse humilité: en fait, elles ne se laissent pas oublier, elles m’agacent 
par leur entêtement de moutons, comme si, parties pour devenir violettes, elles s’étaient 
arrêtées en route sans abandonner leurs prétentions. (N: 37-38) 
The nature of these episodes creates an ambiguity and alienation that, while initially 
disquieting, promotes an increased realisation of the subjectivity of perception. 
Just as Roquentin’s episodes of nausea get more frequent and all-pervading due 
to his increasing self-awareness, Tzara’s diary entries get more clustered and intense 
as the diary goes on, centring around important events. The entries of early 1916 are 
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longer and detailed, documenting the early days of the Cabaret Voltaire, but then a 
shorter series pile up from September and especially in the early months of 1917, 
when Dada was expanding throughout Zurich. The entries then mirror the earlier 
ones in size, expanding but getting less frequent through 1918 and 1919. As the diary 
progresses Tzara also begins to reference repetition and newness (or lack thereof), a 
concern that would plague Dada as its audience began to enjoy and not heckle their 
events. He notes that ‘[t]he public appetite for the mixture of instinctive recreation 
and ferocious bamboula which we succeeded in presenting forced us to give on | 
May 19 [1917]| REPETITION OF THE OLD ART AND NEW ART EVENING’ (ZC: 
26; original formatting). In essence this occurrence represents a doubled repetition, in 
that the night itself is already centred around ‘the old and new’ and the fact of 
repeating the night as a whole. We have seen that repetition interrogates the notions 
of identicality and, through it, authenticity. It is therefore logical that repetition of 
such events should be undesirable. We might even wonder if this is the reason for 
which Tzara brought an end to Dada: a movement that had been born out of a desire 
for individual freedom and choice had stagnated into a recipe. In short, it was losing 
its authenticity. 
Drawing together our analysis of the diary form, through Ball, Tzara and Sartre 
(Roquentin), we can posit that texts in this style create and maintain a unique and 
flexible relationship with time and truth. Joseph Halpern notes that 
Sartre's novels - Nausea, in particular - are more than illustrated syllogisms; their metonymic 
unity opens onto the realm of similarity and repetition, metaphor and synchrony. The strength 
of Sartre's novels lies in the way they convey lived experience, but lived experience resists 
intelligibility. (Halpern 1979: 71) 
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This emphasis on similarity and repetition is certainly evident in Tzara’s chronicle. 
Ball’s text often draws upon descriptive metaphor for his synthesis of his 
environment and events. And all three accounts show a resistance to intelligibility 
that highlights the flawed or subjective nature of the process of historicisation. Ball’s 
diary is particularly instructive to consider because it documents the earliest days of 
Dada from a first-hand point of view. Additionally as the co-founder (with Emmy 
Hennings) of the Cabaret Voltaire, his account dates exactly to Dada’s beginnings (if 
we are to agree on Zurich as its birthplace and starting point). Tzara’s account, 
though shorter, is informative in highlighting moments of particular importance, and 
an idea of Dada (or at least Tzara’s) values starts to come through. We have seen that 
Ball reported the purpose of the movement and its review as rejecting nationalism 
and labels: we will now identify which aspects the Dadas promoted as representing 
such a heterogeneous movement, or a nascent Dada philosophy. 
Manifestos, Morals and Mindsets 
Don’t you see my dear Tristan you are simply asking me to accept that the word Art means whatever 
you wish it to mean; but I do not accept it. 
- Carr 
Why not? You do exactly the same thing with words like patriotism, duty, love, freedom, king and 
country… 
- Tzara 
(in T: 21) 
Dada is the desire for a new morality. 
(Huelsenbeck 1974: 141) 
Through an assessment of Dada accounts and diaries, as well as interaction 
with the written word in previous chapters, we have shown that Dada’s relationship 
with published material shows a desire to be taken at its word, even if that word is 
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deliberately fabricated. Despite evidence of such fabrication, however, examples of 
(anti-)morality come through such bold statements, especially in the movement’s 
own journals. Dada’s own little press essentially represents the movement’s public 
diary, or journal: an indelible and pseudo-live commentary on the movement’s 
activities and thoughts. As demonstrated by the Stoppard quotations above, Dada 
considered words manipulable, and by extension that meaning can be manipulated 
in a similar way. As such, the construction of tenets and morals is just as subjective as 
anything else. Perhaps the most direct proclamation of morals and values is in the 
manifestos, an active declaration of the Dada self. We will look at two of these 
manifestos: Tzara’s infamous ‘Manifeste Dada 1918’ and Picabia’s 1920 ‘Dada 
Philosophe’. Tzara’s manifesto was published in the eponymous Dada review Dada 
(D3), and Picabia’s in Littérature (L13).  
Early in his manifesto, Tzara engages in a critique of objectivity in the realm of 
aesthetics: ‘Une œuvre d’art n’est jamais belle, par decret [sic], objectivement, pour 
tous. La critique est donc inutile, elle n’existe que subjectivement, pour chacun, et 
sans le moindre caractère de généralité’ (D3: 1). This is furthermore expressed in his 
desire not to tell others how to act: ‘je n’ai pas le droit d’entraîner d’autres dans mon 
fleuve, je n’oblige personne à me suivre et tout le monde fait son art à sa façon’ 
(ibid.). We have seen that Sartre believes that we choose in a way in which we believe 
would be universally applicable, but it would still remain inauthentic to impose our 
own way of thinking on others. This is a sentiment that is foregrounded in Tzara’s 
statement that ‘[c]eux qui appartiennent à nous gardent leur liberté’ (ibid). Through 
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this Tzara directly confronts the idea of philosophy, defying critics who claim that 
Dada did not engage with it: 
La philosophie est la question: de quel côté commencer à regarder la vie, dieu, l’idée, ou les 
autres apparitions. Tout ce qu’on regarde est faux. Je ne crois pas plus important le résultat 
relatif, que le choix entre gâteaux et cerises après dîner. (ibid.: 2) 
Tzara’s thoughts show immediate alignment with Existentialist notions of the 
authenticity of personal choice: whether one chooses cake or cherries is not as 
important as the act of choosing for oneself. As he states, ‘[i]l n’y a pas de dernière 
Vérité’ (ibid.). Through his theorising both that everything is false, and that there is 
no real truth, Tzara pre-empts Merleau-Ponty’s statement that we saw at the 
beginning of this chapter ‘tout serait vérité dans la conscience’ (PP: 437). 
We have seen that Existentialism is often (falsely) accused of indifference (‘On 
lui a d’abord reproché d’inviter les gens à demeurer dans un quiétisme du désespoir’ 
(EH: 21)): Tzara offers a novel alternative to indifference, and in doing so manages to 
refute a resulting denial of the choices of others: ‘Je nomme jem’enfoutisme [sic] l’état 
d’une vie où chacun garde ses propres conditions, en sachant toutefois respecter les 
autres individualités, sinon se défendre’ (D3: 2). He later extends choice to the 
creation and subjectivity of morality: 
La morale a determiné la charité et la pitié, deux boules de suif116 qui ont poussé comme des 
éléphants, des planètes et qu’on nomme bonnes. Elles n’ont rien de la bonté. La bonté est lucide, 
claire et décidé, impitoyable envers le compromis et la politique. La moralité est l’infusion du 
chocolat dans les veines de tous les hommes. Cette tâche n’est pas ordonnée par une force 
surnaturelle, mais par le trust des marchands d’idées et accapareurs universitaires. (ibid: 3) 
                                                 
116 Reference can be made here to Maupassant’s 1880 Boule de Suif, in which strength and flexibility of 
morals are interrogated under external pressure, as well as the manipulation of others for the 
perceived ‘greater good’. 
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By rejecting bygone morals created by another (‘Nous ne reconnaissons aucune 
théorie. Nous avons assez des académies cubistes et futuristes: laboratoires d’idées 
formelles’ (D3: 1)), Dada takes responsibility for its own ethical position, as 
evidenced in Chapter Three’s analysis of the rejection of common judgement values. 
Notably, Stoppard’s Tzara rejects the use of former ideas by claiming that ‘causality is 
no longer fashionable owing to the war’ (in T: 19). If ideas are not linked by causality, 
choice is foregrounded, in that it does not matter what choice is made, only that it is 
on one’s own grounds. We are reminded here of (the real) Tzara’s claim that ‘[o]nly 
contrast links us to the past’ (in Jakobson 1987: 39). Additionally, both of these 
quotations can be linked to Beauvoir’s statement that ‘[o]n n’aime pas le passé dans 
sa vérité vivante si on s’obstine à en maintenir les formes figées et momifiées’ (MA: 
118). 
Sartre’s Roquentin depicts a similar rejection of common values through a 
group of women looking at a statue that represents a generic forefather. He states 
derisively that: 
Au service de leurs petites idées étroites et solides il a mis son autorité et l’immense érudition 
puisée dans les in-folio que sa lourde main écrase. Les dames en noir se sentent soulagées, elles 
peuvent vaquer tranquillement aux soins du ménage, promener leur chien: les saintes idées, les 
bonnes idées qu’elles tiennent de leurs pères, elles n’ont plus la responsabilité de les défendre; 
un homme de bronze s’en fait le gardien. (N: 49) 
These women are not only exempt from creating their own ideals, but they also do 
not have to even think about or take responsibility for them, as they are defended by 
a form of authority that precedes them. Additionally the non-identity of the statue 
means that these individuals do not care what form authority takes as long as they 
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have faith in it as an ideal. This goes against both Dada and Existentialist ethics 
whereby everything, particularly systems, is questioned in order to believe in (yet 
not be defined by) ideals that stem from personal, specific choice. 
Picabia’s ‘Dada Philosophe’ engages with what we might call a Dadaism or 
Dada theory through its title. Its opening section reflects Ball’s statement that we 
cited at the beginning of the chapter, that of the supranational aims of Dada and the 
Cabaret Voltaire (both place and review). The manifesto performs a levelling of 
characteristics, as well as taking on a plethora itself, claiming that Dada 
simultaneously has aspects of multiple nationalities, and leading to a hybrid identity 
that we saw through fragmentation and assemblage in Chapter One. By claiming to 
be so many nationalities, Picabia foregrounds the theory that the idea of nationality is 
simply a construct, especially since the aspects he identifies with particular nations 
are often based in ridicule.  
For example, he claims that ‘DADA a le cul en porcelaine, à l’aspect français’ 
(L13: 5). We may wonder whether this reference to porcelain represents a fragile 
purity as well as standard of quality. However, this pure cleanliness, especially when 
related to toilet humour, may rather be incorporated into a Duchampian pun 
through his porcelain Fountain, parodying the covering up of less desirable qualities. 
I refer here to the infamous L.H.O.O.Q., where we could replace the implicit ‘chaud’ 
with a whitewashing metaphor to create ‘elle [la France?] a [de la] chaux au cul’. 
Listing a wide variety of cultural references of which Dada ‘dreams’, the manifesto 
introduces an inherent ambiguity created by this multifaceted identity: ‘Changeant et 
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nerveux, DADA est un hamac qui berce un doux balancement’ (L13: 5). Not only 
does this changeability depend upon a balance of contradiction supported by 
Beauvoirian ambiguity, but Picabia then goes on to claim that ‘nous ignorons le 
chemin qu’il faut choisir’ (ibid.): we have seen that in Sartrean thought, refraining 
from (here denying knowledge of?) being influenced by that which one should do is 
preferred as a means to forming personal choices uninfluenced by external pressures. 
These two manifestos foreground a constant balance of rejection of narratives 
and acceptance of egalitarian principles, leading to a general philosophy of choice 
and subjectivity, authenticity through ambiguity. Weyembergh shows us that the 
tension between acceptance and refusal through revolt leads to truth(s), in that ‘les 
vérités existentielles les plus profondes […] ne s’éprouvent que dans la contradiction, 
ce que montre la révolte elle-même avec son accent sur le oui et le non’ (in Guérin ed.: 
918; my emphasis). This definition reminds us of Tzara‘s characterisation of Dada as 
‘le point où le oui et le non et tous les contraires se rencontrent’ (in Merz 7: 70; 
original emphasis/formatting), and the statement in his ‘Manifeste Dada 1918’ that 
‘[j]’écris ce manifeste pour montrer qu’on peut faire les actions opposées ensemble, 
dans une seule fraîche respiration’ (in D3: 1).  
Tzara’s desire for freshness through creativity is also expressed by Roquentin, 
who states that ‘J’écris pour tirer au clair certaines circonstances. […] Il faut écrire au 
courant de la plume; sans chercher les mots’ and that ‘J’ai besoin de me nettoyer avec 
des pensées abstraites, transparentes comme de l’eau’ (N: 87).  While contradiction 
and clarity may initially be unhappily combined, we can instead consider both types 
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of writing active desires to interrogate thought and versions of the truth, especially 
through spontaneity (‘sans chercher les mots’). We have seen that Huelsenbeck 
explains the embracing of rejection by claiming that ‘[t]he fact that the Dadaists said 
no was less important than the manner in which they said it’ (cf. DE: 144). This 
cements our notion that it is the telling that is key, rather than the certainty of the 
content portrayed. 
Conclusion 
Unrelieved truthfulness can give a young girl a reputation for insincerity. 
(Carr in T: 25) 
To do it is nothing, to be said to have done it is everything. 
(Wilde in Stoppard’s The Invention of Love, cited in Nadel 2008: 481) 
When Tzara was asked for permission to use the name Dada on the avant-garde 
periodical New York Dada, he was compelled to respond that the very idea of the 
request was absurd: ‘You ask permission to name your periodical Dada. But Dada 
belongs to everybody’ (in Ades ed. 2006: 159). However, as Ades elucidates, 
‘[w]hether they were seriously interested in forming an alliance with Tzara’s 
movement or were operating an ironic game of testing the very idea of ownership 
that the notion of “authorisation” introduces is impossible to say’ (in ibid.: 146). This 
rejection of both authorisation and authority is also present in Dada’s response to the 
reactions of others. For example, Richter related his thoughts on Dada scholarship: 
If I am to believe the accounts which appear in certain books about this period, we founded an 
association of revolutionary artists, or something similar. I have no recollection of this at all, 
although Janco has confirmed that we signed manifestos and pamphlets, and Georges Hugnet 
(who admittedly gets his information at second hand) says that Tzara received one of these 
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manifestos from me, scored through it with red pencil, and refused to publish it in Der Zeltweg. I 
regard this as doubtful. Tzara was no red-pencil dictator. (AA: 80; my emphases)117 
The constant replacement or addition (or removal, in Richter’s case above) of truths 
to accounts creates an impression of chaos, one which loops back on itself in its 
perpetual redefinition. As Huelsenbeck describes, ‘Dada is the chaos out of which a 
thousand orders arise which in turn entangle to form the chaos of Dada’ (in 
Sheppard 2000: 195).118  
We can link notions of truth to subjectivity of the perception and interpretation 
of reality, and as C. D. Innes states on Travesties, ‘representing reality […] depends on 
the artist’s capacity to see what reality is. And Stoppard underlines that Joyce is 
almost blind, needing heavy spectacles for his astigmatism, that Tzara sports a 
monocle, and that Carr’s memory is particularly unreliable’ (2006: 228).119 
Furthermore, Sheppard argues that ‘not only does reality have no inherent structure, 
there are also no a priori categories of the understanding to shape our experience of 
that (disordered) reality in a predetermined manner’ (2000: 108). Ball writes that 
‘perhaps it is necessary to have resolutely, forcibly produced chaos and thus a 
complete withdrawal of faith before an entirely new edifice can be built up on a 
changed basis of belief’ (FT: 60). We can therefore consider that the embracing of 
chaos in general, and contradiction in particular, is mutually dependent on an 
assertion of absolute freedom through personal choice unfettered by external 
                                                 
117 It is instructive that Tzara is not denied having refused something, just that he refused to red-pencil 
it. This underlines the difference between rejection of the undesirable, and imposition of external 
morals.  
118 Although this text comes from the Dada Almanach, I have cited from Sheppard out of preference for 
his translation of this particular Huelsenbeck quotation. 
119 Additionally, in Artist Descending, Sophie is blind. 
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pressures. As Ball claimed, ‘[p]erfect skepticism makes perfect freedom possible’ (FT: 
59), and Tzara that ‘[c]omment veut-on ordonner le chaos qui constitue cette infinie 
informe variation: l’homme?’ (in D3: 1). 
The balance of chaos and order within reality has a strong link to the imaginary, 
as we saw in Chapter Two’s films and the effects of pareidolia. Nadel states that 
‘[i]magination’s link to the truth makes acceptable the fissures and disruptions found 
in Travesties’ (2008: 481). Imagination, applied to an account, renders the banal 
memorable and, in extension, 
pour que l’événement le plus banal devienne une aventure, il faut et il suffit qu’on se mette à le 
raconter. C’est ce qui dupe les gens: un homme, c’est toujours un conteur d’histoires, il vit 
entouré de ses histoires et des histoires d’autrui, il voit tout ce que lui arrive à travers elles; et il 
cherche à vivre sa vie comme s’il la racontait. (N: 64; original emphasis) 
The various Dada accounts of the movement certainly demonstrate that the telling 
(and re-telling) of stories is important to its history as a series of improvised, 
spontaneous adventures. The emphasis on imagination reminds us of the need to 
question accounts, to maintain intellectual curiosity at all times. Carole Haynes-
Curtis states that ‘for Sartre whether something is true or not is secondary to the 
attitude we take towards it’ (1988: 270). This is supported by Beauvoir’s ideas on 
‘internal truth’, in that ‘la valeur d’un acte n’est pas dans sa conformité à un modèle 
extérieur, mais dans sa vérité intérieure’ (MA: 171; original emphasis). Additionally 
Roquentin’s views can be used to describe Dada’s own self-historicising nature, as 
well as its view of ‘History’ as contingent, arbitrary, and partial. We can link this 
view of history/ies with Sartre’s views on temporality as seen in Chapter Two, 
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especially his statement on the non-existence of the past, present and future (EN: 
142). 
Beauvoir writes that ‘c’est parce que la condition de l’homme est ambiguë qu’à 
travers l’échec et le scandale il cherche à sauver son existence’, and furthermore that 
‘[l]’art, la science ne se constituent pas malgré l’échec, mais à travers lui’ (MA: 160; 
161; my emphasis). Dada’s artistic output is predominantly defined by an ethos of 
improvisation and spontaneity. Thus inevitable failure allowed for the development 
of expression, a constant redefinition of the movement’s sense of self, along with the 
fact that ‘most of the Dadaists were buoyed up by a robust, exuberant, and ironic 
sense of humor that we have learned to call carnivalesque and that enabled them […] 
to keep some sort of balance in a wildly fluctuating universe’ (Sheppard 2000: 87). 
Ball explained that ‘the special circumstances of these times […] do not allow real 
talent either to rest or mature and so put its capabilities to the test’ (FT: 67). The 
uncertainty consequently raised with the contemporary reader is not only part of 
Dada’s constant desire not to be fixed in a certain cultural memory, but also appears 
to embrace Beauvoir’s conclusions on ambiguity (cf. MA: 14). We might conclude, 
therefore, that Dada’s fluctuating relationship with reality, truth, deception and 
façade lends itself richly to explorations of authenticity through ambiguity. Dada, 
‘not a dogma or a school, but rather a constellation of individuals and free facets’ 
(Tzara in Ades ed. 2006: 44) allows the individual to strive for authenticity through 
spontaneity, ambiguity, and the embracing of multiple or hybrid identities. 
Alternatively, to re-conclude with Tzara’s thoughts on the ambiguity of truth, 
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On croit pouvoir expliquer rationnellement, par la pensée, ce qu’on écrit. Mais c’est très relatif. 
La pensée est une belle chose pour la philosophie mais elle est relative. […] La dialectique est 
une machine amusante qui nous conduit /d’une maniere [sic] banale/ aux opinions que nous 
aurions eu en tout cas. Croit-on, par le raffinement minutieux de la logique, avoir démontré la 
vérité et établi l’exactitude de ces opinions? Logique serrée par les sens est une maladie 
organique. Les philosophes aiment ajouter à cet element: Le pouvoir d’observer. Mais justement 
cette magnifique qualité de l’esprit est la preuve de son impuissance. On observe, on regarde 
d’un ou de plusieurs points de vue, on les choisit parmi les millions qui existent. L’expérience 
est aussi un résultat de l’hazard [sic] et des facultés individuelles. (in D3: 2; original formatting) 
Tzara foregrounds several fundamental elements of truth and rationality, which also 
strengthens our links with Existentialism. He shows that writing and thought are 
both subjective and situational, as well as holding the potential for dangerous 
manipulation. He repeatedly highlights the desire for final or singular truth as a 
‘disease’, primarily because it seeks to eradicate the individual, and the chance for 
personal choice or chance itself. 
This chapter has brought out the ethical, epistemic importance of the 
subjectivity of truth from a perspective of Dada. But as Innes demonstrates, the 
challenging of truth and reality initiated in part by Dada had long-lasting effects on 
the way we continue to perceive our environment: 
Artists operate on reality just as historians do on recorded fact; and in his plays about art, 
Stoppard deals specifically with the modernists: writers and painters who consciously set out to 
challenge accepted conventions of realism and whose take on representations of life was openly 
ideological – hence the “isms”: Cubism, surrealism, Dadaism. Revolutionary at the beginning of 
the last century, by now they have become part of the way we interpret our contemporary 
world. (2006: 230) 
Innes’s statement on Dada complements Chapter Four’s theory of the assimilation of 
the revolutionary into the routine. Through this and through our analysis of Dada’s 
stories we might say that, although many of Dada’s characteristics have been 
incorporated into our worldview, Dada operated on history, and even historiography, 
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through the scattering of its stories and the varying way in which the movement 
continues to be remembered. This chapter has begun to bring together thematics 
from the preceding four chapters, demonstrating elements of choice, alienation, 
responsibility and censorship in order to assess our final notion of truth from a wider 
perspective of the historical memory of Dada. The conclusion to this thesis will now 
perform a final synthesis of the way in which these key themes draw Dada and 
Existentialism philosophically close. 
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- CONCLUSION - 
‘ESSAYONS D’ASSUMER NOTRE FONDAMENTALE AMBIGUÏTE’ 
[J]e ne me connais que dans mon inhérance au temps et au monde, c’est-à-dire dans l’ambiguïté 
(PP: 402) 
If Everything was Nothing and Nothing the beginning of Everything, Dada intended an artistic-
philosophical creation of an endlessly relational abundance and emptiness, instrumentalized 
ambivalently […] both into negative and positive spheres 
(Bergius 2003: 21) 
The term ‘authenticity’ is multifaceted, from its common definition right through to 
its complex Existentialist meaning. What is clear, through this plurality of sense, is 
that authenticity in any of its critical forms implies an affirmative individuality or 
genuineness.120 It can be argued, however, that this can only actually be achieved 
through an Existentialist definition of the term, whereby the authentic is not true or 
real by an external, generic reasoning, but stemming from the individual’s sense of 
value choice. Through its analysis of the concept across Dada and Existentialist art 
and philosophy, the thesis has drawn upon the term’s dependence on another - 
equally loaded - term, that of ‘ambiguity’. 
In initiating this dialogue between two discrete movements through our 
discussion of terms, we have highlighted not only philosophical commonality 
between Dada and Existentialism, but also their combined intersection with 
contemporary art and theory. This is particularly evident in the continued influence 
                                                 
120 Definitions of authenticity become problematic when we consider their application through 
corporate branding such as Coca Cola. There is a certain irony in the implication that only by 
consuming the most authentic brand can one be an authentic individual (thereby attaining 
authenticity through conformity). This is particularly demonstrated by the ‘individualisation’ of 
bottles by printing a selection of given names on them, allowing the individual to seek out their 
‘personal’ version of this generic product, and even then only if they are in possession of one of the 
available (most common) names. 
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of Dada art, as well as in the presentation of retrospectives of solo Dada artists, 
combinations of Dada artists, the co-presence of Dada and ‘non-Dada’ artists, and the 
conscious referencing of Dada as an artistic influence in contemporary works. A 
prominent example of this is illustrated by Duchamp, who continues to have 
retrospectives dedicated both to him as a solo artist and alongside others, as we have 
already seen in the Barbican’s 2013 retrospective, Dancing around the Bride, linking his 
art and thought to Cage, Rauschenberg, Cunningham and Johns.  
A relevant satellite to this exhibition was Geoffrey Farmer’s The Surgeon and the 
Photographer (2009-2013, Fig. 28), a set of 365 puppets constructed with fabric torsos 
and paper faces, limbs and accessories cut from books and magazines. While the 
work was not part of the main exhibition space, it claims as its inspiration ‘the 
collage and assemblage traditions of Hannah Höch and Robert Rauschenberg, the 
element of chance employed by John Cage and Merce Cunningham, and an animist 
perspective from Pacific Northwest Coast cultures’ (Barbican Online: n.p.). 
Additionally the work presented demonstrates an affinity with Chapter One’s 
exploration of the mask in general and the work of Taeuber in particular, despite her 
not being cited as an influence. Like Taeuber’s costumes, the 365 puppets embody an 
individuality that invites a constant sense of choice, an emphasis on becoming. It can 
be no accident that these puppets number 365: the artist implies quirkily that one can 
take on a new puppet, that is, a new combination of characteristics, for each day of 
the year, should one choose. And though a century separates Taeuber’s and Farmer’s 
works, the likeness is undeniable. 
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Both Dada and Existentialism are often reductively deemed products of their 
time, results of their wartime context and, as such, irrelevant to contemporary 
society. Evidently Dada's continued artistic influence refutes this, as demonstrable 
through its sustained strong presence in the art world. In a less visible (or visual) 
manner, Existentialism also continues to make itself heard, perhaps, as Richter 
explained, because we all live in an ‘existential vacuum’ (AA: 204), no doubt 
exacerbated by the omnipresence and rapid disposability of social media in the 
contemporary age of information. As we saw in the review of the literature of 
Existentialism, a renewed enthusiasm for this complex movement has led to a 
plethora of new texts on the subject, proving its constant relevance both within and 
outside of academia. Beyond their continuing influence as independent strands of 
thought, we have seen repeatedly through this thesis that Dada and Existentialism 
intersect in various philosophical, epistemic, ethical and aesthetic ways. 
Alongside artistic and philosophical influences explored throughout the thesis 
we also find a certain coexistence of Dada and Existentialist thinkers through a 
number of common causes. Tzara in particular crossed paths with Existentialist 
thinkers, including his post-Liberation contributions to L’Eternelle Revue, which was 
edited by Sartre. Other Dada-affiliated contributors to this journal included Paul 
Éluard, Aragon, and Picasso. Additionally, both Tzara and Beauvoir were involved 
in protesting against the then Prime Minister Michel Debré’s decision to refuse 
Algerian independence (Adler 2001: 233-34). Despite both movements often being 
labelled nihilistic, Existentialism quietist, and Dada (pejoratively) meaningless, 
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something that draws them together is the desire of individual members of each 
movement to support intellectuals in trials and political affairs.121 Tzara and Camus 
joined the French Communist Party within a short time of each other (over the period 
of 1934-1935), and were both involved in Resistance work. We can logically infer that 
the members of the two movements would continue to represent the ideologies of 
each, and it is instructive that these would overlap in such a way.  
The example of Breton, who broke away from Dada, and his later argument 
with Camus, is an indication that Surrealism, widely considered to be Dada’s logical 
continuation, was perhaps not as much of a straightforward continuation as initially 
thought, especially if we bear in mind its incompatibility with Existentialism. We 
have seen that Camus rejected Surrealism on the level of its obsession with suicide 
(and rhetorical inclination towards murder), and that Sartre rejected the movement 
on account of its work in the unconscious and dream states, disapproving of its 
detachment from the individual. This rejection is additionally justified in relation to 
Dada, if we consider its will to destroy narratives, including a reliance on logic (and 
even dreams have a certain logical structure, especially if we are to accept the ideas 
of Freud, as per the Surrealists). Surrealism’s attachment to the unconscious, 
especially in relation to psychoanalysis, replaced these destroyed narratives with 
others, each as ‘inauthentic’ as the next through their prescriptive nature. 
  
                                                 
121 Even the farcical nature of the Barrès trial is indicative of strong opinions on the conduct of others, 
particularly those who are lauded as society’s grands hommes. 
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Dada and Existentialism: a Compatible Comparison? 
It has been the aim in this thesis to explore and define the relationship between 
Dada and Existentialism, both through theory and through practice. The five chapter 
themes have elucidated a complex interaction between the movements, common 
themes, and the overriding notions of authenticity and ambiguity. A number of 
questions were raised at the beginning of this research, which underline the 
humanistic dilemma at stake for the artist-as-rebel, as well as providing a tripartite, 
overarching interrogation of the compatibility of the analytical joining together of 
Dada and Existentialism.  
Firstly, how can we use Dada and Existentialist ideas to not only critique but 
also to improve the human condition? We have seen, through explorations of various 
facets of identity, that Dada and Existentialist ideas direct us to a thoroughly 
individualist view on art and society that allows not only for authentic living, but 
that also has mutually beneficial implications between individuals. As best 
highlighted by Sartre, ‘on choisit en face des autres, et on se choisit en face des autres’ 
(EH: 67; my emphasis).  
Secondly, given the total revolutionary approach performed by the two 
movements, are they rebelling for rebellion’s sake, or do they genuinely believe they 
have the potential to instigate change? While a surface-level assessment of Dada may 
lead one to conclude that it was a movement without any real aims beyond ludic and 
puerile trouble-making, this deeper analysis has drawn upon a fundamental need to 
alter and ameliorate an imperfect world, not just at the level of ‘civilisation’ or 
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‘society’ but in respect of individual choices, acts and living. Pegrum notes that 
‘[d]espite the fact that the Dadaists attack universal philosophies and theories, in the 
final analysis they are looking for solutions or at least propositions for the whole of 
humanity’ (2000: 190). This furthermore corresponds with the Existentialist notion of 
belief in individual choice that is yet universally applicable. The use of Existentialist 
tenets alongside Dada has encouraged a more involved understanding of Dada’s 
furious destruction of traditional artistic and cultural values, as demonstrated 
particularly strongly in Camus’s account of rebellion through its dual cores of 
nihilism and affirmation (‘s’il [l’homme révolté] refuse il ne renonce pas’ (HR: 27)), 
and Sartre’s vision of rebellion through creativity and invention in philosophy and 
art (‘[c]e qu’il y a de commun entre l’art et la morale, c’est que, dans les deux cas, 
nous avons création et invention’ (EH: 66)).  
Thirdly, how do the ideals and aims of the nature of revolt in these two 
movements compare to the outcomes? It is in combining these two movements that 
we might posit the outcomes of their revolt as moving out of and expanding upon 
their aims, since we can trace the results of such revolt across the twentieth century 
and into the twenty-first century. We saw through Tzara’s and Picabia’s manifestos a 
desire to combine contradictions and revel in the outcome. This is an attitude that, 
rather than being nihilistic and aimless, can be confirmed through Existentialism’s 
desire for the virtues afforded by ambiguity, as well as a need to incorporate one’s 
failures into one’s (definition of) success. 
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Chapter One’s analysis of masks, the ‘look’ and choice in the work of Taeuber 
and a series of related works showed the importance of ambiguity in working 
towards an authentic self through fragmentation and assemblage. This was 
demonstrated through an emphasis on expansion, extension and externalisation of 
the self (something which can be seen in a different form in Chapter Four’s analysis 
of the unwanted other), and expanded upon in relation to Sartre’s notion of the look 
in terms of the subjecthood of the other and the objecthood of the self. This is 
reflected in terms of Dada’s rebellion as ‘other’ in art, as well as Taeuber’s own 
simultaneously central and peripheral role in the movement. The works assessed in 
this chapter additionally exemplify Dada’s foregrounding of the tension between 
destruction and creation, and the possibility of the coexistence of these two concepts. 
Taeuber’s emphatic fragmentation performs a constant rejection of mimetic and 
artistic ‘normalcy’, destroying traditional notions of identification, yet works with the 
remains of these concepts to create anew. This contradiction is not only embraced by 
Dada (cf. ‘le point où le oui et le non et toutes les contradictions se rencontrent’) but 
also in Camus’s depiction of the rebel, who rejects but does not renounce (HR: 27). 
Beyond the foregrounding of binaries, however, the works discussed moreover 
introduce, through this antagonistic coexistence of contradictions, the notion of a 
constant state of becoming or developing of the rebellion within the self.  
Chapter One drew upon Taeuber and her role in Dada in a way that has not 
previously been explored. The chapter sought to assess the artist beyond her 
traditional academic pigeonholing as ‘female Dada’. While it may have been 
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necessary to address the neglect of female members of the movement, as seen in the 
works of Hemus (2009) and Sawelson-Gorse (ed. 1999), the continued focus based 
solely on biological gender means she has been ‘celebrated and trivialized as a heroine 
of women artists’ work’ (Afuhs and Reble eds 2007: 35; my emphasis), as well as 
segregated from the rest of the movement. In comparing her works with other 
identity-based Dada art we can begin to underline her philosophical value as a 
prolific, interdisciplinary artist. 
Chapter Two’s assessment of alienation and reality in the films of Man Ray and 
a selection of other Dada films took this sense of alterity into the notion of distance 
from and a questioning of traditional notions of perception. These films, like the 
works studied in Chapter One, highlight and put pressure on boundaries and 
contradictions, emphasising a need for personal interpretation and value choice. 
Moving on from Chapter One’s stress on the simultaneous conflict and coexistence of 
the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’, Chapter Two assessed the interaction of a number of additional 
abstract opposites in Dada film, in order to evaluate the tendency to accept the 
inherence of patterns of perception. While Chapter One focused on the fragmentation 
of terms, Chapter Two began to bring out a presence of ambiguity, in both its regular 
and Existentialist senses, a focus on the process of (human) reality as ‘dépassement 
perpétuel vers une coïncidence avec soi qui n’est jamais donnée’ (EN: 125-26). This 
highlighted a constant presence in both movements of a necessary ‘hors de soi’ state 
for the individual, primarily through externalisation of the self both from reality and 
from itself, as well as building upon Chapter One’s notion of becoming through the 
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realisation of a constant relationship with the ‘perpetually present’ nature of time, 
and the nature of the present as a constantly filled and self-renewing ‘hole’ in being 
(cf. EN: 182). This in turn began to bring out the relationship between choice and 
individuality, alienation and reality, and their consequences for authenticity and 
ambiguity. Consequently Chapters One and Two initiated the highlighting of Dada 
and Existentialism’s focus on rebellion and alterity.  
Chapter Two engaged in a new reading of Dada films, particularly in respect to 
the layering of interpretive perception and its relation to the philosophy of the self. In 
this way the chapter modifies the existing field by aligning films by multiple artists 
with Existentialist analogies of alienation and reality. This builds upon existing work 
in film and philosophy in a way that comes out of two strands of study. Firstly, it 
draws from the notion of the presence of theory in Dada film, as particularly 
extensively explored by Knowles in her work on Man Ray. While Knowles considers 
the films of Man Ray as part of his œuvre, I have selected two of his films most 
closely chronologically, and, I would argue, thematically, linked to Dada, in order to 
analyse them alongside other Dada-related works.122 Knowles tends to relate Man 
Ray’s film to existing avant-garde theory, including Bürger (Theory of the Avant-
Garde) and Abel (French Film Theory and Criticism, 1907-1939). Chapter Two has 
largely avoided avant-garde film theory in favour of a comparison with an 
independent philosophical movement. The second strand from which this chapter 
emerges is the analysis of film more broadly against an Existentialist methodology, 
                                                 
122 Knowles does not fail to mention the influence of films such as Entr’acte and Ballet mécanique on 
Man Ray’s work, but this remains a passing reference within a work on Man Ray himself. 
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as exemplified by Boulé et al. in Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema, through the 
exploration of contemporary cinema alongside Sartrean and Beauvoirian theory. In 
this way these two texts compare and contrast thematics in terms of narrative 
function, an aspect which is demonstrably absent in Dada film. The chapter takes 
Existentialist thematics and applies them to abstract notion in an analysis of the 
fundamental perception of the cinematic image. My work on selected Dada films 
using a methodology based in the theory of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty therefore takes 
the application of theory to Dada film and the use of Existentialism in the analysis of 
narrative film to provide new work on abstract film through an Existentialist lens. 
Chapter Three expanded the notions of the coexistence of contradictions, and 
the necessity of both alterity and ambiguity, into a deeper interrogation of 
authenticity through an analysis of the use of justice to enforce the idea of a common 
morality. This was done through an assessment of the absurdity of the trials of 
Meursault in Camus’s L’Étranger and Maurice Barrès in Dada’s mock trial of the 
author. This chapter highlighted two explicit indictments of society through these 
Dada and Existentialist critiques of human behaviour. As Chapter Two challenged 
the inherence of perception, so Chapter Three questioned the validity of the ‘natural’ 
authenticity of tradition, narrative, and moral justice. This led to a rejection of 
institutional justice as compatible with Existentialist authenticity, limiting it to 
standard definitions which seek to address the universal over the individual. 
Camus’s presentation of an amoral individual showed us an example, while not 
condoning his behaviour, of an individual who has consistently proven himself to be 
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outside of society. Dada, through its mock trial of Barrès, and particularly through 
the consequent breakdown of the movement, performed a position outside of society. 
Both texts ridicule the notion of ‘fitting in’ as an inauthentic, herd mentality.  
The questions that this interrogation of justice raised complement the issue of 
objectivity that was explored in Chapters One and Five, through their respective 
explorations of individual and universal truth, and the subjective and situational 
nature of the concept of truth. Additionally, Chapter Three’s investigation of two 
literary texts (and events as texts), through its questioning of the validity or existence 
of truth began an inquiry into the limits and boundaries of our notions of fiction that 
would be furthered in Chapter Five. As Stephens notes in his study of Sartre and 
Victor Hugo, ‘[t]he novelist may write the text, but he does not own its meaning, and 
should not feign any absolute truth’ (2011: 112). Furthermore Stephens explicates that 
‘[t]he writer acts as a kind of teacher who asks questions and gives answers, but who 
declines to provide any definitive and therefore illusory response to the issues he 
tackles’ (ibid.: 113). The combined analysis of these two trials has enabled a more 
direct comparison of Dada and Existentialist ethics through a comparable literary 
form, as well as representing an extended appraisal of the Barrès trial as a key event 
in the development of the Dada movement and its philosophy. 
Chapter Three built upon Sanouillet’s short, descriptive historical account of the 
Barrès trial, going into more analytical detail on the moral and philosophical 
substance of the individual sections. Additionally, the comparative analysis 
alongside an Existentialist text is unique not only through the comparison of Dada 
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with Existentialism, but more fundamentally through analysis of the Barrès trial in 
relation to non-Dada literary representations of trials and forays into justice. Through 
this the chapter drew out the philosophical implications of this important yet 
underestimated (and under-examined) Dada event, as well as its wider consequences 
in the history and theory of Dada. 
Chapter Four’s discussion of censorship and freedom revealed that limitations 
can serve as a challenge to the individual to rebel, and that they are condemned to be 
free regardless of their constraints. Through a comparison of a range of Dada 
artefacts with Camus’s La Peste, we were able to explore the notion of the self as 
unwanted other, and the consequent impact on the individual as well as the impetus 
to react. Furthermore this chapter examined the inevitable normalisation of deviance, 
showing not only the need for the existence of rebellion but also the continuing 
importance of its novelty. We discovered that our relationship with the aesthetic of 
shock is ephemeral, or as Arensberg so aptly stated, ‘[l]es vraies œuvres Dada ne 
doivent vivre que six heures’ (in L13: 15). 
The chapter investigated Dada’s need to break with the past, linking this trait 
with Beauvoir’s thoughts on ambiguity, to demonstrate not only that Dada does not 
entirely succeed in relinquishing all ties with the past, but also that this should not 
necessarily be considered a negative aspect. An exploration of this relationship with 
temporality allows for a formation of the becoming self, as well as an incorporation 
of error into one’s sense of place in the world. As Beauvoir points out, leaning on the 
past enables the creation of the new (cf. MA: 36), as well as leaving traces on the new 
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creation. We can consider this a positive effect on the development of the new 
precisely because it responds to Camus’s notion of the rebel as an individual who 
simultaneously says ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. The work of art can reject the past while drawing 
upon its desirable aspects to create a hybrid work that remains new. Additionally, 
these traces are usefully continued into Neo-Dada, which we saw as a version of 
Dada that fully integrated itself into the art world that Dada once opposed (and was 
opposed by) so strongly. This normalisation of the deviant represents a successful 
realisation of Dada’s aim for rebellious freedom. This chapter moved on from current 
analyses of Dada and Neo-Dada relationships with deviance to assess their 
productive relationship with censorship, particularly through Existentialist notions 
of freedom. 
Chapter Five took our discussion of post-(Neo-)Dada into the realm of 
postmodernity, in its exploration of Stoppard’s Travesties. Alongside Sartre’s La 
Nausée, the analysis drew out the importance of accounts and stories of Dada, 
particularly when viewed as a diary, a ‘private’ confession to the self that was 
nevertheless at some point designed to be read. These accounts highlighted both 
Dada’s and Existentialism’s refusal of the authority of objective truth, as seen 
through the deliberate manipulation of the concepts of truth on both sides. This 
destruction of the objectivity of truth draws upon ideas explored earlier in the thesis, 
those of the perception of reality, aesthetic normalcy and beauty, and the creation of 
moral values. All of these lean on the Sartrean notion that ‘l’existence précède 
l’essence, ou, si vous voulez, qu’il faut partir de la subjectivité’ (EH: 26). Across the 
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thesis this has functioned as a springboard for the rejection of pre-made values, as 
seen through the proferring by Beauvoir of an ethics of ambiguity. As she writes, ‘[l]a 
morale, pas plus que la science et l’art, ne fournissent des recettes. On peut proposer 
seulement des méthodes’ (MA: 166). Beauvoir’s promotion of a ‘recipe-free’ morality 
can be given a parallel in a humourous Dada example (which is further satirised in 
Travesties): that of the ‘recipe’ to make a Dada poem. The way in which this recipe is 
presented embodies a parodic representation of an anti-recipe that is yet a method, 
allowing for the creation of unique Dada poems while implicitly critiquing the notion 
of ‘rules’ of the writing of poetry.  
Chapter Five showed probably Dada’s strongest link with theory and 
philosophy through the movement’s relationship with subjectivity, particularly in 
relation to truth. It is notable that this should be brought out through linking the 
earliest Dada accounts with the most contemporary, which showed that the 
movement continues to manipulate its own interpretation, perhaps the ultimate 
proof of subjectivity. As we have seen Tzara state, ‘[o]n observe, on regarde d’un ou 
de plusieurs points de vue, on les choisit parmi les millions qui existent. L’expérience 
est aussi un résultat de l’hazard [sic] et des facultés individuelles' (D3: 2). This 
chapter developed current notions of the historical account by moving beyond the 
content of memoirs and diaries to investigate the ways in which structure and style 
can say more about a movement than the details of events recorded. Additionally, 
the chapter interrogated Stoppard’s relationship with Dada through two of his texts 
in order to push the boundaries of the ‘Dada’ account. 
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The five chapters of this thesis have brought out different ways in which Dada 
can be read with Existentialism, as well as highlighting areas in which they do not 
converge. Dada and Existentialism notably differ methodologically in that 
Existentialism posits the crisis in a philosophical sense, even through its literature, 
whereas Dada stages, or traverses, the problem through its creative action.123 These 
can be considered two facets of the same confrontation of alterity in radical thought. 
We can demonstrate this particularly through comparing Dada works with 
Existentialist literature. Sartre posits the trauma of otherness in Huis Clos, and Camus 
raises issues of the discovery of the unwanted other in La Peste. By contrast, the Dada 
masks creatively engage with staging otherness wrapped around the self, and 
Duchamp’s readymades actively insert the unwanted other into everyday life, 
highlighting its eventual normalisation. Camus presents, in L’Étranger, the individual 
subjected to the judgement of others, and Sartre foregrounds, in La Nausée, the 
individual subjected to the alienating reality of daily existence. However, the Dadas 
literally stage the trial of Barrès and in so doing reveal the absurdity of accusations of 
inauthenticity, and Tzara, through his ‘Zurich Chronicle’, actively and creatively re-
writes the world around him.  
Throughout these works, while the Existentialists are presenting a constant re-
writing of the self, Dada projects this onto a re-writing of the world. While we may 
point out that, chronologically, Dada had already attempted to change the world, 
                                                 
123 Importantly, though, this exemplifies Beauvoir’s desire to provide a method, and not a recipe. 
Indeed, the strongest relation between the two movements is the foregrounding of both ambiguity 
and individuality, something that would be weakened were the two movements argued to be 
methodologically identical. 
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Sartre and Camus later saw the need to first change the self in order to experience the 
world differently. We might argue that Dada’s widely conceived ‘empty’ nature was 
produced because Existentialism was needed to give it a means for interpretation, 
and furthermore that Existentialism is considered meaningless without the practical 
application provided by Dada. 
In addition to the productive combination of Existentialist literature and Dada 
art, the non-literary works of Existentialism have been used in comparison with 
Dada film and events. This has provided an unpacking of theoretical content in Dada 
work and happenings that are often written off as meaningless or nihilistically ludic. 
This continued to strengthen the productive methodological difference between the 
two movements. We saw in Chapter Two that Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical depictions 
of perception and distortion thereof can be applied to Dada films. This additionally 
contributes to the overarching relevance of the non-literary Existentialist texts of 
Sartre and Beauvoir, particularly L’Être et le néant and Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté. 
These central theoretical texts are particularly useful in unpicking Dada accounts and 
manifestos, as such providing a crossover of the expression of the dominant tenets of 
each movement. 
Contribution to the Field and Areas for Further Research 
Recent trends in Dada research have sought to place the movement in its 
theoretical context, contesting the opinion of many that Dada has, and wanted, no 
link(s) to theory or philosophy. We have seen that recent literature has begun to 
consider these implications, principally through theoretically and contextually 
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placing the movement as occupying a position ambiguously situated between the 
Modern and the Postmodern. However, while Huelsenbeck explicitly suggested a 
connection between Dada and Existentialism in his short essay of the same name, the 
invitation for comparison of the two movements has largely been ignored, limited to 
Sheppard’s fleeting references in his account of Dada’s relationship with Modernism 
and Postmodernism (2000: 77; 85; 183; 193). It should be noted that these references 
refer to indexed occurrence of terms: following these references leads to very little 
concrete comparison. The most in depth of these, and the lengthiest (in that it is the 
only complete sentence linking the two), is Sheppard’s claim that ‘[t]he former type 
of Dada [that is, the view that Nature is ‘inherently patternless’] is like a zany version 
of Sartrean existentialism and proclaims the Dada state of mind against a background 
of absurdity and chaos’ (2000: 193; orginal emphasis). Sheppard’s flippant 
description reduces his referencing the two movements to a tangential remark.124  
This thesis therefore represents the first full, book-length study of the 
movements alongside each other. Exploring Dada and Existentialism’s key tenets 
with a heavy focus on their art and literature respectively has led to a thesis that 
prioritises the active expression of theoretical notions, while interrogating such 
themes in and of themselves. The comparison through literature of philosophical 
thinkers is not new, as we have seen through Stephens’ drawing together of Sartrean 
thought with that of Victor Hugo. Equally, Existentialist thought, in a less deeply 
                                                 
124 Sheppard does, however, engage in a detailed account of Huelsenbeck’s general interest in 
Existentialism, in his earlier text ‘Richard Huelsenbeck (1892-1974): Dada and Psychoanalysis’ (in 
Kunisch, Bercham and Link eds 1985: 271-305), although without conducting an analysis of the two 
movements. 
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theoretical respect, has been compared to the art of its time, as shown by Morris’s 
(predominantly historical and aesthetic) account of Existentialism and Post-WWII 
art. What is new, then, about the methodology of this thesis is the analysis of art, 
literature and philosophy in these two movements as temporally separated 
phenomena that nonetheless provide a rich point of comparison. 
The reassessment of the movement alongside theoretical or philosophical 
concepts is a relatively new, yet fundamentally important, development in the field 
of Dada. As we have explored here, Existentialism has proven to have a productively 
wide basis for comparison with Dada, yet because of the confines of this thesis scope 
remains for further work. This thesis has focused on French Existentialism for its 
body of accompanying literature, and has maintained a general focus on 
Francophone Dada. The international nature of Dada gives ample potential for 
combination with other national brands of Existentialism, particularly German, and 
especially in relation to Berlin and Hanover Dada. While German and German-
language Dada have been touched upon in this thesis, my interest both in the 
movement of Dada from Zurich and New York to Paris, as well as its convergence 
there with the Existentialism of Sartre, Beauvoir, Camus and Merleau-Ponty, has 
(productively) limited the present work’s attention to French, or Paris-based, 
Existentialism. In addition to exploration of German-language Dada and 
Existentialism, there remains room for further work on Dada alongside the thinkers 
discussed in this thesis. While it has been essential to perform a thesis-length analysis 
of Dada’s relationship with Existentialism more broadly in order to detail their initial 
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fundamental connections, necessitating attention to several thinkers in a conceptual 
assessment, it will now be necessary to look at each of the four philosophers 
individually, so as to perform a deeper analysis of their separate connections with 
Dada. 
As there is potential for development of work on the crossover of Dada with 
varying versions of Existentialism, so there is space for its association with other lines 
of thought. We saw in reviewing the literature in the field of Dada that the 
movement has been extensively and successfully assessed alongside both 
Modernism and Postmodernism. It would be hugely rewarding to consider Dada 
alongside other ideologies (or ‘isms’), whether these are explicitly philosophical or 
theoretical, or simply other art movements. Furthermore these in turn could be 
assessed alongside a multitude of philosophies and theoretical schools, continuing to 
prove that art and philosophy can (and should be) intrinsically linked.  
For example, Dada is often compared with its historical neighbours, and as such 
those that the movement either actively opposed, or with which it had natural 
affinities or crossovers. Dada is foregrounded as a reaction to a modern(ist) world, 
and as a natural predecessor of Surrealism. It would perhaps be more fruitful to 
compare it with more disparate movements, such as those to which Dada texts make 
passing reference, in obvious yet underexplored influence. We have seen this in the 
‘quoting’ of Descartes in Dada, as well as claims to association with Charlie Chaplin. 
We might ask, what affinity does Dada have with actual Cartesian thought? How 
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does Dada’s persistent referencing of Charlie Chaplin relate to the movement’s 
approach to humour? 
Equally Dada could be compared to other ‘outsider’ movements and 
philosophies. Thematically speaking, we may ask, if Dada is a form of rebellion, what 
similarities and differences does it show with other forms of rebellion, and how does 
this notion of rebellion relate to ideas of revolution? Instructive artistic comparisons 
would include Les Nabis, a pre-Dada movement whose work influenced the 
development of abstract art, and Hyperrealism, a twenty-first century form of work 
that distorts perception to parody notions of reality in a way that could be linked to 
Dada film or photomontage.125 Another twentieth/twenty-first-century example that 
could productively be compared to Dada, especially if also including Neo-Dada, 
would be that of Stuckism, whose claims to be ‘anti-anti-art’ and desire to return to 
modernism invite evaluation, especially considering such declarations as ‘Stuckism is 
the quest for authenticity’ and ‘[w]hat was once a searching and provocative process 
(as Dadaism) has given way to trite cleverness for commercial exploitation’ (Childish 
1999: n.p.). The frequency with which the term ‘authenticity’ occurs in relation to 
cultural products raises an additional point of inquiry for further study: that of 
society’s obsession with the notion of authenticity itself. 
The Authenticity of Ambiguity 
The most important product of my comparison of Dada and Existentialism has 
been the way in which both movements show not only a perpetual striving toward 
                                                 
125 Artistically and etymologically speaking, it would also be instructive to perform a comparison 
between Sur-realism and Hyper-realism. 
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individual authenticity, but also that this authenticity is precisely achieved through 
ambiguity, a constant realisation of the self as becoming, as fluid and non-fixed, but 
expressed through a conviction of the individual’s own values, unpressured by social 
tradition or narratives. These two movements continue to be remembered for their 
challenge to the individual to question, doubt and actively choose their own way of 
living. Choice is individual, reality and truth are subjective, justice is internal, and 
deviance is actively encouraged. Through the desire to realise this state of subjective, 
individual and active choice, an ethic is created in which responsibility for moral 
structures lies with the individual. As Huelsenbeck wrote, ‘[i]n other words, man is 
no longer the product of some conventional morality. […] He is what he is because 
he has become aware of his own value’ (DE: 147). This centrality is highlighted 
constantly by Sartre, who claims not only that ‘il faut que l’homme se trouve lui-
même’ (EH: 77), but also that ‘avant que vous ne viviez, la vie, elle n’est rien, mais 
c’est à vous de lui donner un sens’ (EH: 74). Through this he links responsibility to a 
meaningful relationship with the self and the resulting outlook on life. The 
individual is fundamentally the source of all their values, whether these are values in 
terms of morality, worth, or sense. Moreover, this authenticity does not lead to 
quietism, as critics might expect: as Todd Lavin writes, ‘authentic existence does not 
end in isolated individualism lacking all moral guidance but leads to social 
engagement, with deep moral commitments’ (in Daigle ed. 2006: 53-54). 
Henri Béhar and Michel Carassou wrote on the future of Dada, through its 
simultaneous emphasis on creation and destruction: 
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Création et destruction demeureront toujours indissociables, parce que la vie est ainsi faite, 
constatait Dada. En privilégiant la création, la société sécrète sa ruine. En démolissant, Dada 
soulève un immense élan créateur. Il sera toujours indispensable de détruire pour empêcher la 
création de se figer, de se couper de la vie, d’engendrer la mort. Dada a, semble-t-il, de beaux 
jours devant lui. (2005: 212) 
This co-presence of opposites is one that has been foregrounded throughout the 
thesis, and is, according to Béhar, precisely that which guarantees Dada its future. 
Notably Béhar’s comments have precedent in Ribemont-Dessaignes’s thoughts on 
the creation and destruction in Dada’s core: 
Man is unable to destroy without constructing something other than what he is destroying. 
Consequently, though Dada had the will and the need to destroy every form of art subject to 
dogma, it felt a parallel need of expressing itself. It was necessary to replace submission to 
reality by the creation of a superior reality. (in Motherwell ed. 1989: 102) 
We have seen throughout the chapters of this thesis an aim for the ‘creation of a 
superior reality’, through distortion, nonsense, and a provocation to find individual 
meaning in the ostensively meaningless. Underlining Dada’s fundamentally positive 
outlook, Richter claimed that ‘[n]obody knows what direction art will take, in its 
present chaotically disoriented state. But one thing is sure: a new generation has 
taken up Duchamp’s experiments, with optimism, with conviction, and in the spirit 
of a new artistic humanism’ (AA: 96).  
Richter’s insight into Dada’s afterlife not only re-words (and theoretically pre-
empts) Sartre’s thoughts on painting that we saw in the Introduction to the thesis 
(‘personne ne peut dire ce que sera la peinture de demain’ (EH: 65)), but also 
expresses the fundamental crossover that we have seen between Dada and 
Existentialism, that is, the choices that we make are secondary to the conviction with 
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which we make them. This in turn foregrounds an insistence on the present that is 
related to, but not dependent on, the past and the future or, as Lavin suggests, 
A life of existential moments is one in which each present moment poses itself as one of self-
choice to shape and thus bear responsibility for the situation of our existence, a life that ties both 
past and future together in the present moment. (in Daigle ed. 2006: 61) 
From this we may conclude that Dada and Existentialism (individually, but 
especially in combination) continue to encourage us to interrogate such fundamental 
notions as history (and History), truth and reality, not as an empty highlighting of 
the futility and meaninglessness of the world, but as a reinforcement of the need to 
create our own meaning, in realisation of our most authentic self. 
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Art Works Referenced 
Duchamp, Marcel (Paris, 1913) Roue de bicyclette 
 Bicycle wheel mounted on wooden stool 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/22314157123/marcel-duchamp-
 bicycle-wheel-1964-replica-of  
--- (New York City, 1917) Fountain 
 Signed porcelain urinal 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/19401371394/alfred-stieglitz-marcel-
 duchamp-fountain-1917  
--- (New York City, 1915-1923) La Mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même (Le 
 Grand Verre) 
 Mixed media on glass 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/55958142820/man-ray-reproduction-
 dune-photographie-de-la  
--- (New York City, 1946-1966) Étant donnés 
 Mixed-media installation/sculpture 
 http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_3/Articles/Hoy/etantdon_en.html  
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Farmer, Geoffrey (Vancouver?, 2009-2013) The Surgeon and the Photographer 
 Photomontage with fabric 
 Quotation from gallery guide, Barbican 2013 
 https://www.barbican.org.uk/generic/large-
 images.asp?id=14389&im=16838&af=artgallery  
Höch, Hannah (Hanover, 1916) Dada Puppen [Dada Dolls] 
 Dolls in fabric and beads 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/55869346681/hannah-hoch-1889-
 1978-dada-puppen-1916-1918  
Hausmann, Raoul (Berlin, 1919) Mechanischer Kopf (Der Geist unserer Zeit) [Mechanical 
 Head (Spirit of Our Time)] 
 Wooden hatmaker’s dummy, various mechanical attachments 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/66361789493/raoul-hausmann-
 mechanischer-kopf-tete-mecanique  
Lichtenstein, Roy (New York City, 1961) I Can See the Whole Room…and There’s 
 Nobody in It! 
 Graphite and oil on canvas 
 http://www.lichtensteinfoundation.org/icansee.htm  
Man Ray (Paris, 1920) Portemanteau 
 Photograph, b/w 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/15452152725/man-ray-the-coat-
 stand-le-porte-manteau-1920  
--- (Paris, 1921) Gift 
 Iron with tacks 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/54594088587/man-ray-cadeau-1944-
 paris-centre-pompidou  
--- (Paris, 1923) Indestructible Object (or Object to be Destroyed) 
 Metronome with paper eye 
 http://archives-dada.tumblr.com/post/64466653061/man-ray-indestructible-
 objet-1923-1959  
--- (Paris, 1926) Noire et blanche 
 Pair of photographs, b/w 
 http://www.stedelijkmuseum.nl/en/artwork/18827-noire-et-blanche  
Matisse, Henri (Paris, 1905) La Raie verte 
 Oil on canvas 
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 http://www.smk.dk/en/explore-the-art/highlights/henri-matisse-portrait-
 of-madame-matisse-the-green-line/ 
Munch, Edvard (Oslo?, 1893) Skrik [The Scream] 
 Oil, tempera and pastel on canvas
 http://www.moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/1330  
Picasso, Pablo (Barcelona, 1900) Self Portrait 
 Charcoal on paper 
 http://www.artchive.com/artchive/P/picasso/self2.jpg.html  
Rauschenberg, Robert (Morocco?, 1953) Erased de Kooning Drawing 
 Erased pencil drawing on paper, gilded frame 
 http://www.sfmoma.org/explore/collection/artwork/25846  
Schwitters, Kurt (Hanover, 1919) Merzbild 1A Der Irrenarzt [Merzpicture 1 A The 
 Psychiatrist] 
 Mixed-media collage 
 http://www.museothyssen.org/en/thyssen/zoom_obra/638  
--- (Hanover, 1920/1922) Assemblage on a Hand Mirror 
 Hand mirror, mixed-media collage 
Taeuber, Sophie (Zurich, 1918) König Hirsch [King Stag] Puppets 
 Puppets in wood, metal, fabric, feathers and beads 
--- (Zurich, 1918-1920) Dada-Köpfe 
 Sculptures in turned wood, painted 
--- (Zurich, 1920 and 1926) Self-Portrait with Dada-Kopf 
 Pair of photographs, b/w 
 http://www.wikipaintings.org/en/sophie-taeuber-arp 
